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ABSTRACT
What does it mean to say that something is “temporal” or that something “exists” in time?
What is time? And how should we interpret the “ontology” of time? One important strand in
twentieth century thought and the philosophy of time has given these fundamental questions a
neat and tidy set of influential answers—according to this view, time itself is understood to be a
kind of series, and the basic ontology of time is taken to consist of events, together with either
the  tenses,  which  get  interpreted  as  special  sorts  of  second  order  properties  known  as  “A
properties” (i.e. the properties of being either Past, Present, or Future), or with special sorts of
second order relations, known as “B relations” (i.e. the relations of “earlier than”, “later than”, or
“simultaneous with”) which are typically referred to as tenseless . 
According  to  this  particular  view,  taken  together,  A properties  and  B  relations  are
understood to exhaust the ontology of time. This is an interpretation that has been typically found
throughout  much  of  the  philosophical  literature  on  the  metaphysics  of  time  throughout  the
twentieth century despite the fact that both of these prospective temporal ontologies had already
been shown early on to face a major problem—McTaggart's paradox (1908). According to the
paradox, regardless of whichever ready-made ontology we ultimately opt for, we still are led to
the same ineluctable conclusion—that time is unreal. For the better half of the twentieth century,
philosophers of time, science, and language have struggled with this paradox in different ways,
in various attempts to wrest their own preferred categories of temporal being from its grasp, in
order  to  redeploy  them  in  the  course  of  developing  a  number  of  competing  metaphysical
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accounts of time, which get characterized technically,  as either “A” or “B” theories of time,
depending primarily on whether  their  respective ontology remains either tensed or tenseless.
What has thus emerged over the course of the past century, has been a growing preference among
philosophers  for  interpreting  temporal  ontology along strictly  A theoretical  or  B Theoretical
lines, which has rendered this particular strand of thought a highly influential one with respect to
a large portion of  our contemporary understanding of temporal ontology, which remains one that
ultimately boils down to a choice between A properties or B relations, as evidenced by Broad
(1923), Smart (1963), Prior (1970), Mellor (1985), Oaklander and Smith (1994), Inwagen and
Zimmerman (1998), Smith and Jokic (2003), Sider (2011), Tallant (2013), etc. Further evidence
of this view can also be located not just within both A and B theories of time—which include
both tensed and tenseless theories—but also within theories of  presentism and eternalism, as
well as within recent relationalist and substantivalist accounts of time. 
In  the  dissertation,  it  is  argued  that  a  common  background  assumption  within  these
various accounts of time, perhaps one of the most basic and most wide-spread, turns out to be
fallacious. More precisely, an extended argument is developed against the common and basic
assumption found within these views that it is appropriate to depict time as consisting of either
an A series or a B series in the first place. This metaphysical assumption is referred to as the
“SER  thesis”. The dissertation aims to show that any such serialized interpretation of time fails
to  be sufficiently distinguishable  from what  are  merely formalized  spatial  representations  or
spatializations  of  time,  and  that  when  viewed  from  the  standpoint  of  developing  a  viable
metaphysics of time, any such formalized spatializations ultimately appear to result in something
like a contradiction. Some objections are then raised to this main line of argument, where it is
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further shown, that the most intuitive strategies for replying to it are unsuccessful in the end, and
serve only to supply us with various ways of masking the real problem, since each of these
strategies seem themselves to commit some form of the ignoratio elenchi or red herring fallacies.
In the remaining portions of the book, a revisionary approach to the question of temporal
ontology that seems capable of avoiding some of these problems is briefly sketched out. This
approach employs the resources of a hermeneutic phenomenology of temporality to try and help
us get outside of the standard view that is supplied by the A-B tradition and provide us with an
alternative  starting  point.  This  approach  draws  heavily from the  work  of  McTaggart's  early
twentieth century contemporaries Henri Bergson (1889) and Martin Heidegger (1927).
v
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
“Basic concepts determine the way in which
we get  an understanding beforehand of the
area  of  subject-matter  underlying  all  the
objects a science takes as its theme, and all
positive  investigation  is  guided  by  this
understanding.” – Martin Heidegger,  Being
and Time (1927) H10.
This work has grown largely out of an attempt to advance three major research projects
which have captivated my attention for some time, all of which happen to share the metaphysics
of time as their common theme. The first of these, has been the search for a strong critique of the
hundred year old, yet still widely influential, A-B tradition1 that can be found within the twentieth
century philosophy of time, which treats time as little more than a series of discretely ordered
events, and which, from my first encounter with it has always struck me, however indefinitely, as
in some way inadequate as a viable metaphysics and a wrong-headed approach to the question of
time. The second undertaking, has involved a concern with trying to more demonstrate what I
perceive to be the continued relevance of Henri Bergson's insightful admonitions against  the
common  tendency  among  philosophers,  scientists,  and  common  folks  alike  to  unwittingly
“spatialize” time—that is, to either identify it with or reduce it to a species of space—whenever
they  undertake  attempts  to  explicitly  conceptualize,  theorize,  and  talk  about  it  intelligibly.2
1 This is how it will be referred to here throughout what is to follow, a tradition which arose out of a particular
problematic that was first identified by J.M.E. McTaggart, whose members are taken here to include A Theorists
(e.g. presentists, maximalists, and growing blockers; like C.D. Broad, Arthur Prior, William Lane Craig, Quentin
Smith, and Dean Zimmerman, etc.) and B Theorists (e.g. eternalists and their ilk; such as J. J.C. Smart, Hugh
Mellor, Robin LePoidevin, and Nathan Oaklander, etc.).
2 Among A theorist and B theorist philosophers of time who can be seen maintain the reasonable assumption that
“time is not to be thought of as identical with or reducible to space”, most fail to be fully explicit on this point,
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Finally, the last of these projects, which has held my interest for around the past decade or so and
is  perhaps  the  most  ambitious  of  the  three,  has  been to  further  develop Martin  Heidegger's
unfinished project in Part Two of his groundbreaking work  Being and Time, namely, towards
developing the proposed phenomenological destruction [Destruktion] of the history of ontology.
A history  of  ontology,  which  according  to  Heidegger,  has  molded  and  shaped  our  current
understanding  of  being,  and  which  arises  out  of  (and  is  made  possible  by)  a  primordial
understanding  of  Temporality  [Temporalitӓt].  In  Being  and  Time,  Heidegger  comes  to
characterize  the  philosopher’s  task  as  one  of  the  “Destruktion” of  traditional  ontological
concepts, writing: 
“When tradition becomes master, it  does so in such a way that what it  'transmits' is made so  
inaccessible, proximally and for the most part, that it rather becomes concealed. Tradition takes 
what has come down to us and delivers it over to self-evidence; it blocks our access to those  
primordial 'sources' from which the categories and concepts handed down to us have been in part 
quite genuinely drawn...If the question of Being is to have its own history made transparent, then 
this hardened tradition must be loosened up, and the concealments which it has brought about  
must be dissolved. We understand this task as one in which by taking the question of being as our 
clue [sic], we are to destroy [sic] the traditional content of ancient ontology until we arrive at those
primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways of determining the nature of Being—
the ways which have guided us ever since.” Being and Time, (1927) H21.
In what follows, it will be argued, among other things, that a major reason3 why this second
portion of Heidegger's magnum opus went unfinished, and eventually came to be almost entirely
abandoned by him in the end, was due in large part to his failure to sufficiently integrate the
previous insights of the early twentieth century French philosopher Henri Bergson regarding
spatialized formalizations time (penetrating insights with which Heidegger himself happened to
be very well  acquainted),  into his  own original account of the nature of temporality.  This is
something which Heidegger himself seems, over the course of his philosophical career, to have
and simply assume it as a given right from the get to. There are however, others who have remained thorough
enough to provide some remark to the effect that time and space are to be thought of as somehow separate, for
example, Nathan Oaklander, Hugh Mellor, and Quentin Smith, to name a few.
3 And perhaps the major reason.
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eventually begun to realize, and seems to have become increasingly aware of. Later in life, in the
Winter of 1941, and a full decade after having written the extant portions of  Being and Time,
Heidegger's thought appears to undergo something of a rediscovery of its Bergsonian roots, when
he states: 
“The modern habit of thinking time together with 'space' (already prefigured in the beginning of 
metaphysics  with  Aristotle)  leads  us  astray.  For  according  to  this  way  of  thinking  time  is  
considered solely in terms of its  extension, and this as a counting up of fleeting now-points.  
Thought in modern terms, time is a parameter, like space, a standard scale according to which  
something is measured and estimated. Space and time are essentially related to 'calculation'.”  
(Martin Heidegger, Basic Concepts, 103). 
It is worth noting that this line of criticism has received surprisingly little attention in the
philosophical literature by Heideggerian scholars. This may have had a lot to do with the fact that
in  his  own writing,  Heidegger  had made repeated  and explicit  attempts  to  try  and  distance
himself from Bergson in  Being and Time, as well as elsewhere. Epigonism, however, makes a
poor substitute for critical reflection, and this traditional tendency to neglect the possibility of
turning the tables on Heidegger by placing his own account of time under the critical gaze of his
predecessor Bergson, is something that would have only been further exacerbated by the rise of
Sartrean existentialism on the continent following World War II, during which time the work of
Bergson (justifiably or not) came to be grouped along with that of the old guard, and quickly
began to  fall  out  of  favor  amongst  the  latest  generation  of  postwar French intellectuals  (an
historical occurrence, which by itself is immersed in irony, since Sartre, like Heidegger before
him, was also intimately familiar with (and an early admirer of) Bergson's philosophical writings
on the nature of time; and the numerous parallels that can be drawn between the major ideas of
these thinkers, and those of their French predecessor abound. This can be seen by comparing the
many common themes  appearing  throughout  Bergson's  Time and Freewill,  with  Heidegger's
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Being and Time and Sartre's Being and Nothingness. More recently, this established practice of
disregarding  Bergson's  original  contributions  to  the  development  of  a  viable  and  working
understanding of the nature of time, has continued to remain fashionable among even the latest
generation of philosophers, and appears to have only be further strengthened by a growing trend
in philosophy to focus more and more attention on corpuscentric topics, like those concerned
with issues of “embodiment”, etc. 
One of the central aims of this work is to suggest that among the “basic concepts” which
form and underlie this important strand of twentieth century metaphysics referred to here as the
“A-B tradition”, and which have guided a substantial amount of philosophical research on the
subject since at least the early part of the twentieth century4, not only are some of these basic
concepts incoherent and other ones groundless, but they are all of them intimately bound up with
the  tacit  (yet  problematic)  assumption  that  time is  either  identifiable  with  or  reducible  to  a
species of geometrical5 space6. 
4 Though incidentally, the roots of this tradition go back much further, and can be traced at least as far back as
Aristotle, in his Categories and his Physics IV.
5 For  simplicity's  sake,  “geometrical”  can  just  be  taken  here  to  mean “one-dimensional”,  which  is  the  most
commonly encountered way that spatialized time shows up in most contexts; e.g. as in the basic case of a “time-
line”, etc. However, we have still chosen to include the term “geometrical”  here because it is much broader, and
the critique that follows is intended to extend to (and include) the possibility of much more complex “non-linear”
hypostatizations of time as well. And that is simply because any such possible accounts would merely be the
more exotic cousins of the more humdrum and more commonly encountered one-dimensional variety we are
already so familiar with, and so would remain essentially, and at base, bona fide “spatializations” of time. At the
risk of beginning to run too far afield here, it is also worth noting that in contemporary metaphysical theories
such as “four-dimensionalism”, and in the physical scientific theories of Alfred Einstein's general and special
theories of relativity, what shows up there in essence is, just your typical one-dimensional account of time that
has simply been conceptually wedded to the other three classical dimensions of space. We add this here only as a
minor bit of clarification at this point, since there are some philosophers, such as Dostal (2006) etc., who are
wont to speak at times as if time itself were in some way “three-dimensional”; but just what those who speak this
way can be taken to mean by this—since even in our non-classical physical and metaphysical theories, time is
still treated as consisting of only one dimension—remains rather mysterious and obfuscated.  
6 Something which—curiously (and expediently) enough—rarely, if ever, comes to be viewed in such contexts as
in any way problematic in its own right. An observation which showcases the continued relevance of Bergson's
insightful criticism of philosophers, scientists, as well as common folks, that frequently, all that they are really
talking about or “have in mind” when they take themselves to be speaking or thinking about “time”, is actually
“nothing but space” (Bergson, Time and Free Will (1889) xix, 91). An crucial insight which, unfortunately for the
current state of our metaphysics, has somehow fallen away, and has gone almost entirely unheeded for more than
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In keeping with some of the previous insights originally brought forth by Henri Bergson,
who was writing  around the  same time that  the  A-B tradition began establishing itself  as  a
prevalent influence in the philosophy of time, the arguments here endeavor to show that this
particular view of temporal ontology is deeply problematic from both an epistemological and
metaphysical  standpoint.7 This typical  way of understanding the ontology of time continues,
however, to influence and inform much of our metaphysical research and investigation into the
nature of time from the very outset. So that as a result, the range of possibilities left open to those
trying to  answer  a  fundamental  metaphysical  question,  like  “What  is  time?”,  ends  up being
severely restricted from the very start,  and finding itself confined to the same old sanctioned
approaches that have been endorsed by the A and B theories of time, each of which carries with
them their own perennial problems and paradoxes that arise from within the narrow frameworks
in which they continually operate. What is contended here, is that whether designedly or not,
contemporary approaches to the question of time that continue to operate within this typical and
widely  influential  view8,  repeatedly  answer  the  question  “What  is  time?”  by  means  of  an
unwarranted (and for the most part unnoticed) identification or reduction of time with (or to),
space.9 
This persistent habit on the part of A-B tradition within contemporary metaphysics of
conflating time with space,  and the  hypostatization of  time which subsequently results  (e.g.
“Time consists of a linear sequence of events”, or “Time is just a series of nows”, etc.), far from
affording  us  any genuine,  comprehensive,  or  accurate  understanding  as  to  the  metaphysical
a century now.
7 That is, it can be shown in some way to be both epistemologically unjustified and ontologically inadequate.  
8 A view which, as will be shown here, includes traditional tensed accounts of time, in addition to tenseless ones.   
9 Specifically, with (or to) some version of what McTaggart referred to as the spatial “C Series”, and which he
himself  identified as  the  basis  for  both of  the  more “temporal”  (tenseless)  B Series  and (tensed) A Series.
McTaggart, The Nature of Existence. Volume II. (1927) 213.
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nature of time, reveal themselves simply to be the artifacts of an historically situated attempt to
ontologize temporal phenomena in such a way that  time itself becomes rendered more amenable
to our “enlightened” theoretical attitudes of empirical observation and “rational” judgment—they
are  the  inherited  result  of  an  historical  attempt  to  construe  time  in  a  way that  is  the  most
conducive to the narrowly defined and technically oriented ends of operationalist thinking, and
of the natural sciences in general. The outcome of all this, is that the basic metaphysical and
ontological understanding of the nature of time that such A-B theories afford us with, is one
which has been left grotesquely one-sided, dreadfully inadequate, and horribly distorted. 
By calling into question this particular conception of time that has remained for the most
part the standard view among metaphysical depictions of temporality for the better half of the
twentieth century (and which continues to exert an strong influence especially over mainstream
“analytic” interpretations of the subject matter10) by radically undermining its basic concepts and
demonstrating its primary background assumptions to be fundamentally incoherent, the hope is
to reorient contemporary philosophical attention away from what a close examination of the
history of twentieth century metaphysics suggests has been an over-extended preoccupation with
a  degenerating  research  program.  With  the  publication  in  1908 of  J.M.E.  McTaggart's  “The
Unreality of Time”, this particular research program in metaphysics seems to have degenerated
to full scale crisis levels, but for reasons which are to be brought to light, standard philosophical
inquiry on the subject matter since then, has largely failed to properly countenance and fully
appreciate  the  crisis;11 but  has  instead  remained contented  with,  and firmly indebted  to,  the
10 It is suggested here however, that this initial qualification might also be lifted, so as to also include many other
academic interpretations of time that extend far beyond the confines of “analytic philosophy”, to include some of
our most common sense notions of time involved in both our “chronometric” and “chronological” understanding
of clocks, calendars, and similar instances of “time-reckoning”, etc.
11 The continual failure of the A-B tradition to properly acknowledge itself as having reached a full-scale crisis,
seems to have historically occurred because of it has consistently mistaken the mere validity of one of its most
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standard A-B interpretation, and has continued to operate exclusively within it. Given a proper
appreciation of the crisis  facing the A-B tradition,  it  is averred here that in place of normal
inquiry conducted along lines that have already been laid out in advance by the typical and
received  way  of  doing  things12,  a  more  productive  focus  of  philosophical  attention  at  this
juncture would instead, be one that proceeds “hermeneutically”, and which attempts to introduce
and develop an alternative interpretation of the phenomenology and ontology of time that does
not carry with it this growing demand that the same old (problematic) assumptions be in place
before any “serious” work on metaphysical issues surrounding time can even begin. To clarify as
to what is meant by the term “hermeneutically” here, is to say in a manner that is concistent with
and characteristic of what Richard Rorty, in his Philosophy and The Mirror of Nature (1979), has
dubbed “abnormal” discourse. There, Rorty points out:
[What] is necessary is the edifying invocation of the fact or possibility of abnormal discourses,  
undermining our reliance upon the knowledge we have gained through normal discourses. The  
objectionable self-confidence in question is simply the tendency of normal discourse to block the 
flow of conversation by presenting itself as offering the canonical vocabulary for discussion of a 
given  topic—and,  more  particularly,  the  tendency  of  normal  epistemologically  centered  
philosophy to block the road by putting itself forward as the final commemorating vocabulary for 
all possible rational discourse. (PMN 386). 
Given our concerns here and speaking in a similar “Rortyan” vein, it might then be said that to
conflate and confound time with space, as has typically been done within a substantial portion of
contemporary analytic metaphysics of time, results in an extremely narrow and impoverished
understanding of how we actually relate to time, giving rise to a one-sided understanding that
serves to cover up and disguise any of the other significant ways that time not only can, but most
often does, show up for (and end up mattering to) us. One need take only cursory glance at the
extant philosophical literature on the “phenomenology” of A-B time, for some clear evidence of
central arguments (viz., the tensed-tenseless dilemma) for its soundness.
12 Cf. n1.
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this at work.13  
By proceeding hermeneutically in this way, it will then be possible to supply ourselves
with not only a strong critique of the established A-B framework, but also with perhaps initiating
a long overdue revision of the much older Aristotelian tradition, and its long favored answer to
the fundamental metaphysical question “What is time?”. In the final portions of the dissertation,
a positive account of one such revisionary approach to the question of time is sketched out, and
one that  can be seen to  have already taken some significant  steps  beyond the standard A-B
metaphysical tradition and its preoccupation with the usual sorts of  puzzles involving “time”,
which draws on the pioneering work of two of McTaggart's early twentieth century continental
contemporaries, Bergson and Heidegger.  
13 See, for example, The New Theory of Time. Nathan Oaklander and Quentin Smith. Yale UP (1994).
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CHAPTER 2
A-B THEORIES OF TIME 
§2.1
MCTAGGART'S PARADOX AND THE TENSED-TENSELESS DISTINCTION 
The early twentieth century metaphysical philosopher J.M.E. McTaggart is perhaps best
known for his work in the philosophy of time, and for introducing a paradox14 which he took to
demonstrate the unreality of time.  McTaggart's argument for the unreality of time has had an
enormous influence on the fields of metaphysics and the philosophy of language, but its effects
can  also  be  seen  to  extend  beyond  these  fields  to  several  other  areas  of  contemporary
philosophical  research.15 Less  well  known,  however,  is  that  McTaggart's  most  widely  cited
version of the argument, is only one of three versions that he had developed over the course of
his philosophical career. It is McTaggart's second version of this argument, which appeared in
1908 in the journal  Mind, that has become the most widely read of the three, and this is the
version that we will primarily be concerned with here. McTaggart's first attempt at providing an
argument  that  establishes  the  unreality  of  time  can  be  found  in  his  1896  book  Studies  in
Hegelian Dialectic.  His third and final attempt, which very closely resembles his second one,
appeared in volume II of his The Nature of Existence, and was posthumously published by C.D.
Broad in 1927. This often overlooked fact that McTaggart continued work on and rework his
14 Which will  be shown to be a prominent  anomaly (interpreted in the Kuhnian sense of 'a  puzzle which has
resisted solution') that happens to reside at the very heart of the traditional philosophical understanding of time in
the West, and to have precipitated a heretofore unrecognized crisis within traditional metaphysical treatments of
time. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Thomas Kuhn (1962) 64. 
15 L. Nathan Oaklander and Professor Quentin Smith, The New Theory of Time (Yale University Press, 1994), 1–13.
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argument for the unreality of time over the course of his life is suggestive of the importance that
its conclusion held for the rest of the body of his philosophical work; a point which would not
have been lost to him, being the  systematic philosopher that he was.  
McTaggart's  overall  argument for the unreality of time can be seen to consist  of two
major  parts.  The first  of these is  the claim that  the reality of time requires the existence of
something  he  called  the  “A Series”.   McTaggart  argues  that  only the  A Series  can  support
anything like genuine “change”.16  McTaggart defines the A Series as “...the series of positions
[in time] running from the far past through the near past to the present, and then from the present
to the near future and the far future ...”.17 This is a conception of time that he contrasts with what
he  refers  to  as  the  “B Series”:  “the  series  of  positions  which  runs  from earlier  to  later.” 18
McTaggart then argues that the only way for an event to undergo a genuine change is by means
of  possessing  the  A properties  of  the  “Past”,  “Present”,  or  “Future”,  which  are  taken to  be
mutually exclusive determinations.19 Commenting on this point he writes,
Now what characteristics of an event are there which can change and yet leave
the event the same event? (I use the characteristic [sic] as a general term to
include both the qualities which the event possesses, and the relations of which
it is a term—or rather the fact that the event is a term of these relations.) It
seems to me that there is only one class of such characteristics—namely, the
determination of the event in question by the terms of the A series.20
And in coming to this conclusion he further adds,
We seem to be forced to the conclusion that all change is only a change of the
characteristics  imparted to events  by their  presence in  the A series,  whether
those characteristics are qualities or relations.21 
16 McTaggart, “The Unreality of Time”, 459. 
17 Ibid., 458. 
18 Ibid., 458. 
19 It  is  precisely  this  characteristic,  the  mutual  exclusivity  of  A properties,  that  McTaggart  seizes  upon  to
demonstrate the contradictory nature of the A  Series in the second part of his overall argument for the unreality
of time. Ibid., 468.
20 Ibid., 460.
21 Ibid., 460.
10
The second part of McTaggart's overall argument for the unreality of time was to claim that the A
Series leads to a contradiction22, which together with major claim of part one, seems to imply
that time must therefore be unreal.23 It is also perhaps fairly clear why McTaggart came to view
the B Series, a Series which lacks such A properties as Past, Present, and Future, as falling short
with regard to its suitability as a properly temporal Series. This is because within a B Series there
would be no “change”, or as McTaggart himself puts it “Without the A series then, there would
be no change,  and consequently the  B series  by itself  is  not  sufficient  for  time,  since  time
involves change.”24 
The bifurcated nature of McTaggart's overall argument for the unreality of time into these
two main parts, which first demonstrates the B Series to be problematic (on account of the fact
that it cannot account for genuine change), and then the A Series to be equally problematic (since
the very things which allows for  it  to  be a real  contender  as an accurate  description of the
metaphysics of time, i.e. its A properties, also lead it to a contradiction), has set the stage for
myriad subsequent A theoretical and B theoretical responses to this general way of framing the
metaphysics and ontology of time. Over the course of the twentieth century, and well into the
early portions of the twenty-first century, among the perennial issues that continue to crop up
22 Or is, at best, to a claim that turns out to be viciously circular. McTaggart, “The Unreality of Time” (1908) The
Monist.  468.  A problem which  stems  from the  fact  that  the  A properties  of  Past,  Present  and  Future  are
incompatible, yet every event must still have them all. 
23 McTaggart, “The Unreality of Time,” 458. McTaggart's basic depiction of time as just a “series of moments” is
suggestive of other interesting issues found within the epistemology and metaphysics of time, such as whether
there can ever be such a thing as time without change, see for example,  Shoemaker, Sydney. “Time Without
Change”. The Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 66, no.12 (Jun. 19, 1969), pp. 363-381; and of whether time should be
thought  of  as  something  that  can  exist  independently  of  its  contents  (events),  as  in  the  case  of  temporal
absolutism or substantivalism (e.g.  in  Duns Scotus,  Isaac  Newton,  etc.),  or  whether  it  is  something that  is
dependent upon those contents for its own existence, as in the case of temporal relationalism (e.g. in Aristotle,
Gottfried Leibniz, etc.). McTaggart himself can be seen to weigh in on some of these issues. For example, with
respect to the first of these issues, he writes “A universe in which nothing changed (including the thoughts of the
conscious beings in it) would be a timeless universe.” Ibid., 459.
24 Ibid., 461.
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among the countless contemporary metaphysical debates involving time, is the basic issue of
whether time itself is either tensed or tenseless, a seemingly crucial metaphysical issue which
McTaggart had clearly elucidated with the identification and distinction between the A Series and
the B Series. The fundamental question of whether time is either tensed or tenseless has served as
the  basic  entry  point  for  attempts  to  resolve,  not  just  the  metaphysical  puzzles  that  are
characteristic of avowedly A or B theoretical treatments of time, but also, for others that happen
to arise within the popular metaphysical doctrines of presentism and eternalism, endurantism and
perdurantism (i.e.  persistence  and identity),  and determinism and freewill,  etc.25 As a  result,
much of what has taken place within contemporary metaphysical debates over the course of the
twentieth century can be seen to have been framed and guided from the outset by what might be
referred to as the  “tensed-tenseless dilemma”, which typically goes something like this: “If the
metaphysics of time is A theoretical in nature, then the ontology of time is tensed, but if the
metaphysics of time turns out to be B theoretical, then the ontology of time is tenseless. Time is
either A theoretical or B theoretical (i.e. it consists of either something like the A or something
like the B Series).26 Therefore, the ontology of time is either tensed or tenseless.” 
This fundamental dilemma has served as a sort of de facto paradigm27 for much of what
constitutes our typical way of conducting metaphysical research into the nature of time. And its
25 Incidentally, it is also worth noting, that many, if not most, of the well-respected contemporary introductions to
the  field  of  metaphysics,  tend  to  begin  with  an  initial  discussion  of  “time”,  before  anything else.  See,  for
example, Peter Van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman's Metaphysics: The Big Questions (2004).
26 This  is  what  will  be referred to  here as “the SER thesis”,  a  metaphysical  thesis that  has been assumed by
McTaggart and the rest of the A-B tradition, whereby “time” gets understood to be a kind of serialized linear
order. 
27 The use of the term “paradigm” here, happens to function in both the broad and narrow senses of the term. Broad
in the sense of understanding a 'metaphysical paradigm' to be a package of ideas and methods, which when
combined, make up both a view of the world and a way of doing metaphysics (as in the case of the T v L
dilemma  taken  as  a  whole);  and  narrow,  in  the  sense  of  understanding  the  tensed-tenseless  distinction  to
constitute a specific achievement, exemplar, or model in the eyes of the tradition, and one which has served as a
source of inspiration to others, and continues to suggest a way to investigate time, ontology, and the world.
Theory and Reality. Godfrey-Smith (2003). 77.
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conclusion, the tensed-tenseless distinction, has served for over the past hundred years as a basic
ontological thesis that has been held to provide some deep insight into the essential nature of
time and reality, and has provided the basis (and entry way) for a significant portion of twentieth
century  metaphysical  investigations  into  the  nature (and  puzzles)  of  time.  To  this  day,  the
distinction  still  remains  a  basic  concept  and  perhaps  one  of  the  most  commonly  employed
starting points among our contemporary metaphysical accounts of time,28 and is largely unrivaled
as the paradigmatic way of interpreting and fleshing out the ontology of time.29
§2.2
TWENTIETH CENTURY A-B FORMALIZATIONS OF TIME AS MODELED ON  A
LINEAR CONCEPTION OF SPACE 
The basic idea that time is not identifiable with (or reducible to) space, and that time is
not to be thought of as a kind of space, but rather, as something altogether different in kind, is a
fairly uncontentious claim historically speaking (despite still being perhaps a little vague), and is
something that has been more or less assumed throughout much of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries within the philosophy of time.30 The contradictory of this common idea would then be
attributable to any view which could be shown to have interpreted time as if it were ultimately
(deep down and at base) just some variant of space. That is, to put the matter more generally, the
28 As evidenced  by numerous  articles  appearing in  Time,  Tense,  and  Reference (2003)  Smith  and  Jokic  eds.;
Metaphysics: The Big Questions (2004) Van Inwagen and Zimmerman. Eds.;  The New Theory of Time (1994)
Oaklander and Smith eds.; The Philosophy of Time (1993) LePoidevin and MacBeath, eds., as well as elsewhere. 
29 For overwhelming evidence of this, see Nathan Oaklander's massive  multi-volume anthology, which includes
many of the best and most influential writings (both historically and contemporarily, speaking) to have had a
lasting influence on the field of metaphysics with particular respect to our understanding of time. The Philosophy
of Time. Volumes I-IV. Nathan Oaklander  ed. Routledge, (2008).
30 For evidence of this assumption at  work within the tradition (on  both sides of  the A-B debate),  see:  Henri
Bergson. Time and Free Will (1889); J.M.E. McTaggart. The Nature of Existence, Vol. II. (1927); Hugh Mellor.
Real Time (1981);  Robin LePoidevin and Murray MacBeath.  The Philosophy of Time (1993);  Graham Priest.
Logic: A Very Short Introduction (2000); Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic, Time, Tense, and Reference (2003);
Nathan Oaklander. The Ontology of Time (2004); Jonathan Tallant. Metaphysics: An Introduction (2013). 
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basic  claim  underpinning  the  call  for  metaphysical  treatments  of  time  to  remain  “non-
spatialized” is the view that it is in some way fallacious to answer the question “What is time?”
with any sort of answer that would entail, either explicitly or implicitly, that “time is like space”;
a view which entails the specific claim that it is somehow erroneous to depict time as a species of
space.  One  prominent  reason for  asserting  the  need  for  non-spatialized  conceptions  of  time
would  be  the  claim,  made by Henri  Bergson31 and others, that  no account  of  “time” which
utilizes what is essentially just a spatial vocabulary or ontology is properly equipped to provide
us with an exhaustive (let alone accurate) account of the metaphysics of time.
It should also be pointed out here, that in the hands of many of those who have worked
throughout the twentieth century within the A-B metaphysical tradition, space itself is taken, for
the  most  part,  to  be  relatively  unproblematic  and  fairly  well  understood;  so  that  the  real
“mystery” is taken to reside with time and temporality—though this is merely something that
gets assumed from the outset without much of anything in the way of actual argumentation to
further  back  it  up.  But  given  that  one  of  the  main  objectives  here  in  the  dissertation  is  to
undermine confidence in the A-B tradition, and in order to keep our target clearly in focus, not
much  will  be  discussed  here  about  “space”  beyond  what  the  practitioners  of  this  particular
tradition have already assumed. However, this should not be taken as an endorsement of the
typical  view  that  time  is  the  only  (or  even  the  primary)  thing  amongst  the  two,  that  is
“problematic” or “mysterious”, or worthy of sustained metaphysical investigation.
Given this historical tendency within the metaphysical tradition of seeking to preserve the
basic idea that time is to be kept in some sense separate from—and not to be thought of as either
31 Henri Bergson.  Essai sur les Données Immédiates de la Conscience (1889).  Time and Free Will.  Trans. F.L.
Pogson. (1913)
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identifiable with (or reducible to)—space; an important question then arises, as to whether our
traditional A theoretical and B theoretical formalizations of time do precisely what they claim
they are not doing, by tacitly committing themselves to the spatialization of time. This would be
a problem, since this would then appear to render all of these A theoretical and B theoretical
accounts of “time” contradictory, and to culminate in a reductio ad absurdem, by attempting to
maintain simultaneously “Both that time is, and is not, identifiable with (or reducible to) space;
that is, that time both is, and is not, a kind of space.” In what follows,  reasons and evidence are
put forth that suggest that this is indeed the case. 
In  order  to  more  clearly  see  this,  we  must  introduce  one  last  Series  that  has  been
frequently  overlooked  by  commentators  and  those  working  in  the  A-B  tradition,  which
McTaggart  refers  to it  as the “C Series”.32  The C Series had first  appeared in McTaggart's
seminal article from 1908, and he ended up discussing it at greater length and in much more
detail in the second volume of The Nature of Existence. What is needed, according to McTaggart,
in order for a Series to be considered properly “temporal”, are two things taken in conjunction;
“change” and “directionality” within the Series. Firstly, and as we have already seen, the Series
in question must be able to support “genuine change”, as McTaggart writes:
...this other series—let us call it the C series—is not temporal, for it involves not
change, but only an order. Events have an order. They are, let us say, in the order
M, N, O, P. And they are therefore not in the order M, O, N, P, or O, N, M, P, or
in any other possible order. But that they have this order no more implies that
there is any change than the order of the letters of the alphabet, or the Peers on
the Parliament Roll, implies any change. And thus those realities which appear to
us as  events  might form such a series  without being entitled to the name of
events, since that name is only given to realities which are in a time series.33
The second thing that  is  needed in order  for  a  Series  to  be  considered properly “temporal”
32 McTaggart, “The Unreality of Time”, 461–2; J.M.E. McTaggart. The Nature of Existence, Vol. II. (1927)
33 McTaggart, “The Unreality of Time”, 461–2.
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according  to  McTaggart,  is  “directionality”  within  the  Series.34 To  emphasize  this  point  he
provides the following example:
A  non-temporal  series,  then,  has  no  direction  in  itself,  though  a  person
considering it may take the terms in one direction or another, according to this
own convenience and in the same way a person who contemplates a time-order
may contemplate it in either direction.35 
Having argued for the necessity of genuine change and directionality for any temporal Series,
McTaggart then sums up his account of the temporality of time by asserting that:
Therefore, besides the C series and the fact of change there must be given—in
order to get time—the fact that the change is in one direction and not in the
other.36 
The point of dredging up the third, relatively obscure, and often neglected McTaggartean Series,
is simply to point out the noticeable way in which the other two much more renowned and
familiar Series'  that have been taken as candidates for time, can be seen to arise out of, and
crucially depend on, McTaggart's third Series. Yet it is this third Series, the C Series, which is
arguably  the  most  primordial  amongst  the  three  as  it  is  simply  a  straightforward  idea  of
characterizing time as essentially a linear “order”.37 
34 It should be pointed out that McTaggart also came to fault the B Series as not being sufficiently temporal because
of its having to derive its own directionality from the A Series and its A determinations. He states: “The B Series,
however, cannot exist except as temporal (read: as requiring some reference to A determinations), since earlier
and later, which are the distinctions of which it consists, are clearly time-determinations. So it follows that there
can be no B series where there is no A series, since where there is no A series there is no time.” Ibid., 461.
35 McTaggart, “The Unreality of Time,” 462–3.
36 Ibid., 463. McTaggart then later considers, and rejects, multiple efforts to demonstrate that the B Series taken by
itself is somehow an appropriate and sufficient candidate for time. He considers the following question, “Could
we say that, in a time which formed a B series but not an A series, the change consisted in the fact that an event
ceased to be an event, while another event began to be an event? If this were the case, we should certainly have
got a change.” He concludes however, after offering multiple demonstrations of how such an account might
plausibly go, that any such account would in fact be  impossible, stemming from the basic reason that “An event
can never cease to be an event.” McTaggart writes, “But this is impossible. An event can never cease to be an
event. It can never get out of any time series in which it once is. [...] That is, it will always be, and has always
been, an event, and cannot cease to be an event.” Ibid., 459.
37 Near the end of the second volume of  The Nature of Existence, McTaggart struggles to explain the nature of the
relations of the C Series, writing: “What are the relations in the C series which appear in the B series as “earlier”
and “later”? They  must be transitive and asymmetrical relations, since “earlier” an “later” are so, and they must
be such as to make the terms of the C series into a series of one dimension.” In an effort to come up with an
acceptable answer to this fundamental question,  McTaggart ends up embarking on a lengthy discussion in The
Nature of Existence which spans numerous pages and chapters, and at one point even comes to involve a direct
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In the case of the B Series presupposing (and being based on) the C Series, this claim is
not as controversial as the similar claim that is also being made in the course of explicating the
reductio that pertains to the A theoretical accounts. This is mostly due to the fact that, ever since
McTaggart made his own assertions in support of the view, practitioners within the A-B tradition
have likewise followed suit by assuming that the A Series can purportedly do a better job than its
B  theoretical  counterpart  at  being  able  to  successfully  account  for  the  kinds  of  properly
“temporal” phenomena that any ideal theory of time that is worth its salt should reasonably be
expected to explain, for instance, the phenomena of genuine “change”.38 But even if this were to
be put to the side, what is important to recall is McTaggart's own admission, the A Series and B
Series are essentially just different versions the primordial C Series (i.e. an ordered series) with
just  a  few  additional  properties  added  on,  viz.,  change  in  the  case  of  the  A Series,  and
directionality in the case of the B Series39.  The truth behind this assertion,  that the B Series
presupposes (and is based on) the C Series, can be made even more salient, by taking a closer
look  at  B  theoretical  ontology (which  is  tenseless), and  how it  functions  and  comes  to  be
interpreted at the hands of the tradition; a project which is taken up in subsequent chapters of this
dissertation.  
With respect to the seemingly more controversial thesis that the A Series presupposes (i.e.
is based on), the C Series, a separate and brief argument can be supplied to aid in the recognition
of its truth. Since the A Series possesses the properties of both change and directionality, it is
appeal  to  the Hegelian  dialectic  to  help sort  out  the problem. What's  being suggested  and  argued for  here
however, is that the C Series relations that appear in the B Series as “earlier than” and “later than” etc., are
simply the corresponding “spatial” relations of “to the left of” and “to the right of” etc. used to describe point-
like objects (moments,  events,  etc.) that  have been juxtaposed along the collinear path of an idealized one-
dimensional line.
38 Once more, as McTaggart writes, “A universe in which nothing changed (including the thoughts of the conscious
beings in it) would be a timeless universe.” “The Unreality of Time,” (1908) 459. 
39 McTaggart, Ibid., 462; 463.
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therefore sufficient for the B Series (directionality). Or conversely, as B theorists such as Hugh
Mellor and others have long put it, this is to say that the A Series itself already presupposes, or
requires, the B Series.40 Along with this, we then add the previously acknowledged fact that the B
Series presupposes (i.e. is based on), the C Series; which means that therefore, that the A Series
implies the C Series, due to the former's dependence on the B Series.41   In other words, the A
Series and the B Series are to be understood and recognized as species of the C Series.42 
Using the following figures, we can begin to depict some of the relationships holding
between the Series'. To avoid any possible confusion, it should be kept in mind that these are not
a  Venn  diagrams43,  but  pictorial  representations  of  the  logical  relationships  of  “genus”  and
“species” that characterize each of the Series', most notably, the fact that the A Series and B
Series are species44 of the C Series.
40 Mellor, Real Time (1981). 
41 Once this has been made fully explicit, and when it subsequently taken in conjunction with the final claim being
made, that the C Series involves a spatialization of time (i.e. it interprets time as space-like, or to be essentially a
kind of space), it becomes clear to see that the A theory remains tacitly committed to the very same a priori
metaphysical assumption and “nontemporal” starting point as the B theory.
42 As McTaggart himself puts it “But in the order of existence the C Series does not depend on the A and B Series,
which, on the contrary, depend on it.” McTaggart, The Nature of Existence. Volume II. (1927) 213. 
43 Although one could readily be provided which demonstrates the validity of the claims that have been made so far
up to this point, this is not what we are primarily concerned with accomplishing here, but rather, merely with
providing  a  graphic  depiction  of  the  logical  relation  of  specieshood.  Here  “genus”  is  simply taken  in  the
straightforward  logical  sense  to  mean  “a  relativity  larger  class”,  and  “species”  means  “a  relativity  smaller
subclass of the genus”. A Concise Introduction to Logic. Hurley, Patrick J. (2008) 101.  
44 That is, understood simply in the logical sense of “species”. 
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Before moving on, it is worthwhile to contrast this first way of depicting the relationships
of A, B, and C Series to each other, with another one, which, although it hasn't explicitly been
laid out in this particular way before, can nevertheless be seen to serve as an accurate illustration
of the way in which the Series' have been  traditionally conceived as relating to one another. On
this interpretation, the circular rings would represent our metaphysical understanding of “time”,
and the background plane upon which the rings are projected would be something similar to time
itself, in the noumenal sense, as it were, or time as it is “in reality”, etc. See (Figure 2).
(Figure 2): The B Series is the C Series, plus directionality. The A Series is the B Series, plus 
change. 
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Figure 1
Figure 2
According to this way of visually representing the relations of the Series' and progressing from
the  center  outward;  moving through each ring  from C to  A and adding on more  and more
purportedly “temporal” attributes as we progress, we seem to be afforded with an increasingly
more   adequate  description  of  “temporal”  phenomena,  and  hence  an  increasingly  closer
approximation (thus,  the progressively larger circle)  as to what time is  “really like”.  Such a
representation is consistent with, and aids in the recognition of, the McTaggartean claims that (i)
“the B Series just is the C Series, plus directionality”, and (ii) “the A Series just is the B Series,
plus change”. Yet, despite these apparent benefits, a noticeable feature of this particular depiction
of the relationships between the Series' is that it tends to be somewhat question begging from the
point of view of the A theory, since it ends up being framed at the outset by the additional tacit
metaphysical assumption “that tense and the A Series are both merely something extra that get
added onto the B Series, but which are ultimately unnecessary”.45 This is a view explicitly held
by well-known contemporary B theorists such as Hugh Mellor and Nathan Oaklander, but which
also can be seen to characterize the views of Bertrand Russell,  W.V.O. Quine,  J.J.C. Smart,
Richard Gale, Clifford Williams, and Robin Le Poidevin as well, to name but a few.46 Hence,
from the  simple  adoption  of  a  conceptual  standpoint  that  characterizes  the  Series'  and their
45 Although he eventually comes to ultimately reject such a view, McTaggart himself tends to speak in this manner
throughout  his  seminal  1908  article  (459).  And  ironically,  what  may  have  seemed  as  a  perfectly  benign
suggestion at the time, has, in the hands of the tradition, become transmogrified by subsequent generations of
philosophers working within that tradition into a full blown research program, which tasks itself the sole and
expressed purpose of establishing the superfluity of tense,  a research program which currently serves as the
dominant school of thought throughout contemporary metaphysics and the philosophy of time. See for example,
Jonathan Tallant's Metaphysics: An Introduction (2013) 150.
46 Mellor, Real Time (1981) 50; Oaklander, The Ontology of Time (2004) 61. For a succinct recapitulation of some
these tenseless views, see Quentin Smith's Language and Time (1993) 8-24. Smith adeptly, and painstakingly,
categorizes the many different versions of the tenseless theory which have been expounded since the early part
of  the twentieth century,  and classifies  these different versions of  tenseless  theory into “The Old Tenseless
Theory”, “The New Tenseless Theory”, “The A Priori Version of the Nonsemantic Tenseless Theory” (to which
McTaggart's Paradox belongs), and “The A Posteriori Version of the Nonsemantic Tenseless Theory of Time”.
What's being argued for here, is that all of these different versions of tenseless theory have operated on the same
shared (and from the point of view of the A theory, question-begging) assumption that the relationships between
the A, B, and C Series are most accurately depicted as looking something like what appears in (Figure 2).
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relations to each other in a manner that is consistent with (Figure 2), we end up inadvertently and
prematurely representing the relationships that hold between the A, B, and C Series in such a
way that already begins to pave the way, and suggest to us from the start, that the A Theory may
be understood to be in some way extravagant, or more than what is needed in order to be in
possession of an adequate metaphysical theory of time.47 
Turning our attention then back to (Figure 1) and attempting to bring its preferred way of
representing the Series' in line with the rest of what is needed to see how the reductio follows
from this particular metaphysical understanding of time,48 a dashed line has been added which
now represents the thesis (soon to be established) that the C Series is itself, simply an abstract
linear conception of space. This pictorial representation of the relationships between the A, B,
and C Series has the virtue of elucidating, visually, how the A and B Series can be understood to
be, not different in kind, but rather similar, as both are ultimately species of the C Series, and
hence of space. In this way, tensed accounts of “time” can be seen (for perhaps the very first
time) to be just as susceptible to the spatialization of time as tenseless accounts have traditionally
been claimed to be.49 
47 Although, for present purposes, such an interpretation could be rendered more acceptable were it able to make
more explicit how the C Series actively serves as the essential core for each of the two surrounding outer rings.
48 That is, specifically from the SER thesis, the fundamental a priori metaphysical assumption that time is either A
theoretical or B theoretical (i.e. that it consists of either something like the A Series or the B Series).
49 Mellor,  Real Time (1981);  Robin LePoidevin and Murray MacBeath,  The Philosophy of Time (1993);  Nathan
Oaklander and Quentin Smith, The New Theory of Time (1994); etc.
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The final claim, is that the C Series involves a spatialization of time (i.e. it interprets time as
space-like, or as if it were essentially a kind of space).50 The C Series is a spatialization of time in
which time gets interpreted as a species of geometrical space. More specifically, it is an abstract
conceptualization51 which interprets time as a one dimensional object, viz., a line.52 This means
that the C Series, and any serialized conception of time which it subsequently gives rise to (e.g.,
A Series  and the  B Series),  are  ultimately just  different  thematizations  of  time having been
construed as species' of one dimensional geometrical space, in particular, as a line.53 As a result,
50 That is, an abstract geometrical space that consists of merely an array of mathematical points. 
51 Which appears to have arisen within the history of thought for expressed purpose of trying to account for, and
provide some explanation of, the “temporal” phenomenon of succession.
52 This conceptualization turns out to be entirely compatible with Euclid's classical definition in the  Elements of
“line”, as “breadthless length”. It may also be worth pointing out here, that while the C Series represents time in
a way that  is  both abstract  and atomistic,  the provocative question of whether the analysis of such a linear
conception of “time” must always proceed atomistically, with much of the attention falling on the discrete event-
points themselves, or whether a more holistic analysis can be provided, which interprets event-points as merely
abstractions which arise out of a more basic continual “flow” of time, turns out in the end, to be a nonstarter,
when viewed from the standpoint of trying to carry out a successful investigation and thorough development of
the metaphysics of time. This is because, in either case, time still ends up getting interpreted linearly, and hence,
through the lens (or against  the backdrop of)  space.  Which means that  the great  medieval debates,  and the
absorbing  question  which  was extensively investigated  during  the  Middle  Ages  of  whether  time  is  best
understood as being “dense” or “discrete” (cf. Time, Creation and the Continuum: Theories in Antiquity and the
Early Middle Ages. Sorabji, Richard. (1983)), can be seen to have been just one more manifestation of a similar
confusion of mistaking space for time. A misdirection of mind, that has continued, and that likewise extends to
much more recent, topological treatments of “time”. For more on the issues surrounding “temporal topology”
see, The Philosophy of Time. LePoidevin, MacBeath. (1993). Oxford.
53 Where once again, all that is being understood by “line” here, is just the straightforward classical sense of “an
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Figure 3
at the hands of both tensed and tenseless theories, “time” comes to be construed as merely a
linear  ordered  arrangement  of  point-like  objects54 in  just  the  same  manner  as  abstract
mathematical  points  are  arrangeable  alongside  each  other  along  the  breadthless  length  of  a
classically conceived geometrical line.55 
McTaggart himself, was able to identify the C Series as a “nontemporal” Series, however
he failed to fully grasp the implications and further significance of this fact. It is contended here,
that this fact of the C Series entailing a spatialization of time56 provides a crucial “missing step”
for successfully securing McTaggart's own original conclusion that the C Series is a nontemporal
Series and has nothing to do with time. This is on account of its ability to reveal this portion of
McTaggart's original argument to tacitly consist of an enthymeme with the following form: “The
C Series involves a spatialization of time which identifies or reduces time with (or to) a species
of space. Spatializations of time are nontemporal, and as such, have nothing to do with time.
Therefore, the C Series is a nontemporal Series, which has nothing to do with time.” The thesis
that the C Series involves a spatialization of time can be understood more or less as simply
reiterating the major point that Bergson was discussing more than a century ago. Namely, the
tendency of common sense, science, and philosophy alike, to mistakenly conceive of time as
merely an abstract juxtaposition of point-like objects (be they “moments”, “events”, or “nows”)
along a collinear path, a peculiar conceptualization which effectively constricts and distorts our
ordered array of abstract mathematical points in one-dimensional space”. 
54 Regardless of whether these objects be referred to as “moments”, “events”, or “nows”, etc.
55 This spatialization of time may have at one point been originally understood only metaphorically, but the origins
and recognition of this non-literal interpretation of time have been either lost, or historically forgotten, and so the
received view that time is like a “line” or “series”, now freely functions as a dead metaphor for time.  Which
helps explain why spatial-visual  representations of “time”, like “time-series”,  “timelines”,  “light-cones”,  etc.
have remained so prevalent throughout a substantial portion of Western history, and are still taken for granted as
acceptable depictions of time to this day. Their name is legion. The original spatial metaphor is long dead. Today,
for the overwhelming majority of us, time just is one of these idealized variants of space. 
56 That is, “The C Series involves a spatialization of time (i.e. it interprets time as space-like, or to be essentially a
species of space).”
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basic understanding, and inhibits a more sensitive and thorough appreciation of it.57 
A further clue that the C Series involves the identification or reduction of time to space—
and that with it, the implication that A-B serialized accounts of time (viz., those accounts with
their origins in the C Series, and which unanimously treat time as merely a serialized order of
point-like objects) are not properly accounts of time at all, but rather ones of space—has been
staring English speaking members of the tradition in the face for quite a while, as the very idea
of something like an “order”—a word which originates from the Latin ordo, ordinis—turns out
etymologically, to have unmistakable “spatial” roots, and among its primary translations happens
to mean,  quite  simply,  “a line”.  Viewing matters in  this  particular  light,  it  therefore perhaps
becomes not all that surprising that “time” would later become increasingly, and more explicitly,
treated as something more and more indistinguishable from space. An historical trajectory and
development of ideas that has been only further (starkly) underscored during the early part of
twentieth century,  with the rise and development of the theoretical concept of “space-time”58
within physical sciences.
57 Henri Bergson.  Essai sur les Données Immédiates de la Conscience (1889).  Time and Free Will. Trans. F.L.
Pogson. (1913) 90, 98, 101-2, 106. 
58 While there may not be sufficient room here to fully and successfully defend the claim, what nevertheless is still
being suggested, is that throughout the course of human history, under the pretense of aiding our understanding
of time,  efforts  get  made every now and then,  towards making its  meaning more clear,  its  definition more
“definite”. And what typically results from such efforts however, is not so much a clearer or more thorough
account of time per se, but of “time” understood simply as a species of space. An outcome which subsequently
has  lead  to  the  rise  of  the  widespread  habit  of  providing  visualizations  and  quantifications  of  “temporal”
phenomena. As preliminary evidence of this, in the early part of the twentieth century, in the hands of the natural
sciences,  “time”  came  to  be  operationally  defined  to  mean,  simply,  “what  a  clock  measures”  (“Zur
Elektrodynamik bewegter Körper”, Einstein, Albert, (1905) Annalen der Physik 322 (10): 891–921), a definition,
which, if carefully compared with the one found to lie at the heart of Ancient and Scholastic physics (a physics,
which the “new” science is so frequently touted to have radically overturned and replaced, by historians of the
subject), can be seen in many ways as essentially just another (albeit more exotic) version of the same basic
twenty-five hundred year old Aristotelian definition, of “time” as “the number of motion with respect to before
and after” (Aristotle, Physics IV).    
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(Figure 4) : The A and B Series as species of the C Series, and the C Series as a species of space. 
By taking a close and careful look at the basis of serialized “time” than is typically done
by adherents to the tradition, and then taking a step back in an attempt to better appreciate what
the broader metaphysical implications of this basis are for our basic understanding of time, we
effectively add a new dimension to this traditional understanding, and to our old one-sided way
of viewing things. As a result, a new perspective on an old way of seeing how all these things
hang together begins to open itself up to us, and what we end up with is a more comprehensive
understanding of serialized “time”, which resembles something more like the relations depicted
in (Figure 4). 
Of all the pictorial representations of the logical relationships of the Series' that have been
presented up to this point, (Figure 4) would be the most comprehensive and the most accurate. It
possesses  all  of  the  diagrammatic  virtues  of  (Figure  3),  with  the  added  benefit  that  it  also
successfully captures the intuitive claim made by some members of the tradition of the purported
increase in approximating “time” as one moves from the C Series through the B Series to the A
Series, which if we recall, was taken to be one of the major strengths for providing a depiction of
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Figure 4
the nature of serialized “time” in terms of (Figure 2), only it now accomplishes this in terms of
height, rather than using breadth to convey this information.59 It also clearly displays the sense in
which the traditional conception of “time” (i.e. A and B time, tensed and tenseless time, and
serialized “time” in general) first arises out of, and remains fundamentally dependent on, an
unacknowledged a priori identification of time with space.60 
It might be averred by some, that even if it  were the case that the C series involves an
identification (or a reduction) of time with (or to) space, that fact by itself, is still not enough to
show either that the B Series results in a spatialization of time, or that the A Series does. That is,
it  might  reasonably  be  asked,  “What  assurance  is  there  that  these  claims  do  not  end  up
committing some instance of the fallacy of division? Just because something is true of the whole,
does not mean that it must be true of its parts.” 
The appropriate response to this objection (which will be further elaborated upon in the
subsequent chapters of the dissertation), is to point out the fact that in the hands of this particular
twentieth century metaphysical tradition, the metaphysics of “time” gets interpreted using the
framework of one-dimensional space, in practice.61 When explicitly attempting to theorize and
wax metaphysical about the nature of time, there is a longstanding tendency by those operating
59 In this case, it might be that what's really involved here in the case of spatialized and serialized “time”, is not, as
we  have  been  exclusively  focusing  on,  just  a  distortion  of  our  understanding  of  time,  but  also  perhaps  a
deformation and warping of our understanding of “space” in order to try to make it account for (or, come in
contact with) time and “temporal” phenomena. Though this line of thought will not be pursued at any great
length  here,  it  remains  an  undeniably interesting possibility,  and  one  that  is  well  worth  pursuing.  Such an
interpretation of how all these things hang together could be visually depicted by using (Figure 4), and adding to
it, another plane “t”, that lies parallel to, and directly above, plane “S”, which the various serialized conceptions
of 'time' (i.e., C Series, B Series, A Series) would all be attempting to approximate. 
60 Admittedly, much of what has appeared so far may seem, at least prima facie, to have been a bit ironic, if not, in
some vague way,  even  circular.  But  one of  the  reasons for  choosing to  utilize  these  diagrams (which  are,
admittedly, highly unorthodox) in the course of explicating these various positions, has been to try and remain
close to a vocabulary and technique that an audience operating with a traditional spatial-visual conception of
“time”  would  nevertheless  find  themselves  to  be  strangely  familiar  with,  and  more  than  capable  of  easily
comprehending.
61 Cf. Chapter 3.
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within this particular portion of the Western tradition to  spatialize it.62 More specifically, what
tends to take place is a theoretical or conceptual reversion back to something resembling the C
Series, and  conceptualizations of “time” conceived of as a line (or mere order), to guide (and
serve as the standard model for) metaphysical research and inform what is taken to be the most
basic and most fundamental description of time, which then leads to the inevitable result  of
rendering such metaphysical accounts of “time”, more appropriately, ones of space. Typically,
what then subsequently follows (though by no means always, and usually in a manner which
suggests it only gets done as an afterthought), is that plenty of lip service gets paid at length, to
the accepted sorts of purportedly “temporal” characteristics that have to get added into the mix in
order to save63 what had been a hitherto thoroughly spatialized account of “time” from sounding
too much like an outright discussion of space, simpliciter.64 
Finally, although we have sought to eschew all formalisms up to this point, for the sake of
clarification, another way of putting the major claims that have appeared so far all together in a
more  traditional  and formal  fashion would  be  to  include  all  that  has  been said  in  a  simple
argument. Since the relation of “specieshood”—which we have made such heavy use of, though
which has been understood here throughout in merely the straightforward logical sense, to mean
62 And with respect  to this,  Bergson should be rightly credited for  having been the first  to  successfully raise
attention to this curious and perverse tendency. 
63 This is a move which, although rarely ever questioned, if it were to be, appears to be defensible only by means of
appealing to something like a strong insistence (that is then immediately followed by an even firmer assurance),
that  this  is  something  that  these  characteristics  are  indeed  more  than  capable  of  doing—i.e.,  of  basically
completing the transmogrification of time out of space. 
64 Though even this minor effort, at pursuing the question of time in what seems perhaps to be a genuine and
legitimate fashion, appears to occur only for the sake of reconciling these accounts with the ordinary conception
of  “time”,  or  time  as  it  is  typically  understood,  and  hence  (as  will  be  shown),  ultimately for  the  sake  of
ameliorating the particular account given, with traditional substance ontologies (and thus keeping that particular
account, squarely within the predelineated confines of such ontologies). More will be said in what follows (see
Chapter 3) about why such efforts remain otiose when viewed within the context of trying to develop a viable
metaphysics of time. Consider for example, the traditional role and ontological function, of McTaggartean “A
properties and B relations”, and of more recent “tensed and tenseless” ontologies, etc.  
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simply “being a member of the subclass of some larger class (the genus)”—is logically transitive,
from the fundamental claim that “the C Series is a species of space”, so too, does it follow that
“both the A and B Series' are as well”.  Since the A Series is a species of the C Series, and the C
Series is a species of spatialized “time”, it follows that the A Series is itself just a variant of
spatialized “time”. And a similar argument can of course be made for the B Series.
This way of putting things does however begin to raise the interesting question as to
whether the properties of a member of a subclass can contradict the defining characteristics of its
genus class. That is, is it possible for an A theory of “time” (such as presentism, etc.), premised
as it is on the A Series, to somehow transcend its C theoretical, and hence “spatial”, origins? Can
an accurate understanding of “temporality” emerge somehow out of a primordially “spatialized”
starting  point?  In  regards  to  the  first  question,  we could  reply by saying,  “Perhaps”,  but  it
remains unclear whether this matter can be completely settled one way or the other a priori. What
is more, it is worth noting that given our current purposes, and the nature of the arguments that
have been advocated here, we need not interest ourselves with trying to establish the truth of
such a generalized universalizable claim (as Bergson appears to have been), but may content
ourselves with the much more limited, a posteriori one, that, in this particular case, and given
these  particular  developments  of  the  history  of  Western  metaphysical  thought  during  the
twentieth century to today, so far, the answer to these questions seems simply to be a firm “No”.
In other words, while the closely related, and similar looking, modal thesis the “Necessarily, the
SER thesis entails a spatialization of time” would suffice for our purposes, and while it may
indeed  turn  out  to  be  true  (as  Bergson  seems  to  have  held),  it  should  nevertheless  be
distinguished from the thesis  “The SER thesis  entails  a spatialization of time”,  which is  the
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particular claim that is explicitly being made here.  
Put simply, the long and the short of all that has been said up to this point, is that the
“time” we typically have in mind when we think about it, talk about it, and when we reckon with
it, is not actually anything “temporal” at all, but really just an idealized conceptual variant of
space.65 The spatialization of time, defined here, as “the identification or reduction of time to
space”, is both a microscopic and macroscopic phenomenon, and is characteristic of the practices
of both chronometry and chronology. It is found just as commonly amongst the myriad attempts
to quantify time through the positing of some assortment of idiosyncratic spatial-quantitative
metric in order to make possible the calculation and measurement of “temporal” phenomenon, as
it is among the repeated attempts to conceptualize time more generally (on the basis of certain
deeply sedimented a priori metaphysical assumptions about the basic “topology”66 of “time”) in
an effort to try and provide (and record) a grand cosmological “order” of things. 
At this point, detractors might still find themselves inclined to respond to all of this by
saying something along the lines of: “Even if it may actually turn out to be the case that our
prevalent A-B depictions of the metaphysics of time happen to come saddled with a spatialized
conceptions  of  time  as  you  say,  so what?  Just  look at  all  of  the  success  such “spatialized”
conceptions of time have nevertheless afforded us?” In other words, “What is so wrong with the
spatialization of time?” 
65 More specifically, it is the simple idea of a “line” taken in abstraction (i.e. the C Series), for the purposes of
providing a principle of “order”.
66 Metaphysical assumptions which themselves betray the additional (and from what should now be beginning to
become somewhat clear: unwarranted) assumption made by the A-B tradition. For it may behoove us to question
whether—beyond some dry academic exercise that is largely, if not entirely, cut off from the phenomena of the
everyday world and our lives—something like a “topology” of time makes any real sense at all,  an area of
research, which arguably, is itself just another historical development that further showcases the extent to which,
just  how  oblivious  this  particular  Western  philosophical  tradition  has  remained  to  the  thoroughgoing
spatialization of time running through the heart of its preferred way of conceptualizing the subject matter.
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The fitting response to this particular line of criticism, begins simply with a request for
more clarification, and more elaboration, on the particular notion of “success” being employed in
it.  Such  a  line  of  thought  clearly  stems  from  the  common  assumption  that  spatialized
chronometries  and  chronologies  have  been  for  the  most  part  “successful”.  But  we  might
reasonably press them on this point, and ask them further, “'Successful' at doing what, exactly?”
“At merely ordering and enframing the phenomena of the everyday world and our experience of
it in an expedient fashion for the expressed purposes of manipulation and control?” If so, then
what else, in the process of chasing and pinning down “success” in this narrowly specific and
highly limited pursuit, might such spatializations of time perhaps be covering up along the way? 
It is maintained here, that there are at least two things that get covered up in this way.
Namely, the phenomena of worldhood and  selfhood; or what roughly amounts to the same thing,
an adequate and accurate comprehension of the ontologies of “significance” and “authenticity”.67
Traditional spatialized conceptions of “time”, irrespective of their varying levels of exoticism or
sophistication, remain implicitly “thin”, which is a problem, insofar as the metaphysical nature of
time remains capable of revealing itself to us as something that is inherently “thick”.68
67 It will be argued further, that what such traditional spatialized understandings of “time” ultimately give rise to, is
what Heidegger referred to as the “technological conception of being”, which he took as currently characterizes
our own epoch in the history of ontology, and the understanding of being in general.
68 That is, “thick”, in Bernard Williams' technical sense of the term, which is used to characterize the expression of
“a union of fact and value”, and which helps to account for one of the primary reasons why traditional accounts
tend to stifle, if not outright suppress, an adequate understanding of the metaphysics of time.  Bernard Williams.
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985) 129. 
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§2.3
THE ENTHYMEMATIC CHARACTER OF MCTAGGART AND BERGSON'S
METAPHYSICAL THESES ON THE NATURE OF TIME
Upon close and careful inspection, the major theses of McTaggart and Bergson can be
seen to serve as complements for one another and to partially supply what turns out to be a
crucial missing step for fully explicating the other's basic line of argument. Up to this point, the
basic understanding of how the conclusions of these fundamental metaphysical arguments have
been  arrived  at  (both  of  which  have  had  a  lasting  influence  on  subsequent  metaphysical
treatments of time right up to today), has remained surprisingly incomplete. And they have for
the most part simply been handed down through the A-B tradition, and uncritically reiterated by
each subsequent generation of its practitioners. This prevailing and calcified way of thinking has
allowed for the enthymematic character of each thesis to remain covered up and hidden. 
In the case of the Bergsonian insight, in which serialized conceptions of time69 involve a
prior  (and  for  the  most  part  uncountenanced)  “spatialization”  of  time,70 despite  its  having
provided a deep and penetrating perception into (and having provided a strong critique of) the
way many of us usually think about time, what it leaves under-appreciated, and therefore only
implicit, is the fact that serialized “time” presupposes (i.e. is dependently still based on) an initial
positing,  and prior  identification  of,  time  with  something like  the  C Series.  Combining this
together along with the missing thesis that the C Series involves an identification (or a reduction)
of time with (or to) space, we are able to construct a complete and valid argument along the
69 Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will (1889) 98. The SER thesis, recall, is just the metaphysical thesis that has been
assumed by the A-B tradition, that “time consists of either the A Series or the B Series”.
70 That is, they involve either a reduction, or in the most extreme cases, an identification, of time to/with space.  For
evidence of this at work, see Tallant, J.  Metaphysics An Introduction (2013) 142-149; Priest, G.  Logic A Very
Short Introduction (2000) 48-62.
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following lines: “Serialized conceptions of time begin with an identification of time with the C
Series (i.e. with the idea of time as a mere linear order). The C Series involves a spatialization of
time  (i.e.  it  interprets  time as  space-like,  or  to  be  a  species  of  space).  Therefore,  serialized
conceptions of time involve prior spatializations of time.” 
In the case of McTaggart's own contribution to the metaphysics of time, that the C Series
is nontemporal (i.e.  that it has nothing to do with time), what remains tacit and unacknowledged
there,  is  precisely the equally important  fact  that  the C Series  itself  already presupposes71 a
spatialized conception of time.  This  then serves to clearly explain why the C Series and its
various modes, are capable of yielding only nontemporal descriptions of time: “The C Series is a
species of spatialized time (i.e.  it  interprets time as space-like,  or to be a species of space).
Spatialized time is nontemporal. Therefore, the C Series is nontemporal (i.e. it has nothing to do
with time).”
Once all of these hidden assumptions have been fully brought to light, and sufficiently
explicated  using  the  key thesis  that  the  C  Series  involves72 a  spatialization  of  time  (i.e.  it
interprets time as space-like, or to be essentially a kind of space),73 what we end up supplied with
are three fundamental metaphysical theses with respect to the nature of time: that ( i ) “Serialized
conceptions  of  time  (A  and  B  theoretical  conceptions)  originate  from  an  identification
(conflation) of time with the C Series (i.e. with the idea of time as a mere linear order)”; that ( ii )
“The C Series involves a spatialization of time (i.e. it  interprets time as space-like, or to be
71 On account of its having arisen out of one.
72 Or, “is an instance of”.
73 Cf. (Figure 4). The C Series is nothing other than the abstract conception of a line that cannot be drawn. It cannot
be drawn,  because of  the traditional  a  priori  metaphysical  assumption that  time is not identifiable with (or
reducible to ) space. Serialized “time” in general, is merely how spatialized time traditionally manifests itself and
gets understood (hypostatized) on the primitive assumption that time is not to be spatialized. Hence, a defining
characteristic of such traditional serialized conceptions of “time”, is that they yield an understanding of time
which  is rife with cognitive dissonance. 
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essentially a species of space)”; and lastly, that ( iii ) “Spatialized time is nontemporal (i.e. it has
nothing to do with time).”  Finally,  pulling all of these threads together by drawing upon the
resources  that  have  been  made  available  by  Bergson  and  his  initial  insight  that  serialized
conceptions of time—such as the C Series and its ilk, require for the basis of their intelligibility a
prior spatialization of time—then since, as we already have seen,  the C Series underwrites and is
presupposed by both the A and B Series, it can now further be seen that neither the A nor the B
theoretical accounts of “time” are capable of providing a non-spatialized understanding of time.74
Note also, that this “spatialization” happens to be one which includes the A Series—a point well
worth emphasizing, especially to the members of a tradition that has typically only applied this
sort  of  “spatial”  characterization  to  metaphysical  accounts  of  “time”  that  have  been  based
exclusively upon the B Series. As has been demonstrated through a simple case of transitivity,
since the A Series entails or implies the B Series, and the B Series entails or implies the C Series,
it therefore follows that the A Series entails or implies the  C Series.75 This means, that insofar as
our contemporary interpretations of “time” resemble either an A or B theoretical account (which
the vast majority of all extant philosophical and scientific accounts of time currently do, or if
they fail to do so explicitly, can, with minimal effort, be shown to do so implicitly), then whether
we be fully aware of it or not, we have already become tacitly committed to, and our thought has
already begun operating upon, the antecedently given background assumptions of a prior (and
unspoken) spatialization of time.
The  implications  of  the  spatialization  of  time  for  traditional  A-B  metaphysics  and
contemporary  tensed-tenseless  debates,  are  arguably  nothing  short  of  crisis.76 The  tensed-
74 Cf. the reductio, and the contradiction found to lie at the heart of the of all traditional metaphysical accounts of
“time”. 
75 Cf. (Figure 4).
76 On the assumption, that is, that time is not identifiable with, or reducible to, space. 
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tenseless  dilemma  and  the  rudimentary  thinking  upon  which  this  particular  metaphysical
paradigm relies, and upon which it continues to proceed, turns out to in fact be unsound. 77 As
such, the preferred “categories” of temporal ontology and temporal being, as exemplified by the
tensed-tenseless distinction, have been cut off from their traditional source of justification78 for
why they should be understood as informative about anything having to do with the metaphysics
of time, let alone as capable of doing so in an exhaustive fashion. As a result of the traditional A-
B metaphysics of time having arrived at a full-scale crisis with respect to the fundamental lack of
justification for its most basic concepts, we have effectively entered in upon a moment in which
“the most fundamental issues are (once more) back on the table for debate”,79 including our most
basic ontology. 
77 Despite the fact that  it  nevertheless remains a valid argument, a incidental  feature of this particular tensed-
tenseless tradition which helps to explain why it has continued to be uncritically accepted by so many over the
course of the twentieth century, and has been reaffirmed from generation to generation for so long, with little to
no intimation of the pressing crisis of which we now speak. 
78 So that, with this veil having been lifted, the truth of conventional temporal ontology becomes discernible as
something that's  merely being assumed,  the fact  that  it continues  to  serve as  a  guide for  our metaphysical
understanding of time.
79 Theory and Reality. Godfrey-Smith (2003)  82., with reference to Thomas Kuhn's,  The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions (1962).
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§2.4
 ON THE PROSPECT OF ACCEPTING THE SPATIALIZATION OF TIME AND THE HABIT
OF TWENTIETH CENTURY A-B FORMALIZATIONS OF TIME OF REDUCING TIME TO
SPACE 
Ἀλώπηξ καὶ βότρυς.
Ἀλώπηξ λιμώττουσα, ὡς ἐθεάσατο ἀπό τινος ἀναδενδράδος βότρυας κρεμαμένους, ἠβουλήθη  
αὐτῶν περιγενέσθαι καὶ οὐκ ἠδύνατο. Ἀπαλλαττομένη δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν εἶπεν· Ὄμφακές εἰσιν.
The Fox and The Grapes
A hungry fox saw some fine bunches of grapes hanging from a vine that was trained along a high 
trellis, and did his best to reach them by jumping as high as he could into the air. But it was all in 
vain, for they were just out of reach: so he gave up trying, and walked away with an air of dignity 
and unconcern, remarking “I thought those grapes were ripe, but I see now they are quite sour”.80
In looking for an effective way out of the reductio, one obvious move would seem to be
to just accept the spatialization of time and try to continue to live with the consequences of a
reduction of time to space.81 That is, in looking for a way out, why not attempt to just bite the
80 The image was made available by the Arts and Humanities Community Resource at Oxford University.  Aesop's
Fables.  “The Fox and The Grapes”. (1912). Vernon Jones Trans. Avenel Books, New York. 1. 
81 This strategy, while admittedly already appearing initially to be a bit ad hoc, would nevertheless be capable of
providing a way to successfully get us out of the reductio, by adopting a strategy of simply construing non-
spatialized accounts of time, as “sour grapes”. Though it might reasonably be asked, in the end, at what cost? 
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metaphysical  bullet  and simply go along with,  and do our  best  to  remain  content  with,  the
spatialization of time? 
Here  the  ancient  fable  of  the  “sour  grapes”  provides  a  surprisingly  accurate
characterization of the unhappy epistemological predicament we find ourselves in when trying to
convince ourselves that somehow spatialized “time” is good enough, that it gets things right, or
that it is what we were really after all along, when viewed from within a context of trying to
come up with a satisfactory understanding of the metaphysics of time. Contrary to prevailing
scientific practice and the recurrent habits of empirical and naturalistic thinking in general, it is
fallacious to assume that all our everyday beliefs about the world are on a par and that each of
them need to be revised in light of, and with respect to,  what the best “empirical” evidence
suggests to be the case, simply because they may have originated from among what are merely
everyday  phenomena  (and  therefore,  were  not  arrived  at  as  the  result  of  some  formal  or
generalizable “scientific”,  “empirical”,  or “naturalistic” method, etc.).  Such a widespread yet
problematic  (and  ultimately  unwarranted)  assumption,  is  however,  frequently  encountered
nowadays, especially within the burgeoning culture of pop-science. But it also happens to be a
trenchant habit of thought found especially among the educated, and lying close to the heart of
what constitutes most “scientistic” thinking in general. In other words, contrary to widespread
cultural practice and popular educated opinion in the West, there is no guarantee that the simple
act of revising our initial everyday beliefs in a manner that renders them more amenable to, and
comfortably  couchable  within,  our  current  scientific  methods  and  models,  will  necessarily
“always”  result  in  the  generation  of  an  improved  or  more  adequate  understanding  of  the
phenomena we are actually trying to understand. There are occasions, for instance, where all that
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such  a  revision  actually  leads  to  is  merely  an  over  hasty  adoption  of  some  variant  of
“elimintivism”,  or  of  a  crude  and wanton “reductionism” (which,  is  not  much  better),  with
respect  to  some meaningful  and  otherwise  significant  part  of  the  world.  When  this  occurs,
although we undoubtedly succeed in adding yet another respectable “deflationary” account of
some worldly everyday phenomenon along strictly “empirical/naturalistic”  lines  to  our  ever-
growing list of such accounts, what we ultimately end up accomplishing in the long run in cases
such as these, when viewed from the standpoint of “metaphysics”, is nothing short of having
effectively thrown the baby out with the bathwater. And it is worth noting that on the occasions
where we do end up doing this, we wind up doing it mostly because of our current scientific
methods  and  models  having  revealed  themselves  to  be  poor  performers,  or  ill  equipped,  at
adequately capturing (and being able to shed sufficient light on) some particular feature of our
“everyday” world, which, when left in its natural state as it is originally encountered, has proven
itself too recalcitrant for them; a situation which once examined more closely, begins to suggest
traces of a classic instance of psychological denial.82 
The problem with such a proposed strategy and with simply accepting the spatialization
of time (within the context of a search for a viable metaphysics of time), is that it inevitably leads
us down the path of a red herring. This is because what is sought is a metaphysical account of the
nature of time and role time plays with respect to reality. But what ends up being given on such
an account, and on the assumption that there is nothing wrong with spatialized accounts of time,
82 To put the crux of matter in a different way using a more recent analytic (Quinean) nomenclature, what is being
suggested here is  that  in  cases  such as  these,  in which we come to find ourselves being (mis)guided by a
thoroughgoing  and  trenchant  commitment  empiricism and  naturalism  from  the  very  get-go,  our  overeager
attempts to apply classic deflationary principle's like “Ockam's Razor”' to tangled metaphysical problems like the
riddle of “Plato's beard” for instance, end up resulting (ontologically) in not so much a nice clean and close
shave, but rather, something which much more closely resembles various cases of outright decapitation. See,
W.V.O. Quine. “On What There Is” (1948).
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are various fabricated stories and abstract depictions (however coherent) of “time” as if it were
merely a species of space.  At the very best, all such accounts, which treat serialized models of
“time” as exhaustive of the metaphysics of time (like the A-B tradition does), end up missing the
point and ultimately committing some version of the red herring or ignoratio elenchi fallacies.
That is, they have plenty to say about “time” when construed as a species of the C Series, and
hence of space, but they tell us very little, if anything, about time that is not already in some way
dependent upon these spatial models and metaphors. Hence, their “conclusions” about the nature
of “time” end up getting drawn from premises about familiar features of mathematical space, so
that we are left drawing “temporal” conclusions from what are purely “spatial” premises and
axioms.83
Disciples of  spatialized time84 within the A-B tradition appear  to  come in two major
varieties. There are those for whom the findings and conclusions of their metaphysical research
pertains to only a fictitious realm of abstract space,85 and then there are those who never actually
conclude anything at all about the metaphysical nature of time, but in the course of providing
their  long-winded  spatial  depictions  of  “temporal”  phenomena,  merely  presume  that  in  the
course of doing so, some deep metaphysical conclusions pertaining to time have therefore been
established. Either way, through the act of merely diverting attention away from the original
83 As evidenced once  again  by even  the most  cursory glance at  the  current  and extant  literature on both the
metaphysics and logic of  time (e.g, Tallant, (2013); Priest, (2000); etc.), an habitual practice which gets made
particularly pronounced when examining the phenomenology of  A and B time.  See  for  example,   Quentin
Smith's article “The Phenomenology of A Time”, and Clifford William's “The Phenomenology of B Time”, both
of which, appear in The New Theory of Time. Oaklander and Smith. Yale UP: (1994). 
84 Whether they are cognizant of their discipleship and the logical implications of their position, or not. That is,
these comments are intended to cover cases of A theorists, in addition to B theorists, who perhaps unwittingly
arrive at an endorsement and logical commitment to the spatialization of time.
85 Despite perhaps a strong insistence that may be made on their part, to the contrary. A common insistence, typical
among those who continue to operate yet remain for the most part oblivious to their own logical and ontological
commitments to a spatialized conception of time.
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desideratum86,  members  of  the  A-B  tradition  are  able  to  create  the  presumption  of  having
successfully provided something like a viable metaphysical account of “time”. 
The Bergsonian insight that many of our traditional ways of conceptualizing time involve
a prior spatialization of time serves as a precursor to all of this.87 The history of the metaphysics
of A-B time over the course of the twentieth century has consisted in the repeated hypostatization
of various models88 of a fictitious spatial realm; employing at times the resources of mathematics
and geometry to maintain some level of intelligibility89 over the models, but which ultimately,
has only served in the long run to cover up and disguise the genuinely temporal phenomena that
are encountered in everyday experience,  and by so doing, obfuscate and impede a clear and
adequate understanding (from a metaphysical standpoint) of time's role with relation to ontology.
It may prove beneficial and an aid to the apprehension of what is to follow, if we take
note of an observation that can be made concerning the implications of the hermeneutic nature of
understanding and how this can relate to our traditional metaphysical understanding of time in
general.  The role of definitions in constituting meaning and aiding understanding, is that they
help to partly determine what our most general picture of the world looks like from the outset.
But it is also important to point out that they do so “hermeneutically”.90 That is, definitions are
counted among the parts which enable us to understand and make sense of the whole, yet at the
same  time  they  are  themselves  always  already  drawn  from  (and  conditioned  by)  a  prior
86 This can be done either consciously, by attempting to construe the prospects of non-spatialized time once again,
as  merely “sour grapes”,  or  done in such a way that  is  performed almost completely unawares (as  is  most
commonly the case on both sides of the A-B metaphysical tradition). 
87 Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will (1889). passim.
88 That once again, come in a variety of various levels of sophistication, complexity, and exoticism.
89 That is manifested simply in terms of internal coherence and consistency. 
90 For more on the nature of “hermeneutics”, see Martin Heidegger's  Being and Time [Sein und Zeit] (1927); as
well  as  Hans-Georg  Gadamer's  Truth  and  Method  [Warheit  und  Methode] (1960);  and  Richard  Rorty's
Philosophy and The Mirror of Nature (1979), esp. Chapter VII: “From Epistemology to Hermeneutics”.
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understanding  and  primordial  grasp  of  what  we  take  that  whole  to  be,  which  is  itself  an
understanding that is always developing. To give an example to help clarify this point, a classic
metaphysical question such as “What is real?” might initially lead to a seemingly no nonsense
and concrete attempt at defining “real” to mean something like “What is real is what can be
touched and grasped with your hands.”, which could subsequently be stated more formally by the
assertion “X is real iff it can be touched and grasped with your hands”, etc. It does not take long
to notice however, that the operational definition that has been arrived at, and given in order to
try and define and pin down the term “real” in a strict and exact way, shows some obvious
limitations. For instance, it betrays a narrowness of focus, and an over-reliance on just one of the
five senses (at the expense of the other four) with respect to our access to reality. Were we to
proceed to go on and construct a conception of reality in accordance with this definition, then
phenomena of the kind denoted by such terms as “music” or “starlight” for example,  would
inevitably fall outside of it, and thus leave us with a general and basic understanding of the “real
world” in which such phenomena did not come to be counted among (nor come to be seen as
informing us in anyway about) the genuine features of metaphysical reality. Luckily, for us, we
can clearly and fairly easily see that such a way of defining the meaning of “real” merely arises
out of, and supports, a limited and one-sided outlook which understands only a world that it can
touch. Common hypothetical cases such as these—where the possibility of drawing attention to
elements  of  the  definiendum which  continue to  outstrip  the definiens,  is  either  obvious  and
already on hand, or at the very least, still scrutable, are the easy ones. They are quickly shown to
be  unsatisfactory  to  serve  as  comprehensive  definitions  for  the  simple  reason  that  the
definiendum noticeably outstrips the definiens. 
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However, what then about the harder cases? Particularly those instances where (for one
reason or another) we are not in a clear possession of the knowledge that our definitions are
inadequate. There appear to be two problematic ways in which such situations arise. Either our
definition has not yet been discovered to be inadequate, or, our definition had at one point been
grasped and understood to be inadequate, but this knowledge has become covered up for some
reason, and subsequently forgotten.91 What is being suggested here, is that serialized “time” (of
the sort best exemplified by the SER thesis and traditional A-B metaphysical accounts of time),
is one such definition of this uncountenanced variety. And the clue that this definition of “time”92
is deficient, lies in the definition's narrowness of focus, and over-reliance, on “space”;93 an over-
reliance which we are currently in the process of trying to expose, and which comes to play a
pivotal  role  in  setting  up the  initial  conditions  for  (and the  subsequent  proliferation  of)  the
ensuing “red herrings” which have continued to overpopulate our traditional understanding of
time throughout much of the history of metaphysics since the twentieth century.  
Given what has been proposed here, and how unconventional a departure it represents
from traditional philosophy, science, and even “common sense”, the more parsimonious minded
among us might reasonably inquire at  this  point,  “What, if anything, is to be gained from a
rejection of the SER thesis? As in rejecting it,  we would appear to be losing an awful lot.”
91 For more on the particular ways in which these meanings eventually come to be “covered up” see, Heidegger,
Being and Time. passim. And for an related discussion of these matters carried out in a more analytic fashion, see
Thomas Gilovich's  How We Know What Isn't So: The Fallibility of Human Reason in Everyday Life (1991).
There Gilovich undertakes an investigation of the everyday tendency of people of various ranges of intelligence
to hold what can be demonstrated to be either questionable or erroneous beliefs. And observes, that “We hold
many dubious beliefs ... because they seem to be the most sensible conclusions consistent with the available
evidence”, concluding, that many, if not most, of the questionable or erroneous views we cling to are primarily
“...the products not of irrationality, but of flawed rationality.” Speaking in this vein, one of the main purposes of
all the efforts being put forth here then, can be understood as an attempt to uncover, and better understand, a
deep flaw that can be seen to run through traditional metaphysical research and thinking, about “time”. 
92 In addition to, the inadequate conception of the world that it gives rise to, and makes possible. Being and Time,
H64. 
93 And its analytic concomitant: “quantifiability”, as Bergson astutely observed. Time and Free Will (1889). 
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Leaping ahead a little bit, and foreshadowing what is to come in the dissertation, the answer to
this question as to “What is to be gained from an outright rejection of the SER thesis with respect
to our understanding of the metaphysics of time?”, turns out to be, quite literally, the world.94
In place of the old tensed-tenseless dilemma,95 which continues to support and reinforce a
misplaced confidence in the viability of the tensed-tenseless distinction and its ability to serve as
a  lynch-pin  to  our  typical  contemporary metaphysical  understanding  of  time  and  its  proper
relation  to  ontology,  it  is  being  proposed  here  that  a  new and  revolutionary  metaphysical
paradigm should take  its place. One with a focus not on the question of whether time is A
theoretical or B theoretical, but of whether it is something which is96 reducible to space or not. 
This newly proposed dilemma would end up looking something like this: “If time is not
to be thought of as a kind of space, then the traditional A-B metaphysics of time results in a
contradiction,97 but  if  time is  to  be thought  of  as  a  kind  of  space,  then  the  traditional  A-B
metaphysics  of  time  results  in  something  like a  red  herring.” Historically,  the  traditional
assumption within the A-B tradition has been, that it is not the case that time is identifiable with
or reducible to space. If time starts off initially, viewed from the outset as a species of space
however, then the failure to ever successfully discharge this initial assumption (even if it was
only ever  intended just  to  serve as a  springboard),  will  lead any metaphysics based on that
assumption, to inevitably miss the point, and to get left pursuing the path of a red herring—
regardless of however elegant, sophisticated, internally consistent, or expedient to the purposes
94 More specifically, the world as it is understood using a strictly Heideggerian vocabulary. While more on the
question of what this entails will be taken up and covered in subsequent sections of the dissertation (and in much
more depth), at this point, for more on the Heideggerian meaning of “world”, see Being and Time (1927). H91-
128; specifically, Heidegger's explication what he refers to as the “worldhood” of the world.
95 Cf. §2.1
96 Or even, ought to be.
97 Via the reductio in §2.1.
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of the empirical sciences that conception of “time” may happen to end up.98
The  next  step  in  this  new dilemma  is  to  note  that  “Time  is  either  reducible  to  (or
identifiable with) space, or it is not.” That is, there either is something to time which cannot be
captured via Spatialized models and metaphors, or there is not. A failure, or refusal, to seriously
investigate  non-spatialized  routes  however,  is  tantamount  to  simply assuming the  legitimacy
spatialized ones without argument. For whatever the reason it may happen to be—either because
it has enjoyed a long standing history as what the philosophical tradition has done in practice, or
because it is what those exemplars of good epistemology, the empirical sciences, typically tend
to  do—to  simply  assume  the  legitimacy  of  the  spatialization  of  time,  uncritically  and
unquestioningly from the get go, is to increase the risk of covering up, obscuring, or ignoring
altogether,  the  intelligibility  of  non-spatial  temporal  phenomena99 merely  for  the  sake  of
remaining  expedient,  parsimonious,  and  consistently  in  line  with  traditional  “substance
ontologies”, as we shall see.100 
The final step in constructing this new dilemma is to state its conclusion: “Therefore, the
98 Via a red herring. A point which again suggests that the internal  consistency of the traditional conception of
“time” is itself just a feature of the coherency of the mathematical relations employed to characterize a fictitious
abstract spatial realm. And which further helps to explain why no amount of additional “temporal” attributes,
added onto the  Series'  after  the  fact,  could ever  be  sufficient  in  rendering a  serialized (A theoretical  or  B
theoretical) conception of “time”, non-spatial. This is because its roots still fully lie within (and thus make it
capable of still being uncovered as) a species of space. 
99 That is, the kinds of temporal phenomena, which for example, get understood not, solely against a backdrop of
an abstract quantifiable space, but rather, along the concrete teleological, normative, existential dimensions of
time.  The  natural  sciences,  due  to  the  limitations  of  their  own  metaphysical  background  assumptions,  the
operational  definitions which they employ for  the purposes  of  serving merely their  own highly specialized
interests, and the narrow positivistic focus they have for coping with only measurable quantifiable phenomena,
are simply not well equipped, and far too “thin”—in that they do not possess an competent understanding of
“time” or “being” that is broad enough—to adequately address and deal with these kinds of matters. And so,
given a current intellectual climate, such as our own, where, since at least the early part of the twentieth century,
there  has  been  a  steady  and  noticeable  movement  towards  the  adoption  of  a  fervent  and  thoroughgoing
metaphysical “naturalism” within the analytic tradition, the unsurprising metaphysical outcome has largely been
for analytic philosophers to simply forgo non-spatialized routes, either by ignoring them altogether, or by simply
(and fallaciously) assuming that their own preferred A or B theoretical account already sufficiently counts as one.
100  Cf. Chapter 3.
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traditional A-B metaphysics of time results (at best) in either a contradiction or a red herring.” In
either case, it does not succeed in telling us anything helpful, or positive, about the metaphysical
nature  of  time.101 Since  both  A theoretical  and  B  theoretical  accounts  of  time  result  in  a
spatialization of time,102 the traditional tensed-tenseless paradigm is either based on unsound
reasoning, or it results in a red herring.  What this means is that the two most general camps
within our contemporary metaphysics of time, should no longer be understood as boiling down
to a choice between an A or B metaphysics or a tensed or tenseless ontology, but rather, between
spatialized or non-spatialized interpretations of time—this is among one of the most significant
claims to be made here.103 So that if one chooses to go the route of wanting to claim that there is
nothing wrong with the spatialization of time, one then needs to show, convincingly, that one's
account does not end up resulting in something like a red herring; and if, on the other hand, one
chooses to remain wedded to the traditional assumption that time is not identifiable or reducible
to space, then it will need to shown, equally as clearly and persuasively, how the account which
therefore results, is somehow capable of avoiding a contradiction. Any objections or responses to
the arguments that have been made up to this point, will be capable of being shown to easily fit
into either one of these two more general camps or schools of thought—regardless of whether
101 It is perhaps also worth bearing in mind here that practitioners operating within the tensed-tenseless paradigm
need not be explicitly aware of all of the paradigm's basic concepts in order to be thoroughly committed to it, or
continue to successfully operate within it—an important  point  when considering how the transmission of  a
paradigm through a research tradition to subsequent  generations of thinkers  typically takes place,  a process
which involves a tendency for paradigm's most basic concepts and assumptions to become deeply sedimented
within the tradition, and for the most part overlooked by subsequent generations of researchers in the course of
carrying out normal research—rather, commitment to a paradigm manifests itself in the normal investigatory
behaviors and actual research practices of its practitioners as they go about their business. 
102 Cf. §2.2
103 Even if not all of the arguments that have been presented up to this point have been found to be fully convincing
or compelling for some reason, two important points remain to be underscored, first, the validity of this new
spatial-temporal dilemma, and second, the intuition that the revolutionary paradigm that it presents us with, is the
one we should be focusing our attention on, and beginning to operate within, if what we are after, at the end of
the day, is indeed the attainment of a viable metaphysics of time, and it proper relation to ontology. 
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they originate from the side of the A theory or the B theory. 
Additionally, this formulation of the new spatial-temporal dilemma, also reveals it to be
the more pressing of the two dilemmas that have been examined here pertaining to time, since
the tensed-tenseless dilemma leaves the issue of the spatialization of time unmentioned (and as a
result,  entirely  unresolved),  on  a  account  of  its  failure  to  even  properly  countenance  the
distinction.104 If  at  the  end  of  the  day,  what  is  sought  is  an  accurate  and  comprehensive
(temporal) understanding of time itself, then the primary focus of our research efforts should be
on resolving the spatial-temporal dilemma, since the most we could ever hope to gain from a
resolution of the traditional tensed-tenseless dilemma, at best, is simply an answer to the question
of whether time is tensed or tenseless. But it remains hard to see what actual difference (if any)
would  that  ultimately  make  to  our  basic  understanding  of  time,  or  (importantly,  and  by
extension) to our lives. What is needed within the contemporary metaphysics of time is nothing
short of a paradigm shift away from this worn out and infertile way of thinking105 towards a new
one with  more promising horizons; a revolutionary paradigm and fresh way of thinking which
has the spatial-temporal dilemma at its core (instead of the played out, tensed-tenseless one), and
that  successfully  replaces  the  traditional  A-B  way  of  viewing  things  in  order  to  guide
metaphysical research and thought about time on to original frontiers. 
104 Except, as it happens, as usually only a side issue, and as an additional charge that is sometimes leveled against
B theorists  (by  A theorists).  Incidentally,  it  was  a  repeated  encounter  with  this  charge  in  the  professional
literature on A-B time, along with a growing familiarity with Henri Bergson's writings, that led largely to the
writing of this dissertation and to the arguments being made here, in an effort to clearly demonstrate that the
same charge can quite easily be seen to apply to the A theory just as well as the B theory. So that if the B theory
really turns out to be just a way of thinking and talking about time as if it were merely a species of space, then
given their common origin, the A theory does not appear to fare much better—even if it should happen to equate
time with a Series which is somehow endowed with more purportedly “temporal” attributes, than the B theory is
claimed to possess. Which once again, brings up the recurring point that no amount of additional “temporal”
properties added onto the Series' is ever sufficient to render an initially A or B conception of “time” nonspatial.
All such efforts, rather, prove quite simply to be otiose. 
105 And with it, its preferred ways of understanding how time relates to metaphysics, language, and ontology. 
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In chapter three of the dissertation, to further motivate this shift away from the traditional
tensed-tenseless paradigm to the new spatial-temporal one, the “crisis” faced by the old paradigm
is to be exacerbated by showing that the tradition which it informs ends up operating not only
with an unjustified temporal ontology, but with one that may actually happen to be false.  The
positive account that will subsequently be sketched out here adopts a non-spatialized approach,
but it also (importantly) happens to be one which rejects the basic SER thesis,106 on account of
the fact that the one implies the other.107
If the arguments that have appeared so far are taken to be any good, then the traditional
bedrock  belief  and  starting  point  for  much  of  what  constitutes  our  extant  contemporary
metaphysical accounts of time, the idea that temporal ontology is either tensed or tenseless, has
been  severed  from  its  traditional  sources  of  justification.  The  remaining  portions  of  the
dissertation, focus on furthering the rejection of this typical and trenchant belief that has been
handed down over the course of the twentieth century, by providing reasons to suggest it is not
only unjustified, but perhaps even false. 
106 Among other things, the latter portions of the dissertation will seek to “break new ground” on what may best be
characterized as an “error theory” of A-B and tensed-tenseless time. Cf. Chapter 3.
107 The claim that the SER thesis entails a spatialization of time may appear to some as somewhat counter-intuitive
to traditional thinking. One may think, for instance, that it is possible to distinguish in some meaningful way
between  properly  “temporal”  Series'  on  the  one  hand,  and  “spatial”  ones  on  the  other.  But  even  if  such
meaningful distinctions were possible—and any attempt to provide such an example would be welcomed, since
the real culprit here that continues to plague the tradition and stand in the way of developing a satisfactory
metaphysics of time is the spatialization of time, and it is what we really needs distancing from, if we are ever to
develop  a  viable  metaphysics  of  time—the  assertion  being made here  is  that  the  A-B tradition  has  yet  to
successfully provide one. For a related point, recall from McTaggart's own admission, that the A Series and B
Series just are variants of the nontemporal C Series (a mere linear order) with just some additional properties
added on, viz., “change” in the case of the A Series and “directionality” in the case of the B Series. (McTaggart,
“The Unreality of Time”, (1908) 463).
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CHAPTER 3
PHENOMENOLOGY AND TEMPORALITY
§3.1
A-B PHENOMENOLOGIES OF TIME 
The typical twentieth century conception of temporal ontology,  as exemplified by the
tensed-tenseless distinction, has only been shown up to this point to be unjustified.108 What will
now be the primary focus of concern, is laying the groundwork for suggesting that this widely
accepted ontological thesis is not only suffering from a lack of justification, but is problematic in
other ways as well.
From the metaphysical theses that have already been presented109, in what follows, what
will be provided is an interpretation of temporal ontology that is non-spatialized110, but which is
likewise capable of avoiding the contradiction implied by the spatial-temporal dilemma111 for
such accounts, since the contradiction in question, arises only after the additional metaphysical
assumption that time is serialized has been introduced and added into the mix,112 the account to
be provided here however, makes no such special appeal to this traditional a priori assumption
that is repeatedly made by the A-B tradition, but rather attempts to proceed according to a non-
serialized interpretation of time.113 More specifically, since both A and B theoretical accounts of
time presuppose (and are based on) an initial identification (or reduction) of time to the C Series,
108 §2.2
109 §2.4
110 §2.2
111 §2.4
112 §2.2
113 Cf. Chapter 3 
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and since the C Series turns out to be a spatialization of time in which time gets equated with
something like an abstract depiction of linear space, and since spatializations of time are more
accurately idealized depictions of abstract space as opposed to time, it follows that, if what we
are truly after is affording ourselves with an accurate (temporal) understanding of time, then our
account must try to avoid the long-standing traditional habit of identifying time with something
like the C Series, and with space. Insofar as what we remain sincerely interested in arriving at is
a  less  skewed  understanding  of  the  metaphysics  of  time,  as  opposed  to  becoming  easily
distracted  (as  is  so  often  the  case)  by  the  quantitative-visual  spectacle  and  epistemological
expedience offered by its numerous spatialized doppelganger, it seems we are to proceed initially
with a non-serialized approach, and to stick with it as long as we can, taking it as far as it goes. 
Considerations such as these come to suggest the need for a non-empirical investigation
into the ontology of time.  Insofar as inductive reasoning and the type of inferences that are
involved in making inductive generalizations and predictions are taken to be an essential feature,
and a sine qua non, for any empiricist epistemology that can be said to be worth its salt, any
initial investigation into the fundamental ontology of time must strive (as best it can) to remain at
this  preliminary stage,  “non-empirical”,  since one of the primary things that  serves to  make
inductive inferences such as predictions and generalizations possible in the first place, is nothing
other than the a priori background assumption that time is akin to a kind of Series. As David
Hume  had  famously  pointed  out  in  the  course  of  explicating  his  own  qualms  concerning
induction: 
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All  inference  from experience  suppose,  as  their  foundation,  that  the  future  will  resemble  the
past... If there be any suspicion that the course of nature may change, and that the past may be no
rule  for  the  future,  all  experience  becomes  useless,  and  can  give  rise  to  no  inference  or
conclusion.114 
What  this  comes  to  mean  however,  with  respect  to  the  project  of  attempting  to  properly
investigate the ontology of time, is that this facet (and perhaps essential element) of empirical
investigation  can  be  seen  to  be  something  which  counts  against  the  sustainability  of  any
prospective accounts of temporal ontology that can be seen to have already espoused (explicitly
or implicitly) anything like a thoroughgoing “scientism” from the outset. That is to say, this is a
feature  of  our  current  inquiry which counts  against  any prospective  accounts  of  “time” that
tenaciously cling to the view that philosophical problems are in someway really just scientific
problems, and that they should only be dealt with as such—if they are to be dealt with at all; or
that the sciences are more important than other realms of inquiry for an understanding of the
world in which we live, or even all we need to understand it.115 Moreover, while at this early
stage it still only remains something to be seen, by taking this line of thought a bit further, this
particular and curious feature of our ontological inquiry might also eventually come to count
against a “default” endorsement of the doctrine of metaphysical naturalism as well—by entailing
some version of metaphysical non-naturalism instead—though, in what follows, while others
may choose to, this thesis will not be explicitly advocated for here. 
But at this point we might reasonably ask, “What would one of those purportedly non-
serialized accounts even look like? And where do we even begin to look, in order to find one?”
This question brings us face to face with what might be considered the petitio principii116 of the
114 Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. David Hume. (1748). For further issues pertaining to the “problem
with induction”, see also, Nelson Goodman's “New Riddle of Induction” in Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. (1955).
115 The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Ted Honderich. Oxford. (1995) 814.
116 Here, the actual source of support for the belief that time is either tensed or tenseless is not apparent, but remains
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traditional  A-B (and predominantly “epistemological”)117 conception of the ontology of time;
namely, the assumption that time itself is akin to some kind of linear Series. Traditionally minded
philosophers, who, because of their training, and their having been brought up within the A-B
tradition, are already predisposed to believe that time is either tensed or tenseless, are that much
more  likely  to  accept  the  tensed-tenseless  distinction  as  something  logically  true.  But  this
acceptance  only serves  to  reinforce  once  again  their  preexisting  inclinations  and leave  their
fundamental  metaphysical  presuppositions  about  the  nature  of  time  unquestioned;  like  for
instance, the presuppositions that both the SER thesis is a legitimate metaphysical assumption
and that the ontology of time must be either tensed or tenseless.
Drawing  upon  the  major  lessons  that  are  to  be  gleaned  from the  McTaggartean  and
Bergsonian  accounts  of  time118 what  they end up providing  for  us  in  the  end (that  remains
positive) is an opening for the possibility of beginning to conceive of a metaphysics of time that
is at once, non-serial and non-spatial. To those still clinging to, and operating exclusively within,
the old paradigm of the A and B Series with their ready-made ontology of tensed A properties
and tenseless B relations,  the very idea of a non-serial,  non-spatial  metaphysics of time—let
alone the daunting prospect of how to go about developing one—is bound to remain something
close to being unintelligible. And any initial attempt to conceive of time in this way with only the
limited resources of the old ontology made up of A properties and B relations would likely result
in something that resembles a form of intellectual paralysis. To be sure, with many (if not most)
unstated, an omission which then creates the illusion that nothing more is needed to establish its truth. When in
fact, what is needed, is precisely the one metaphysical thesis that we are no longer at liberty to assume, viz., that
there is nothing at all problematic about serialized conceptions of time.
117 That is, as time has come to be characterized at the hands of both the rationalist and empiricist traditions for what
have  been  pronouncedly  epistemological  designs  and  purposes.  And  which  further  opens  up  a  path  for
understanding phenomenology as capable of providing a decisive third way of gaining access to, and lighting up,
the world, especially with respect to its being and its ontological make-up. 
118 §2.2
50
of us having grown up (and been trained) within that same hundred year old tradition, at first
glance, such a prospect of outlining the contours of a non-serialized conception of time does tend
to present itself as one that is extremely difficult to even imagine, let alone as one that can clearly
be conceived of in any clear and definite way. Non-serialized time? Where does one even begin? 
Our proposed way of approaching this difficult question, in order to begin shedding some
much needed light upon it involves an approach which has come to be fairly well practiced (in
one form or another) in other areas of philosophy; and put simply, involves the idea that our
starting point in the search for an intelligible account of non-serialized time should begin with
something like a return (as best it can), “Back to the things themselves.”119 That is, it is to be
contended  here  that  the  phenomenology120 of  temporality  is  capable  of  providing  a  novel
approach to the question of temporal ontology121 that successfully avoids begging the question
against non-spatialized and non-serialized interpretations of time, and that discloses the fact that
the tensed-tenseless distinction seems to ultimately consist in a false dichotomy.122
Bergsonian intuition may be viewed in many ways as akin to a kind of proto- (or inchoate
preliminary version of) phenomenology. The problem with Bergson's initial account, however, as
has already been shown,123 is that despite its having been one of the first accounts of time to have
successfully noticed and drawn attention to the phenomenon of the spatialization of time and the
119 [»Zu den Sachen Selbst!«]. This is the famous Husserlian slogan of transcendental phenomenology [Edmund
Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen,  vol. 2, Part I, Halle, (1913) 6.], which eventually comes to mean, in the
hands of Martin Heidegger and his “hermeneutic” phenomenology, something much closer to the idea of “To the
matters that matter!”, a helpful and illuminating Heideggerian rendering of Husserl's original German slogan,
which is owed to Charles Guignon and my personal exchanges with him. See Heidegger's Being and Time. H34;
50.n1.
120 For a brief and helpful primer on “phenomenology”, and in particular, the idea of phenomenology as constituting
a methodology for doing ontology, consult The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, which contains a short potted
history of the subject. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. (1995) 658-660. 
121 Cf. Being and Time. H35. 
122 And thereby, fails in its attempt to provide us with an adequate account of the ontology of time.
123 §2.3
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serious problems that arise as a result of it, the alternative and purportedly non-spatial account
that gets introduced in order to take its place, fails to succeed in freeing itself fully from one of
the  deepest  and  most  pervasive  fundamental  metaphysical  background  assumptions  that  has
guided a substantial  portion of the Western philosophical tradition since the Ancient Greeks;
specifically, the a priori metaphysical assumption that time itself is a kind of Series,  a deeply
held  belief  that  remains  constant,  regardless  of  the  issue  of  whether  that  Series  has  been
successively (à la durée) or juxtapositively (i.e. “spatially”, in the Bergsonian sense) construed.124
Traditional attempts at providing A-B phenomenologies of time125 tend overwhelmingly
in the end to be not much more than the impoverished results  of these framed metaphysical
hypotheses  at  work.  Typical  A-B  phenomenologies  of  time  frequently  commit  the  circular
petitito  principii  mentioned  above,  and  oftentimes  lead  to  an  increased  amount  of  post  hoc
theorizing that  is  focused on only the same limited data  set.  And interestingly,  a  commonly
encountered phenomena among both the “analytic” and “continental” philosophical schools, and
their similar approaches to the problem of providing something like a phenomenology of time,
reveals  that,  in  at  least  one important  sense,  these two schools  of  thought  are  really not  so
different after all. This common phenomenon, found within both of these traditions, might be
referred to as a case of “apophenic inversion”.126 
“Apophenia127”  is  a  psychological  term  of  art  that  refers  to  the  act  of  “seeing”
124 For similar issues, see also Clifford Williams' “A Bergsonian Approach to A- and B- Time”. Philosophy. vol. 73, 
no 285. (Jul., 1998), 379-393. 
125 See, “The Phenomenology of B-Time”, Williams; and “The Phenomenology of A-Time”, Smith, in The New 
Theory of Time. Yale UP. (1994). 
126 Another possible way of putting this would be to use instead, terms that have been provided by Wilfrid Sellars in
his distinction between the “manifest” and “scientific” images, in his “Philosophy and The Scientific Image of
Man” (1960). For those who enjoy some familiarity with Sellars' philosophy, “apophenic inversion”, as it is
being understood here, would then be akin to something—to use the Sellarsian idiom—like a reduction of the
manifest  to  the  scientific  image,  which  as  a  result,  thereby  fails  to  be  conducive  at  affording  us  with  a
stereoscopic vision of being. 
127 Conrad,  Klaus  (1958).  “The  Onset  of  Schizophrenia:  An  Attempt  to  Form an  Analysis  of  Delusion”  [Die
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meaningfulness in unconnected phenomena. So for instance, various cases of superstition128, or
the  common  example  of  “seeing”  the  “man  in  the  moon”  etc.,  would  be  good  illustrative
examples of this, and of cases where one thinks one “sees” something that is not really to be
found there. The phenomena of apophenic inversion however (as it is being used here) would
involve a failure to see, or refusal to countenance, some actual meaningful or significant item
that is to be found within phenomena that do happen to be genuinely connected. Cases like these
typically occur as a result of our having placed an undue or artificial restriction upon the analysis
of the phenomena from the start; so that what we are left with, is a predicament in which we are
left operating with what comes to be an impoverished (e.g., say merely a causal, statistical, etc.)
appreciation of the phenomena, and the meaningful connections that are to be found there.129
Instances of apophenic inversion appear to pop up most frequently in situations where, whether
by training or by choice, there is a staunch refusal, hyperbolic denial, or a sheer form of mental
stubbornness, to countenance anything like, or that closely resembles, “teleological” phenomena
—broadly construed. In other words, in cases where there is a preexisting aversion to (or simply
an underdeveloped appreciation of) what Martin Heidegger had referred to in Being and Time as
the “worldhood”130 of the world; which, taking a step deeper into the Heidegger's idiosyncratic
nomenclature, turns out to be akin to something like becoming too fixated, and focusing too
intently, on just the “ontic” features of the phenomena, at the expense of the “ontological”.131
beginnende Schizophrenie. Versuch einer Gestaltanalyse des Wahns] Stuttgart: Georg Thieme Verlag.
128 See, for a classic example, David Hume's famous catalog and analysis of some of the more standard cases of
superstition in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748). 
129 Leaving us with only a desiccated account of the original phenomena as it actually gets encountered, and shows
up for us. 
130 Or, as others have translated this term: the “worldliness” [Weltlichkeit] of the world. Being and Time. §14-24. 
131 “Ontological” [ontologisch] inquiry is primarily concerned with being; whereas “ontical” [ontisch] inquiry is
apophantic, and primarily concerned with beings and the various facts about them. For more on the nature of the
ontic/ontological distinction, see Being and Time H11n3; as well as, Hubert Dreyfus'.  Being-in-the-World. MIT
Press. (1991) 20.
53
Take for example, an audience member watching and understanding a lively game of baseball—
or some other “worlded” phenomena (i.e. a normatively governed framework of meaning and
significance)—by allowing themselves to “get into” the game, as opposed to someone viewing
the  same  thing  (ontically)  but  only  as  a  mere  spectator  without  much  in  the  way  of  an
understanding of what at all is “going on”, or what is actually “taking place”; or conversely, of
someone who may be focusing far too much attention on some trivial or inconsequential (once
more, ontic) features of what is happening so as to get themselves “hung up” on them, which
leaves them missing the forest for the trees, and unable to derive even the most basic enjoyment
or appreciation from attending the game.  
Yet another particularity prominent place to find this kind of phenomena would be amid
performances of the works of nineteenth century French composer and pianist, Eric Satie (1866-
1925). A contemporary of Henri Bergson, and living in the famed Parisian arrondissement of
Montmartre amid countless other talented artists and musicians around the turn of the century,
Satie  is  known for  having  composed unconventional  works.  Among  some of  his  most  well
known are his Gnossiennes, which he composed purposefully without any “time signatures” yet
that he left laden with lacunae. A creative decision, which give the works the provocative effect
of requiring performers of the pieces to figure out some way of intimately blending themselves
with the music in order to bring forth “its time” and fully realize its mood. Something which has
to be done with great care, since to proceed by playing the notes (ontically) in a way that merely
goes  through  the  motions  that  have  been  laid  out  well  in  advance  by  something  like  a
predetermined “tempo”, increases the danger of one's performance of the piece passing over the
lacunae much too quickly, or conversely, of failing to bridge them soon enough; dangers which,
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while still technically allowing for a “performance” of the piece to “occur”, bring with them the
added risk of leaving the performer simply too “out of touch” and “out of step” with the music
their attempting to create. For Heidegger, these kinds of phenomena become roughly equivalent
to something like the passing over, or “de-worlding” of, the world—and as commentators such
as Hubert Dreyfus, Charles Guignon, and others, have aptly pointed out, remains one of the most
important recent contributions to our fundamental understanding of the nature of ontology.132 As
Heidegger points out, 
When space is discovered non-circumspectively by just looking at it, the environmental regions 
get  neutralized  to  pure  dimensions.  Places—and indeed  the  whole  circumspectively oriented  
totality of places belonging to equipment ready-to-hand—get reduced to a multiplicity of positions
for random Things. The spatiality of what is ready-to-hand within-the-world loses its involvement-
character, and so does the ready-to-hand. The world loses its specific aroundness; the environment 
becomes the world of Nature. The 'world',  as a totality of equipment ready-to-hand, becomes  
spatialized [verräumlicht] to a context of extended Things which are just present-at-hand and no 
more. The homogenous space of Nature shows itself only when the entities we encounter are  
discovered in such a way that the worldly character of the ready-to hand gets specifically deprived 
of its worldhood.133 
For better or worse, it would appear that one of the lasting (albeit seemingly unforeseen) cultural
developments to occur in the West, beginning around about the mid to late sixteenth century and
accompanying the  rise  of  modern  European philosophy and its  perennial  habit  of  generally
equating philosophy with epistemology (and of therefore becoming preoccupied with matters
“epistemological”, at the expense of those which are, say, “ethical” or “ontological”; and which
stems just as much from a Cartesian rationalism as does from a Humean empiricism), has been a
steady and apparent  progression  towards  the  de-worlding  of  the  world. An ongoing cultural
development which has only been further accelerated (and exacerbated) by the implementation
of currently fashionable pedagogical practices in Western post-industrialized countries, such as
132 See, Charles Guignon's Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge. (1983) 94-103., and Dreyfus's Being-in-the-
World. (1991) 88-107; 205-206. 
133 Being and Time, H112. 
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the recent “STEM”  movement in education, which takes it as its mission a need to influence the
setting of educational policy and curriculum throughout higher education to favor the fields of
science,  technology,  engineering,  and mathematics,  but  which  frequently gets  carried  out  in
practice in ways that end up somehow making it occur at the expense of the arts and humanities.
This strategy brings about the less than desirable side effect of simultaneously depreciating these
other academic disciplines and their perceived overall importance to academia, as well as to the
greater culture at large; and it is a pattern of activity which slowly begins to transform education
itself into an increasingly ahistorical, asocietal enterprise, leaving its practitioners—as well as its
pupils—with little to no appreciation of education's ability to serve, as it once did crucially, as a
significant form of “paideia” [παιδεία] for upcoming generations. 
To some erudite readers, no doubt some of this stuff may sound vaguely familiar, and
simply to be echoing the similar sorts of cultural observations that were already being made
around the middle to late part of the twentieth century by such theorists as Paul Feyerabend and
others.134 Any such comparison would be a welcomed one however.  Pursuing this  point  still
further,  Peter  Godfrey-Smith  has  provided a  helpful  and concise paraphrase of  Feyerabend's
views on this kind of unforeseen cultural and historical development, writing: 
In  the  seventeenth  century,  according  to  Feyerabend,  science  was  the  friend  of  freedom and
creativity and was heroically opposed to the stultifying grip of the Catholic church. He admired the
scientific adventures of this period, especially Galileo. But the science of Galileo is not the science
of today. Science, for Feyerabend, has gone from being an ally of freedom to being an enemy.
Scientists are turning into 'human ants,' entirely unable to think outside of their training. And  
the  dominance  of  science  in  society threatens  to  turn  man into  a  'miserable,  unfriendly,  self-
righteous mechanism without charm or humour'.135 
And finally,  we ought  not  overlook the  fact  that  it  has  already been over  forty years  since
Feyerabend  first  noticed  this  development  and  began  making  these  sorts  of  admonishing
134 Feyerabend, Paul. Against Method. New Left Books, (1975) 175. 188.
135 Theory and Reality. Peter Godfrey-Smith. Chicago UP. (2003) 112. 
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observations with respect to the path that human culture, and an appreciation of the value and
worth of the individual human self, has unfortunately historically taken here and throughout the
major portions of the West. 
§3.2
HEIDEGGER'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH TO TEMPORALITY
The  primary  aim of  Martin  Heidegger's  1927  magnum opus,  was  an  attempt  at  the
recovery of the meaning of being, which, as Heidegger observes, seems to have been lost since
around the time of the Ancient Greeks, from Plato onward.  Through the course of his perceptive
phenomenological investigations and careful analytic of what it is like to be an existing Dasein
that  has  been thrown,  not  of  its  own choosing,  into  what  may confront  us  as  a  thoroughly
physical, mechanically determined universe, Heidegger has been taken by more than just a few136
to have been moderately successful at uncovering three distinctive modes of being, or ways of
being  for  entities,  which  he  refers  to  as  the  present-at-hand  [Vorhanden],  the  ready-to-hand
[Zuhanden], and Existence [Existenz].137 These three distinct ontological modes are taken to be
the ways of being of substances (objects), worlds, and the self, respectively. Later on, and deeper
into the work (Division II), Heidegger also comes to draw a distinction between at least three
different  ways  of  encountering  “time”,  each  of  which  correspond to  one  of  these  particular
ontological  modes,  referring  to  them  as  “the  traditional  conception  of  time”  [vulgären
Zeitbegriffes]138,  “world-time”  [Welzeit]139,  and  “ecstatic  temporality”[  ekstatisch
Zeitlichkeit]140.141 One of the most significant and lasting contributions Heidegger has made to
136 The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger. Charles Guignon ed. (2006). 
137 Being and Time, §4, §9, §15.
138 Being and Time, §81. 
139 Being and Time, §80. 
140 Being and Time, §65.
141 As we shall see, all of these peculiar ways of encountering “time” will then be given a Kantian spin, through the
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the study and investigation of time was that we first need to get right about the phenomena, and
to allow for ourselves to grow once more accustomed to the forgotten practice of describing the
phenomena  in all its richness and fullness as it actually shows up for us in ordinary everyday
experience, instead of proceeding as has traditionally, and more recently, been done, in a post hoc
manner,  that  starts  off  in  a  manner  that  has  already become restricted  by multiple  question
begging and uncountenanced metaphysical posits.142 Heidegger successfully advanced the field
of  phenomenology a step further  beyond the  work of  its  original  founder  (and his  personal
mentor)  Edmund  Husserl,  by having  supplied  a  crucial  insight,  that  once  made,  places  the
phenomenological method upon a new “hermeneutic” footing: namely, “...der methodische Sinn
der  phänomenologishen  Deskription  ist  Auslegung”,  (“...the  meaning  of  phenomenological
description as a method lies in interpretation”). This insight brought to light the fact which had
gone largely overlooked by Husserl and others, that all description, regardless of how “pure” and
free  from  biases  and  preconceptions  it  may  purport  to  be,  inevitably  already  involves  an
interpretation and some definite and operating background understanding of the phenomena that
is encountered in experience. Providing eidetic descriptions is just one way of “making sense” of
the phenomena.143 As Hans-Georg Gadamer (one of Heidegger's former students) would later
claim in his own highly influential work,  Wahrheit und Methode (1960), “Understanding and
interpretation are indissolubly bound together”.144  Incidentally, this shift towards hermeneutics
was also something that began to occur around the middle part of the twentieth century within
introduction of the idea of time as the “horizon of being”  [Temporalität], whereby time itself comes to play a
transcendental role of both limiting, and making possible in the first place, the being (i.e. intelligibility) of the
present-at-hand, the ready-to-hand, and Existence. Being and Time, H18-19.
142 Many of which, as we are in the process of demonstrating, turn out to be unwarranted.
143 Being and Time, H37.
144 Gadamer, Hans-Georg, Truth and Method. Joel Weinsheimer, and Donald G. Marshall. Bloomsbury Publishing
USA, 2004. 400.
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the analytic tradition in philosophy as well, and became especially apparent within the field of
the  philosophy of  science,  although  it  did  not  go  by the  name there,  but  instead,  began to
manifest  itself there as the issue of the “theory-ladenness” of observation, etc. Of the works
written during this influential period, which dealt with how to go about trying to resolve some of
the  metaphysical  and  epistemological  tensions  that  arose  surrounding  this  issue  of  “theory-
ladenness” include W.V.O. Quine's  Word and Object (1960), Thomas Kuhn's  The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions (1962), and Paul Feyerabend's Against Method (1975). 
Insofar as a hermeneutic phenomenological analysis of being is capable of revealing the
ontological modes of the ready-to-hand and Existence, this evinces the fact that the present-at-
hand is by no means ontologically exhaustive, which further implies, that any explanation of
being which restricts  itself  exclusively to  providing only a present-at-hand account  (as most
extant accounts currently still  tend to do), makes for a grossly inadequate ontology. In other
words, as can be shown, by drawing upon the illuminating phenomenological insights brought
about through Heidegger's work in  Being and Time, it is not the case that the present-at-hand
provides  an  ontologically  adequate  understanding  of  being.  This  is  because  present-at-hand
ontologies,  which Heidegger  shrewdly observed to  be essentially derivative,145 fail  to supply
sufficient resources for adequately capturing the ontological modes of either, the ready-to-hand
(world), or Existence. 
An undesirable result of focusing only on, and working exclusively with, present-at-hand
ontologies, ends up being a significant loss of understanding with respect to the phenomena of
145 As Heidegger notes, “The term 'property'  is that of some definite character which it is possible for Things to
possess. Anything ready-to-hand is, at the worst, appropriate for some purposes and inappropriate for others; and
its 'properties' are, as it were, still bound up in these ways in which it is appropriate or inappropriate, just as
presence-at-hand, as a possible kind of Being for something ready-to-hand, is bound up in readiness-to-hand.”
Being and Time, H83.
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both  the  world  and  the  self,  by  forcing  these  ordinarily  rich  phenomena  into  artificial,
epistemologically derived, and extremely desiccated, categories of “subjects” and “objects with
properties”.146 Others,  such  as  Hubert  Dreyfus,  have  shrewdly  identified  one  of  the  key
differences  between  the  ready-to-hand  and  the  present-at-hand  (which  Dreyfus  chooses  to
translate as “availableness” and “occurrentness”, respectively) as largely boiling down to one of
holism and atomism. Dreyfus goes on to explain the way in which Heidegger, drawing to a large
extent from a familiarity with the existential writings of Søren Kierkegaard, successfully recasts
and repositions the traditional understanding of the self in order for it to become more clearly
seen and accurately understood as a kind of phenomena that is essentially “situated” and that
must be “lived”, and because of this, will always be found to require something like a “world” in
which  for  it  to  “dwell”,  a  phenomena  which  Heidegger  refers  to  literally,  as  “being-in-the-
world”, and which contrasts starkly with the traditionally favored epistemological (i.e. Cartesian)
conception  of  the  self,  as  the  Cogito,  or  “mere  beholding”,  i.e.,  as  a  “self-sufficient  and
autonomous observer”, which begins in a state where it has initially been “cut off” from the
world, and whose essential role and function then becomes the pronouncedly epistemic one of
looking for ways of bridging that “gap” that seems to open up between self and world, usually
through the acquisition of some form of propositional knowledge.147 
The implications of all this are not to be taken lightly, and they lead to nothing less than
the demonstrable inadequacy of the tensed-tenseless distinction to serve as a basis for temporal
ontology. Among the many important outcomes for our understanding of time to have come out
146 For  more  again  on  the  fundamental  Heideggerian  ontological  distinction  between  the  present-at-hand
[Vorhanden] and the ready-to-hand [Zuhanden], by way of a helpful primer, see Hubert Dreyfus' Being-in-the-
World. (1991) 60-87. 
147 Hubert Dreyfus. Being-in-the-World. MIT Press. (1991) 246-341.
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of Heidegger's pioneering work—though which still  has not been fully appreciated148 (having
instead,  gone for  the  most  part  unacknowledged by generations  of  scholars  working in  this
area149)—is the implication, that if what we are initially starting out with is essentially a tensed or
tenseless understanding of time, then the ontological bag that we are what we are inevitably
going to be left holding at the end of the day, will not fail to be one that is characteristic of a
present-at-hand [Vorhandenheit] understanding of being; in other words, the implication that the
tensed-tenseless ontological distinction presupposes a thoroughly present-at-hand ontology.150 In
other words, a present-at-hand understanding of being turns out to be a necessary concomitant of
a tensed or tenseless understanding of time. 
What  this  peculiar,  and historically  overlooked,  relationship  between  time  and  being
comes  to  mean  on  the  flip  side  however,  is  that  if  there  should  happen  to  be  ways  of
understanding being that are not present-at-hand (but that still involve time in some way), then
there have to be ways of understanding time that are not fully captured by the tensed-tenseless
distinction, since both tensed and tenseless conceptions of “time” already entail and require a
thoroughgoing commitment  to  an  exclusively present-at-hand ontology.  What  Heidegger  had
successfully (if only implicitly, and inchoately) shown in Being and Time, is that if the present-
at-hand [Vorhandenheit] fails to be ontologically exhaustive of our understanding of being, then
by that same token, so too does the tensed-tenseless distinction of our understanding of time.151
148 Heidegger too, appears to have been largely unaware of these particular implications of his own findings, as
evidenced  by  the  rather  problematic  characterization  that  he  ends  up  giving  of  the  notion  of  “ecstatic
temporality”, a characterization of time that starts off still initially structured in terms of the traditional concept
of tense. Being and Time. §65.
149 Cambridge Companion to Heidegger. Charles Guignon ed. (2006). passim.
150 This has been a historically neglected logical  implication, which in the end turns out to be symptomatic of
another traditional metaontological assumption that runs even deeper. See Chapter 4. 
151 Again, while Heidegger's innovative account in  Being and Time is sensitive enough to include at least three
different ways (or modes) of encountering “time” (the traditional conception of time, world-time, and ecstatic
temporality),  and while  his  thought  does  begin  to  provide  some adumbrations  of  this  implication when he
addresses the issue of world-time, he nevertheless never fully reaches a point that allows him to clearly see and
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Heidegger was perhaps the first to show explicitly, and phenomenologically, that the ontological
mode  of  the  present-at-hand  turns  out  not  to  be  exhaustive  of  the  being  of  entities.  A
(re)discovery which  enables  us  to  draw the further  conclusion that  the  early Heidegger  was
himself unable to fully draw; namely, that it is not the case that time must be thought of as either
tensed or  tenseless.  The ontological  inadequacy of  the  tensed-tenseless  distinction  comes  to
reside in the fact that (despite what has traditionally been, and continues to be fairly commonly
supposed) this distinction does not succeed in presenting us with jointly exhaustive alternatives
for understanding the nature of time. Rather, and quite to the contrary, it turns out instead, to
consist  in  something  much  more  like  a  false  dichotomy,152and  as  such,  is  ontologically
inadequate to serve as a basis for temporal ontology and for what we essentially take time—and
fundamentally, matters temporal—to “be”.
§3.3
THE ONTOLOGICAL INADEQUACY OF TENSED-TENSELESS ACCOUNTS OF TIME
So despite its long favored and traditional role over the course of the twentieth century of
serving  as  a  central  thesis  among  some  of  the  most  popular  and  standard  views  within
metaphysics and the ontology of time, the tensed-tenseless distinction can be shown to consist in
something more like a false dichotomy. We should remind ourselves, however, that this must be
understood in terms of the “broad scope”, or under a de dicto reading of the proposition that “It
is not the case that time is tensed or tenseless”. This is because, so far nothing has been said up to
this point that would warrant a valid application of DeMorgan's rule to this proposition, which
draw this specific conclusion explicitly. And as a result of this, his overall account of “time” (especially that with
respect to ecstatic temporality) ends up faltering in the end. 
152 In  addition  to  being  one  of  the  more  classic  instances  of  informal  fallacy,  in  propositional  form,  a  “false
dichotomy”, one will recall, some of us by hearkening back to our undergraduate days in elementary logic, is
simply a dichotomy (disjunction) which presents non-jointly exhaustive alternatives (there are other alternatives)
as if they were jointly exhaustive (i.e. as if they were the only ones available).
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would enable us to arrive at the much stronger de re, or “narrow scope”, reading of this thesis, to
mean nothing other than “It is not the case that time is tensed, and it is not that case that time is
tenseless”, that is, that time is neither tensed nor tenseless. And however unconventional it may
at  first  seem to  speak  of  negation  as  capable  of  manifesting  the  logical  phenomena  scope
ambiguity, in contrast to the other, more common, sorts of logical situations (i.e. those involving
quantification,  modal  contexts,  etc.)  with  which  this  sort  of  phenomena  has  been  more
traditionally dealt with in the extant philosophical literature, insofar as the proposition that “It is
not the case that time is tensed or tenseless” is taken to be representative of a false dichotomy, as
it is here, then curiously enough, such an ambiguity does end up arising. And for this reason, we
will  be careful  to distinguish in what follows between the de dicto (broad scope) and de re
(narrow scope) interpretations of this crucial proposition. At this point, we have only just begun
to open up the alternatives. As it stands, the de re reading of this proposition could be true, but
this has not yet been fully demonstrated. What such a demonstration would entail, among other
things, would be a de re reading of the proposition that does logically warrant a valid application
of DeMorgan's rule, thereby making it possible to arrive (with deductive certainty) at the novel
and radical conclusion that time is neither tensed nor tenseless, a  revolutionary thesis which gets
referred to in Chapter 4, as “ontico-temporal nihilism”.  With these discoveries, we take our first
crucial steps towards breaking up the sedimented and calcified background assumptions involved
in both tensed and tenseless interpretations of time, and opening up new (or long forgotten and
covered over) pathways to other viable alternatives.
But at this point we might wish to ask, “How then has this purported false dichotomy
come to serve historically as an ontological starting point, and given, for the traditional way of
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understanding of time? And why has it  not been noticed until  now that the tensed-tenseless
distinction consists of one?”153 The answer to these questions, and others like them, happens to
be because in addition to consisting of a false dichotomy, the tensed-tenseless distinction also
turns out to have become embroiled in a complex question,154 which has served to obfuscate and
effectively disguise this underlying fact. The tensed-tenseless distinction has served as a basic
concept, and jumping off point, that has gone unquestioned for so long, and become so deeply
rooted within so many of the the received and familiar ways of thinking about time, that it now
effectively  traps  any  thought  which  has  bought  into  it,  into  continually  granting  other
fundamental metaphysical assumptions, that there is otherwise very little reason to grant; and in
this way, renders such thinking the unwitting, unsuspecting, and unfortunate victim of a complex
question. The problem, of course, is that our most common and dominant twentieth century ways
of thinking have grown so accustomed to innocently responding and offering up answers to the
question of tense-tenselessness on the occasions it arises, that our thought has repeatedly failed
to recognize what is going on, or even notice this happening. 
In an attempt to lay bare the complex question, and put the matter as straightforwardly
and  matter  of  factly  as  we  can,  it  can  be  seen  that  the  primary  import  of  tensed-tenseless
distinction  ultimately boils  down to  the  posing  of  a  single,  basic  question,  namely:  “Which
ontology, tensed or tenseless155, provides us with the most accurate depiction of the metaphysics
153 In addition, that is, to being an unjustified assumption. Cf. Chapter 2.
154 In general, a “complex question”' is just another basic type of informal fallacy, specifically, one that occurs when
a single “yes or no” question, that is really two questions, is asked demanding a single clear “yes or no” answer
in return, so that no matter how the respondent may answer, a single answer ends up getting applied to both
questions, making it effectively impossible for the respondent to deny something that they might otherwise have
perfectly  good  reasons  and  grounds  for  denying,  without  first  somehow  getting  “outside”  of  the  initial
background assumptions that have led up to the posing of the original question; as for example, in the case of a
complex question like, “Have you stopped cheating on exams?” 
155 That is, one which employs, is committed to,  or quantifies over, A properties or B relations. 
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and reality of time?” Putting the matter this way, means that if (by continuing to neglect and
systematically tamp down the actual phenomena of everyday experience) we keep our thought
too  closely  tethered  to  this  question  in  its  initial  (and  already  somewhat  theory-laden)
formulation, we will continue to remain forced (as we have been historically and throughout
much  of  the   course  of  the  twentieth  century)  to  uncritically  adopt  the  question's  initial
background assumptions, and make them our own. And in so doing, will remain incapable of
supplying ourselves with the sort of recognition necessary to come to the realization that we have
already become ensnared by, and left to dwell within the restrictive and artificial confines of, a
complex question.
In order to have any hope then of successfully freeing ourselves from the clutches of this
complex question, we must first be able to place ourselves in a suitable position somewhere
“outside” of the initial question, from where it can be clearly identified and recognized as such.
By operating on the basic understanding of the tensed-tenseless distinction as ultimately boiling
down to a simple question156, one way of gaining this proper sort of “distance” and acquiring a
vantage point from which to do this effectively (and in a fairly rigorous manner), involves the
deployment of the resources of erotetic logic.157 Given that what we are faced with, with respect
to the tensed-tenseless distinction is something resembling a false dichotomy, and given that one
of the most tried and true ways of shattering a false dichotomy is to look for what both sides of
the  dichotomy might  happen to  have  in  common158,  the  strategy here  will  be  to  look for  a
commonality that exists between the two, and to raise the question “What is it that both tensed
156 That is, “Which ontology, tensed or tenseless, most accurately depicts the metaphysical reality of time?”
157 Erotetic logic, or just simply, “erotetics” as it is sometimes referred to, is a branch of formal logic that involves
the logical analysis of questions. For more on the historical development of erotetics and of erotetic inferences,
see for example the classic texts of A.N. Prior's “Erotetic Logic” Philosophical Review (1955) and Nuel Belnap's
“Questions, Answers, and Presuppositions” The Journal of Philosophy (1966).
158 Which, to put the matter “erotetically”, is to look for what they might both happen to commonly “presuppose”. 
65
and tenseless ontologies have in common?” 
The  answer  to  this  question,  which  is  not  that  hard  to  see,  is  the  commonly shared
assumption among both ontologies159 that the metaphysical and predicative role of time is one of
supplying an answer to the question of “When?”. From the twentieth century onward, research
into the ontology of time has come to consist in mainly a search for the truth-conditions of tensed
statements. An approach to doing “ontology” that appears to have been heavily influenced by the
“linguistic turn” that occurred in philosophy around the middle to early part of the twentieth
century. To this day, such research has remained almost indistinguishable from what has become
an endless exercise merely in semantics (in the bad sense of the term), which busies itself in
providing countless analyses, and counter-analyses, of statements like, “Thank goodness that's
over” in either a tensed or tenseless fashion; an approach to doing temporal ontology which,
regardless of what the final analysis may turn out to be, still systematically betrays a recurring
preoccupation with the question of “When?”160 It is notable however that other, common, English
interrogatives  such as  the  “What?”,  “Why?”,  “Who?” and “How?” for  instance,  are  rare  to
appear  (if  at  all)  in  such  contexts.  Indeed,  the  unassuming  and  widely  held  belief  that  the
“When?” happens to  enjoy some intimate and privileged relationship  with  time and matters
“temporal”, in ways in which these other interrogatives do not, turns out to be a sedimented
assumption running so deep, and so thoroughly, throughout the traditional ways of interpreting
time in the West (with roots that can be seen to extend at least as far back as Aristotle's Πότε),
159 Another common assumption is a shared underlying commitment to the Ancient idea of time as  χρόνος. See,
Aristotle  Categories and  Physics IV. This commonality helps to explain the popularity of attempts to try and
define one ontology (be it tensed or tenseless) in terms of the other, a strategy which has remained especially
fashionable among B theorists, and proponents of both the old and new tenseless theories of time. For more on
these historical attempts, see Quentin Smith's Language and Time. Oxford. (1993). 1-27.
160 See, for example,  The New Theory of Time. Nathan Oaklander and Quentin Smith.Yale University Press, (1994);
as well as  Time, Tense, and Reference. Quentin Smith and Aleksandar Jokic. MIT Press, (2003).
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that in some ways, it is not all that surprising it has gone unnoticed for so long and by so many.
Because of this, very few have ever questioned (let alone bothered to seriously and thoroughly
investigate)  what  role  the  “When?”  actively  plays  in  initially  framing  our  most  basic
understanding of time. 
The commonality that is to be found holding among all tensed and tenseless ontologies
seems simply to be the deep seated conviction that the essential metaphysical function of time is
to provide an answer to the question of “When?”161. Taking the time to closely examine this fact
(which has been predominantly overlooked, and which is still constantly taken for granted) and
performing something like an erotetic analysis on this basic interrogative, we at once begin to
cast some much needed light on a latent—yet profoundly fundamental—assumption that lies at
the heart  of the tensed-tenseless distinction itself. Straightforwardly put however,  tensed and
tenseless  ontologies  are  not  “simply”  just  two  alternatives  for  answering  the  question  of
“When?”—but  more  specifically,  and  fundamentally,  insofar  as  this  “When?”  is  taken  and
understood  to  pertain  to  some  metaphysical  variant  of  “substance”.162 This  peculiar  feature
betrays an unacknowledged prior commitment to the viability and generalizability of “substance
ontologies”, broadly construed. In other words, to couch the matter once more in a Heideggerian
161 In  other  words,  this  is  the  metaphysical  question that  time is  traditionally believed  to  answer,  and is  what
constitutes what may be considered its primary role and overarching metaphysical function. Or, at least this is
purportedly the case, since, as we are currently in the process of demonstrating, this “When?” typically gets
cashed out in practice as really just a peculiar, or funny, kind of “Where?”.  That is, given the underlying spatial
framework from which the answers to these questions are eventually derived (cf. Chapter 2), the intelligibility of
this (“temporal”) “When?” inevitably comes to consist, curiously enough, in terms of a peculiar kind of (spatial)
“Where?”. 
162 Which includes, in addition to the Ancient peripatetic conception of “substance”, the more modern notions of
“objects” and “events”, as well—and regardless of whether the latter are themselves either substantivally or
relationally defined. Substance (οὐσία) constitutes the original Ancient formulation of this longstanding basic
idea, and way of relating time to being, with the more current ontological terms of object and event serving
merely as modern and contemporary philosophical cognates of this same basic idea, which, by and large, they
have remained ontologically isomorphic to, with respect to how, qua beings, they are understood to ultimately
relate to “time”. 
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parlance, tensed  and tenseless  ontologies  are  two alternatives  for  answering  the  question  of
“When?”  insofar  as  this  “When?”  is  taken  to  pertain  to  items  that  remain  sufficiently  and
ontologically akin to the present-at-hand.163 Here “substance ontology”, is taken as a blanket term
referring  to  the  kinds  of  atomistic  accounts  of  being  that  treat  beings  as  ensembles  of  self
sufficient entities with various combinations of properties inhering in them. So that, at the end of
the day, the way in which being ultimately gets understood, is from a standpoint of substance, or
as Heidegger has referred to it, from the standpoint of the “present-at-hand” [Vorhanden], which
is the mode of being of substances. This same, basic, subject-predicate understanding of being,
repeatedly manifests itself throughout much of the history of ontology in the West—with the
most  common  examples  including  the  ontological  categories  of  “substance/attribute”,
“object/property”, “event/tense”, etc.—and continues to serve as the ontological basis and logical
foundation  for  the  modern  day  predicate  calculus  and  first  order  logic,  which,  as  some
philosophers working within the continental tradition have accurately pointed out, is in general
just the formalization of the structure of substances with properties. As the Hubert Dreyfus, for
example, had observed:
You then get the interesting phenomena that it looks, if you believe this ontology, as if all you
need is the right story about all the substances in the world and all their properties, or predicates,
and how these are all related logically by formal relations, and you could describe everything. …
So that everything intelligible about the world and about human beings can be represented in the
predicate calculus. That's exactly what you get if in your ontology you think that the only kind of
being,  the  only way of  being,  is  present-at-hand,  then  everything  must  be  understandable  as
presence-at-hand, and if you've got a formal model for understanding everything as substances
with properties, you ought to be able to understand everything.164 
A large part of Heidegger's primary aim in undertaking a sustained investigation of ontology was
to show not only that all such projects aimed at a “theory of everything” (like the one Dreyfus
mentions above, that seek to neatly and tidily account for everything there is, using the limited
163 Being and Time, H25.
164 Dreyfus, Hubert. Berkeley. (2007). Lecture 1. 53:00. 
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resources of the predicate calculus) are doomed from the start, but also to explain “why” it is that
misguided and misinformed undertakings like this must all inevitably result in failure.
Since answering the question of “When?” with regard to some present-at-hand entity is
what traditional temporal ontology within the A-B tradition primarily accomplishes, what this
recognition  ultimately  comes  to  mean  given  our  current  investigation,  is  that  the  basic
ontological distinction and guiding question of contemporary A-B metaphysics as to whether
time  is  tensed  or  tenseless,  betrays  a  deeper  underlying,  unspoken,  and  unwavering
metaontological commitment to what has come to be known throughout the course of the mid to
late twentieth century among continental philosophers, as the “metaphysics of presence”, which
involves a privileging of the present-at-hand mode of being, by treating it as either ontologically
basic, or in some way exhaustive of being.165 In this context, “presence” serves as an English
translation  of  the  German  “Anwesenheit”166;  a  term  which  itself,  is  more  than  capable  of
supplying a definite answer to the question of “When?”, specifically, in terms of a “here” and
“now” etc. It should also perhaps be noted, that from personal conversations with distinguished
Heideggerian scholars Mark Wrathall and Bert Dreyfus167, it appears that despite this particular
phrase having grown attached to Heidegger's legacy, Heidegger never actually used it himself.
Notwithstanding  this  interesting  historical  tidbit,  “the  metaphysics  of  presence”  remains  an
increasingly influential philosophical term of art that is frequently encountered within the extant
literature surrounding Heidegger,168 and fair number of subsequent philosophers have come to
make extensive use of it (though with varying degrees of success), most notably (or notoriously,
depending on your predispositions), Jacques Derrida, in his attempt to flesh out and develop his
165 Allowing for the metaphysics of presence to come, as it were, in both 'weak' and 'strong' varieties. 
166 Being and Time, H25.
167 Conversations which I remain immensely grateful to have had the opportunity to have. 
168 See for instance, the Cambridge Companion to Heidegger. Guignon ed. (2011). 4, 120, 126.
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philosophy of “deconstruction”.169 All this having been said, Heidegger did however, explicitly
claim  that  παρουσία  and  οὐσία  meant  simply,  “presence”  [Anwesenheit],170 although
contemporary commentators still struggle to fully come to grips with what he actually intended
by this. The metaphysics of presence, as it will be referred to here, will be taken to include a
constellation  of  ontological  claims  which  both  arise  out  of,  and  support,  this  central
Heideggerian insight that historically, throughout much of the West, “being” has more or less
meant something like “presence” [Anwesenheit]. One of the earliest, and most notable, examples
of this, is the Aristotelian view that the archetypal form of being is “substance” [οὐσία], viz.,
“that which persists through change” etc; an ontological assumption, which has given rise to a
highly  influential  twenty-five-hundred  year  old  metaphysical  preoccupation  with  substance
ontologies. Setting the stage for this historical development (which has spanned millenia) to take
place, in Metaphysics VII.1028b. Aristotle writes, 
Indeed, the old question—always pursued from long ago until now, and always raising puzzles  
—'What is being?' is just the question 'What is substance?'.... And so we too must make it our  
main, our primary, indeed (we may say) our only, task to study what is that is in this way.171
It should be clear however, from what has appeared here, that ontologies which can be found to
display this meta-ontological characteristic of a “metaphysics of presence” are in no way limited
to those found just among the Ancients, but also extend to many of the ontologies that have been
maintained throughout history and up through the twentieth century. Ontologies, for instance,
like those that were held by some early modern thinkers, such as Descartes, as well as later
moderns like Kant, that tend to end up construing being to mean more or less something like
“objecthood” [Gegenstand] and which, incidentally, have helped give rise to our own current
169 See  Derrida's “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences”. (1970) 279-280.
170 See Heidegger's Logic The Question of Truth. Lectures (1925-6) passim; and Being and Time. (1927) H25.
171 Aristotle: Selections. Terence Irwin. Hackett (1995) 
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twenty-first century understanding of beings as standing reserve [Bestand]—are arguably best
understood as merely historical offshoots (i.e. just modern variations) of this same basic idea:
that being is essentially presence [Anwesenheit].172  
In this way, the metaphysics of presence can be shown to have served as something of a
metaontological complement of the “When?” and of tensed and tenseless ontologies of time,173
and its treatment of the present-at-hand mode of being as ontologically exhaustive helps us to
explain the vast proliferation of substance ontologies that has historically occurred throughout
the Western philosophical tradition, which includes the A-B tradition.174 And it also has the added
effect, of making it possible for us to begin to see (clearly, and for perhaps the first time) how
seemingly disparate  metaphysical  theories  of  “time”  (like  for  instance,  those  of  presentism,
eternalism,  and  the  growing  block  theories)  all  ultimately  end  up  presupposing  the  same
commonly shared and deeply rooted assumptions with regard to ontology, which subsequently
(and inadvertently) lead to transforming the question of time, primarily into one of tense; so that
the only real question left for a metaphysics of “time” to answer, becomes one that is concerned
with determining which of the tenses actually exist (or are “real”)—be it just one of them, none
of them, or all of them—an outcome which effectively traps any attempt at serious metaphysical
thinking, within a literal metaphysics of “presence”. To draw from Heidegger once more in an
172 Compare also, Heidegger's  Vom Vesen der menchlichen Feiheit. Einleitung in die Philosophie, ed. H Tiettjen
(1982).  Lectures of 1930; with special attention to the characterization provided there of being as “constant
presence” [beständige Anwesenheit] 60.
173 And of the traditional conception of time as χρόνος.
174 It would also perhaps be worth pointing out here that the “process philosophies” of Alfred North Whitehead, et
al. which began to be developed in earnest around the early to part of the twentieth century, hardly fare much
better  than  traditional  substance  ontologies  with  regard  to  the  prospect  of  successfully  overcoming  the
metaphysics of presence, insofar that is, as they still continue to presuppose and remain wedded to a traditional
serialized conception of “time”, which brings with it, a forced adoption of either a tensed or tenseless ontology of
time. Despite their laudable intentions, the problem with such revisionary approaches to ontology (many of
which, as it happens, ended up taking their initial cues from an exposure to the writings of Bergson), is that they
fail to think the question of time radically enough. For more, see Process and Reality. Whitehead, A.N. (1929).
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effort  to  further  illuminate  and  flesh  out  the  significance  of  this  point,  in  Being  and  Time
Heidegger  arrives  at  a  preliminary  definition  of   “being”  as  “that  on  the  basis  of  which
[woraufhin] beings get (or are already) understood”175, and later points out, that historically, the
meaning of being [οὐσία] has just been “presence” [Anwesenheit]176. Given these remarks, and
the actual course of development that the contemporary metaphysics of time has taken since he
made them, he appears to have been largely right on both counts. Further complicating matters
however, has been the historical failure on the part  of the tradition to fully countenance this
initial and fundamental background assumption of the metaphysics of presence (apart from the
act of simply taking it for granted right from the start), and this has had the unpropitious effect of
rendering the complex question (which we are currently in the process of trying to find our way
out of) inscrutable up to this point. 
At  this  point  we  may  recall  once  more  the  significance  of  the  ontic/ontological
[ontisch/ontologisch] distinction. Insofar as our current understanding of being continues to find
itself dominated by, and to remain under the thumb of, the metaphysics of presence, “being”' will
continue to be understood as “presence” [Anwesenheit], and the being of beings will continue to
be cashed out primarily in terms of the present-at-hand [Vorhandenheit].  What this comes to
mean  then,  is  that  any  inquiry  that  ventures  into  investigating  the  nature  of  ontology  that
proceeds  merely  at  the  level  of  the  “ontic”  (which  would  include  most  of  such  inquiries,
especially those commonly found within the natural sciences) not only fails to be sufficiently
“ontological”, but by that very same token, also implies and brings with it, a tacit commitment to
the metaphysics of presence, and the belief that the being of beings is to be defined in terms of
175 Being and Time, H6.
176 Being and Time, H25.
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by the present-at-hand. In this way, to characterize an ontological inquiry as being “merely ontic”
would just be another way to critically convey the fact that it unquestioningly interprets the being
of beings solely in terms of the present-at-hand.  At the end of the day, the result of this analysis
of  the question  of  time as  one that  is  primarily concerned with providing an answer to  the
question  of  “When?”,  yields  an  erotetic  inference177 of  the  form where  the  metaphysics  of
presence comes to play the role of a necessary condition that must first be in place in order to
allow for the tensed-tenseless distinction to arise erotetically.
Viewed from within the field of formal logic, the notion of an erotetic inference—while
still treated to this day as something of a black sheep here throughout the States, and is rarely
found among the usual fare that gets covered in graduate level courses in logic and philosophy at
its universities—may be defined as “a thought process in which we arrive at a question on the
basis of some previously accepted declarative(s) and /or previously posed question.”  Andrzej
Wisniewski,  a  Polish  logician,  whose  pioneering  work  on  erotetic  logic  has  done  much  to
develop  the  field,  astutely  observes,  in  his  book  The  Posing  of  Questions:  The  Logical
Foundations of Erotetic Inferences (1995) that: 
Each inquiry may be viewed as a process of asking questions and looking for answers to them. In
most  inquiries  the  asked  questions  are  dependent  upon  acquired  or  hypothetically  assumed
answers to the previously asked questions as well as some background knowledge: in the light of
what has been established or assumed earlier some questions are admitted, whereas some others
are not. These situations are usually referred to by saying that a given question arises from or is
raised by what has already been established or assumed.178 
177 That is, if time is either tensed or tenseless, then the metaphysical function of time is to answer the question of
“When?” (with respect to some substance, object, or event–i.e. with respect to some version of the present-at-
hand). And if the metaphysical function of time is simply that of making it possible to answer the question of
“When?” with regard to present-at-hand entities,  then the ontological mode of the present-at-hand is getting
privileged  and treated as  either  ontologically basic or  exhaustive of  being (giving rise to  a  metaphysics  of
presence). So if time gets understood as being either tensed or tenseless, then this is nothing short of a continued
endorsement of the steadfast historical commitment to the metaphysics of presence.
178 The Posing of Questions: The Logical Foundations of Erotetic Inferences. A. Wisniewski (1995). 3.
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He goes on to note that “Although erotetic inferences occur in almost every process of reasoning,
they have been systematically ignored by almost all logicians”,  further adding, that: 
The attitude towards erotetic inferences shared by almost all  logicians is  that  these inferences
belong to the “pragmatics” of reasoning, in the very bad sense of “pragmatics” as referring to
something that is not subjected to any objective rules. No doubt, there are erotetic inferences of
this kind. But there are also erotetic inferences which have a well-established structure due to the
existence of some logical relations between their premises and conclusions. An average logician
would probably say that asking questions is a method of expressing our curiosity and curiosity is
subjected to almost everything but not logical rules. But asking or posing a given question is one
thing and arriving at it is another.179 
The intention here is not to embark on a lengthy side debate in defense of the merits of admitting
erotetic inferences to our logical taxonomy and philosophical pedagogy, but rather to provide a
clarification as to what is meant by such admittedly esoteric sounding phrases like “an erotetic
analysis of temporal ontology”. In short, in what follows, the line of reasoning that is employed
in order to further excavate and uncover the basic concepts and background assumptions that
underlie and give rise to the complex question (which, again, is that which serves to obfuscate
the fact that the tensed-tenseless distinction consists in a false dichotomy), will roughly parallel
the  kind  of  logical  apparatus  that  has  already been developed (and  much more  thoroughly)
through the rigorous work of others like Andrzej Wisniewski (1995), Nuel Belnap (1966), and
Arthur Prior (1955).
In order to excavate the complex question and restore its scrutability we must first take
note of the way in which the question of whether time is tensed or tenseless180 assumes from the
outset that another one (which pertains primarily to the mode of being of beings) has already
received its answer in the affirmative. That question may be understood as “Is the metaphysics of
179 Ibid., 210.
180 That  is,  “Does  an  ontology  consisting  exclusively  of  present-at-hand  entities,  entail  a  tensed  or  tenseless
metaphysics of time?” And this of course, is just the traditional tensed-tenseless distinction, and what has been
(and remains) the primary focus of the overwhelming majority of contemporary metaphysical inquiries into the
nature and ontology of time itself.
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presence a legitimate metaontological assumption?” That is, “Is it the case that the present-at-
hand is  either  ontologically  basic,  or  exhaustive,  of  being  so  that  the  primary metaphysical
function of time is one of supplying an answer to the question of  'When?' for such entities?”
Notice,  of  course,  that  if  this  question  gets  answered  in  the  negative  (as  opposed  to  the
affirmative), then the central issue at stake in the other does not even come up, or “arise”.
What this tacit commitment to the metaphysics of presence comes to entail then, is that
when faced with the traditional181 twentieth century choice between the two competing versions
of  conventional  temporal  ontology,  our  thought  winds  up  getting  itself  trapped  in  a  classic
instance of complex question;182 in particular, by a question in which the presumed condition
inherent in the questioning itself, viz. the viability of the metaphysics of presence, has already
been  unquestioningly  granted  and  assumed  from the  outset,183 which  then  leads  all  serious
metaphysical thought about the nature and reality of time to become quite innocently trapped and
forced  into  acknowledging  something  it  otherwise  might  not  find  all  that  compelling  or
necessary to acknowledge, viz., the validity of the tensed-tenseless distinction, and the assertion
that  the  ontology of  time  is  either  tensed  or  tenseless.  Insofar  as  “being”  continues  to  get
construed to mean something like “presence” [Anwesenheit], the question of “When?” naturally
arises. 
In order then to emancipate thought from the restrictive confines and framed hypothesis
of this complex question, we must begin with a repudiation the basic premise of the underlying
primordial question pertaining to the validity of the metaphysics of presence. This means that we
are  to  begin  by  endorsing  the  claim  that  “It  is  not  the  case  that  the  present-at-hand  is
181 Not to mention, that it happens to be a false dichotomous choice.
182 Only, it happens to be a complex question which for most of its history it has remained inscrutable. 
183 Although this has either been subsequently forgotten, or simply covered up.
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ontologically basic, or exhaustive of the being of beings.” And we may justifiably do so based
upon the illuminating phenomenological findings arrived at by Heidegger's work in Being and
Time, and given what actually shows up in the phenomena of everyday experience; to wit, the
ontological modes of the ready-to-hand [Zuhandenheit] and Existence [Existenz], which entail
contrary  to  the  central  assertion  of  the  metaphysics  of  presence,  that  the  present-at-hand
[Vorhandenheit] is not exhaustive of the being of beings.184 Something which leaves us with the
notable implication that “the question of time”, and its metaphysical function, does not consist in
merely providing an answer to the question of “When?”, but involves matters that extend well
beyond  the  traditional  ontological  distinction  of  tense  and  tenselessness.  This  is  a  logical
implication which radically transforms our most basic understanding of what is actually at issue
in the question, placing us in a position to assert in a manner even more thoroughgoing than Issac
Newton  himself,  that  “Hypotheses  non  fingimus”.185 And  from  all  of  this,  since  via  a
transposition186 of the erotetic inference it is the case that “If the metaphysics of presence is not a
legitimate metaontological assumption (that is, if it is not the case that the present-at-hand is
ontologically  basic,  or  exhaustive  of  the  being  of  beings),  then  time  is  neither  tensed  nor
tenseless”, this comes to entail that “Therefore, time is neither tensed nor tenseless.” 187 
184 Cf. §3.2
185 That is to say, that “We frame no hypotheses”. See Newton's “General Scholium”. Newton, Issac. Philosophiæ
Naturalis Principia Mathematica. Second edition (1713). But here, we must also provide some mention at least
in passing of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1781), whereby Newton's famous empricist critque of Leibnizian
and Cartesian rationalism ends up getting flipped on it head, when it comes to be shown that the very possibility
of “emprical expereince or evidence” itself, seems to require in turn, its own cadre of a priori “hypotheses” to be
firmly in place in order for it to begin to even get itself off the ground. And given the nature of our current and
sustatined concern here,  it  is  worth further noting, that  one such a priori  precondition for the possibility of
emprical expereince itself (or, one such “transcendental”, as Kant refered to them) that Kant painstakingly ends
up unearthing, turns out (interestingly enough), to be time itself.
186  A Concise Introduction to Logic. 10th edition. Hurley. (2008) 381.
187 Via a simple instance of modus ponens.  Though unlike the previous, and similar looking, proposition that had
appeared  previously  in  this  chapter,  which  only  succeeds  in  showing  (de  dicto)  that  the  tensed-tenseless
distinction consists in something like a false dichotomy, what can now be seen as a result of having carried out
an erotetic analysis of what is ultimately at stake in the the question of whether time is tensed or tenseless, is now
something the much more thoroughgoing, and much deeper, i.e. that the fundamental claims made by both of
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To  sum  all  of  this  up,  the  tensed-tenseless  distinction  seems  to  consist  in  a  false
dichotomy,  though  this  is  something  that  has  gone  unnoticed  historically  because  of  an
unidentified complex question, which has itself remained inscrutable to the tradition on account
of  a  singular  and  widespread  metaontological  background  assumption:  the  metaphysics  of
presence, which can be illuminated through the identification of an erotetic inference lying at the
heart  of  the  traditional  metaphysical  understanding  of  time.  The  problem  with  the  tensed-
tenseless distinction therefore, is not only limited to the fact that it turns out to be something like
a false  dichotomy,  and thereby fails  to  present  exhaustive  alternatives  for  understanding the
ontology of time (which taken by itself,  still  ends up amounting to be quite a problem),  but
extends beyond this fact, to include the additive one that the alternatives it does happen to put
forth turn out themselves to be further problematic, for the simple reason that they happen to be
of the wrong sort to accurately capture and adequately describe the richness and breadth of the
phenomena of time. The properties and relations of tense and tenselessness remain merely ontic
categories, and as such, fail to be sufficiently ontological. 
Unlike the strictly results oriented and technologically driven scientists, engineers, and
their various popularizers of the day, who care very little (if at all) for such matters, it remains
the task of philosophers (if anyone), to critically raise the serious question as to whether the
normalized heuristics of empiricism and naturalism as widespread and as thoroughgoing as they
are, might actually tend to somehow stand in the way of truth and a proper understanding of
metaphysical reality, as opposed to just simply delivering these things over to us (or at least,
always better than anything else can). As philosophers such as Gadamer, have been careful to
point  out  however,  the  quick,  easy,  efficient,  easily replicable and indoctrinate-able ways  of
these ontologies actually turn out to be false. In other words, that time is neither tensed nor tenseless (de re).
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doing things, are not, by that token alone, necessarily always the best or correct ways to do them.
To be sure, engineers are not scientists. But then much less so are they metaphysicians. And it
remains the height of ignorance, hubris, and a general feebleness of the dogmatic mind, to simply
assume  that  one  can  provide  a  more  or  less  conclusive  picture  of  reality  merely  from  a
consideration of what works or gets the job done in some technical (be it largely just a physical
or mathematical) setting, and to further assume, that nothing which cannot be made to fit neatly
and tidily within such a picture of the world, could possibly matter all that much. Another way to
put this, is to say, that contrary to widespread popular opinion within the learned community, a
metaphysical theory's consistency with the natural sciences, is not the mark of its realty (as is so
often, and uncritically, supposed), but rather, merely of its expediency. And a failure to properly
distinguish the two, curiously and ironically enough, ends up resulting in a metaphysics that
resembles what might be thought of as a polar opposite of an extreme of something like Hegelian
Idealism (of all things), where all that really ends up mattering at the end of the day, is merely
some kind of coherence, a coherence with what currently accepted doctrine/dogma says is the
case,  which  in  this  (naturalistic)  case,  would  turn  out  to  be  “experience”—empirically  and
naturalistically construed; an important (though surprisingly neglected) point, which is made all
the more salient by the discovery of the Quine-Duhem thesis, and the under-determination of
theory by evidence in the philosophy of science, during the course of the twentieth century.188 
Before moving on and leaving this behind, it is worth noting here, that through initial
adoption a Heideggerian approach to the question of ontology, a subsequent rejection of either
(or both) of these polar extremes (i.e.  between the metaphysical extremes of something like
Hegelian Idealism and Physical-Realism/Naturalism) would not thereby imply that we get stuck
188 “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” W.V.O. Quine. The Philosophical Review. 60. (1). (1951). 20-43  
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with having to endorse something like a Cartesian dualism in the end. And this, happens to be
counted among another one of the most unique, and starkly original contributions of Heidegger's
philosophy to the field of metaphysics in general, since by treating Dasein as being-in-the-world,
Heidegger's account seems to provide us with a way to perhaps successfully subvert the issue of
something like metaphysical dualism altogether.  
Another (less heavy-handed) way of putting this important point, is to say that time is
neither tensed nor tenseless, simply because it cannot be. Time is not something solely—or even
primarily—concerned with the merely ontic affair  of supplying an answer to the question of
“When?”, in terms of providing a “temporal” location for what are exclusively present-at-hand
entities, notwithstanding the fact that a longstanding prior commitment to the metaphysics of
presence has made it seem as though this were the case. Both of these traditional “ontologies”
turn  out  simply  to  be   much  too  “thin”189 to  successfully  capture,  fully  account  for,  and
adequately explain the phenomena of time. To attempt to answer the question of time and its
relation to  ontology in a  way that  uses  the  narrow and constricting framework of  the  ontic
distinction between tense and tenselessness, is to fail to provide a syntactically correct and well-
formed answer to the question, and to (continue to) fundamentally misunderstand the question.
In one of his later lectures during the winter of 1941, Heidegger notes: 
We do not apprehend “time” when we say “Time is ….” We are closer to apprehending it when we
say “It is time”. That always means it is time that this happens, this comes, this goes. What we
thus address as time itself is in itself the kind of thing that directs and allots.190 
189 That is, “thin” in the technical sense of misleadingly providing only a non-evaluative (and excessively general
and abstract) description of the actual phenomena as it is encountered and shows up in everyday experience. For
more on the distinction between “thin” and “thick” concepts in normative contexts, see Bernard Williams' Ethics
and the Limits of Philosophy. (1985) 129. 
190 Heidegger, Grundebegriffe. 104. 
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CHAPTER 4
TIME AND ONTOLOGY
§4.1
THE A-B METAPHYSICAL TRADITION AS LEAVING SOMETHING OUT
Reversing  the  traditional  “top-down”  strategy—of  proceeding  (abstractly)  from  an
inherited set of framed a priori metaphysical assumptions about the nature of time to provide an
understanding  of  temporal  ontology  (a  strategy  which  culminates  in  the  tensed-tenseless
distinction and its concomitant dilemma)—our proposal  is to turn this approach on its head, by
beginning instead with a focus on the development temporal ontology itself, and then taking note
of the implications that necessarily follow from that developed ontology to help inform us about
the more general makeup of the metaphysics of time. More specifically, the strategy employed
here proceeds (concretely) from the phenomenology of temporality191 to arrive at a developed
understanding of temporal ontology, and then from this understanding, to one with regard the
overall makeup of the metaphysics of time. The habit of beginning with a set of framed and
inherited metaphysical hypotheses, as the A-B tradition has customarily and historically done,
has inevitably led it to distort, miss, or pass over entirely, key aspects of the phenomena of time
(especially with regard to time's relation to the world, and to the existing human self)  as they
disclose themselves in everyday experience.
“Ontico-temporal nihilism”, as it might be referred to, is the view which entails a de re
reading of the false dichotomy that appeared in Chapter 3,  and simply means that the tensed-
191 Cf. Chapter 3    
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tenseless distinction as a thesis that attempts to describe the ontology of time is false, on account
of the traditional “ontic” categories of temporal being with which it consists being capable of
being  shown  (following  in  the  footsteps  of  Heidegger)  to  be  merely  derivative,  one-sided,
abstract depictions of a more basic, primordial, and “thicker”192 understanding of time. This is
not to say that there might still be much that is either helpful or useful with respect to these more
traditional “thinner” conceptions; only that we first need gain some appropriate distance from
them before reintroducing them back into our basic understanding of time and being, and attempt
to reclaim what they provide for us that remains “positive” in respect to arriving at a viable and
more accurate metaphysics of time. To begin with these traditional A-B categories right off the
bat (as has typically been done), will only make it harder to properly limit and qualify them, and
to keep them within their respective and appropriate place, metaphysically and ontologically. A
radical claim like ontico-temporal nihilism should  not be understood as the end goal in itself, but
as an important step that  only serves as a beneficial heuristic towards furthering the  ends of
developing  something  like  Heidegger's  proposed  “Destruktion”  of  the  history  of  ontology.
Michael Inwood carefully notes that Heidegger's proposed Destruktion of the tradition should
not be taken to involve a case of “destroying” in the usual sense, but more a matter of “loosening
it up” so as to discern the “original experiences” that gave rise to it, in order to show the merits,
failings, and limitations of traditional concepts, and reveal new possibilities that the tradition
obscures,  by loosening the grip that the tradition has on us and enabling us to take a fresh,
unblinkered look at being.193 Or, as Heidegger himself had characterized it: 
But this destruction [Destruktion] is just as far from having the negative sense of shaking off the 
ontological tradition. We must, on the contrary, stake out the positive possibilities of that tradition, 
and this always means keeping it within its limits, […] to bury the past in nullity [Nichtigkeit] is 
192 Cf. Chapter 3
193 Michael Inwood. A Heidegger Dictionary. Wiley, (1999).
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not the purpose of this destruction; its aim rather is positive.194 
To  this  end,  and  utilizing  the  validity  of  ontico-temporal  nihilism  as  a  working
hypothesis,  an  argument  can  be  supplied  which  proceeds  from  temporal  ontology  to  the
metaphysics of time, which allows for the A-B metaphysics of time to begin to be viewed in an
entirely new light. The argument starts by noting that if time consists of either the A or B Series,
then the ontology of time is tensed or tenseless. This statement is a logical consequence of the
horns of the tensed-tenseless dilemma,195 and fundamental implication that results from the a
priori metaphysical assumptions made by the A-B tradition. The next step in the argument is to
bring  about  the  assertion  that  the  ontology  of  time  is  neither  tensed  nor  tenseless.196 This
statement asserts that tensed-tenseless distinction consists in a false dichotomy and glosses over
the  fundamental  distinction  between  phenomenological  and  empirical  experience—where
“empirical experience”, as it has been traditionally understood in both philosophy and the natural
sciences, turns can be seen just to be a “thinly” construed abstract caricature of the “thicker”197
phenomena of our everyday concrete dealings with the world. This means that tensed properties
and tenseless  relations  are  something like  a  priori  theoretical  presuppositions,  or  conceptual
“posits”, that get read into the actual phenomena of temporality after the fact198, and only after a
reflective or theoretical stance towards beings in the world has somehow already been taken up,
a stance which we have seen, equates the being of entities with the mode of being of the present-
194 Being and Time, H22.  
195 Chapter 2.
196 That is (de re) via ontico-temporal nihilism.
197 That is, once again, “thick” in the technical (Williamsian) sense of the term, which is taken to involve matters
pertaining to  teleology and normativity,  beyond that  of  the  mere “brute  facts” that  get  studied  by,  and  are
characteristic of, the sorts of investigations carried out within the natural sciences.  Bernard Williams. Ethics and
the Limits of Philosophy (1985).
198 And in a manner reminiscent of post hoc theorizing, which as a result of the circular reasoning it entails, makes
them appear to be true—and be that much more likely to be accepted as being true—despite the fact that they
actually aren't. 
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at-hand  and  with  traditional  substance  ontologies.199 These  ontico-temporal  properties  and
relations are themselves the result of an a priori positing of an abstract and detached serialized
metaphysics of time, viz., the SER thesis.200 All of this then leaves us with the conclusion that
therefore, time consists of neither the A nor B Series, and that metaphysically speaking, time is
neither A nor B theoretical; in other words, with the conclusion that that the SER thesis is false.
This conclusion follows via a simple instance of modus tollens.201 In this case, the metaphysics of
time  consists  of  neither  the  A nor  B  Series,  and  the  traditional  A-B conception  of  time  is
delusory.  The metaphysics  of  A-B time,  as  it  has  traditionally  been understood,  would  then
culminate (at best) in merely a coherent story that gets told about a fictitious and abstract realm
of reality, that gets referred to as “time”, but which has been tacitly and closely modeled on a
preconceived understanding of space.202  A conception of “time” which—despite whatever its
positivistic utility, or “success” it may tend to afford us when viewed from within only narrowly
construed,  thoroughly  naturalistic,  and  strictly  theoretical  contexts203—has  little,  if  any,
significant role to play with respect to improving our fundamental grasp of the metaphysical
nature of time (or of being, for that matter). As the phenomenological analysis of temporality (in
Chapter 3) has displayed, phenomenological evidence for the existence of such merely posited,
and  thinly  conceived,  abstract  spatialized  ontologies,  remains  surprisingly  lacking.  In  our
199 Cf. Chapter 3.
200 Cf. Chapter 2.
201 An argument which, when coupled with the arguments that have already appeared Chapter 2, means that two
separate arguments have now been provided entailing a rejection of the traditional A-B conception of time. The
first, proceeds to this conclusion by demonstrating the traditional metaphysics of time is self-contradictory at the
theoretical level; while this one, arrives at a similar rejection of the traditional A-B conception of time, but by
way of a careful examination of the spurious ontology which issues from this problematic metaphysics, and
checking it against what actually shows up for us phenomenologically within concrete everyday experience,
where  the  phenomenological  inaccuracy  and  ontological  inadequacy  of  this  conventional  tensed-tenseless
ontology provides grounds for rejecting its progenitor metaphysics.
202 Cf. Chapter 2.
203 That is to say, contexts which are themselves, concerned first and foremost merely with manipulating and trying
to exercise some control over what are purely physical phenomena.
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concrete successful everyday dealings with the world, and finding our way around day to day,
we do not initially encounter anything like the A properties or B relations that get posited from
the outset by the tradition.  Although we do commonly have it suggested to us, and hear the
world (and things in it) constantly talked about as if it, and the rest of reality, were somehow
metaphysically carved up into  something like three distinct  realms of  the  Past,  Present,  and
Future,  etc.204 (including—ironically  enough—in  contexts  which  involve  what  might  be
considered to be strictly empirical matters, such as those found within the natural sciences etc.,
notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  initial  background  assumptions  of  those  purely  physical
contexts,  typically,  and by and large,  already happen to logically entail  a  B theoretical—i.e.
“tenseless”—metaphysics). 
Interestingly, matters such as these turn out to be something that even members of the
tensed-tenseless  tradition  (especially  B  Theorists),  have  themselves  been  made  consciously
aware of at times. As prominent B theorist, Hugh Mellor, pointed out decades ago:
Our temporal interest in reality is indeed tensed; but as we shall see, the tense attaches to our  
interest, not to the reality. Nor do we really observe the tense of events. The idea that we do comes 
from confusing the events we observe with the experience of observing them. Suppose I am  
looking through a telescope at events far off in outer space. I observe a number of events, and I 
observe the temporal order in which they occur: which is earlier, which is later. I do not observe 
their tense. What I see through the telescope does not tell me how long ago those events occurred. 
That is a question for whatever theory tells me how far off the events are and how long it takes 
light to travel that distance. We used to think celestial events much closer to earth, and concluded 
that they were much more recent than we now think them to be. So, depending on our theory, we 
might place events we see anywhere in the A series from a few minutes ago to millions of years 
ago. Yet they would look exactly the same. What we see tells us nothing about the A series  
positions of events. It does not even tell us that the events are past rather than future. Someone 
who claims to see the future in a crystal ball cannot be refuted by pointing to some visible trace of 
pastness in the image. Our reason for thinking that we cannot observe the future rests on theory, 
not on observation.205 
204 The proper nouns of “the Past”, “the Present”, and “the Future” set up a very peculiar and distinctive way of
referring to and talking about the phenomena of the world, which, given along with their relative frequency, can
be taken as a sign indicating just how far along this fictionalized spatial ontology has taken root and gained
ground within a particular intellectual/linguistic community. 
205 Mellor, Real Time. (1981) 26. 
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Of course what must also be taken into account and added to this, is the further observation that
Mellor himself (qua B theorist) is already operating within, and remains deeply indebted to, the
same fundamental sort of serialized metaphysics of time as the A theorist—a metaphysics of
time, which, as it has been shown, more or less equates “time” with space. So that when Mellor
comes to suggest, that despite the lack of observational evidence for tense (A properties), there
nevertheless turns out to be plenty of it for “temporal” order (B relations)—something which he
later tries to interpret as a vindication of his own preferred version of the B theory of time—he
can  be  seen  to  inevitably  be  mistaking  “temporal”  phenomena  for  what  are  merely  just
rudimentary  spatial  occurrences  (involving  distance,  direction,  motion,  etc.).  Since,  the  B
relations  of  “earlier  than”,  and  “later  than”,  etc.,  get  treated  in  practice—despite  all  the  lip
service that gets paid espousing the contrary—by members of the tradition (and in this practice,
Mellor  himself  is  of  no  exception)  as  logically  indistinguishable  from  their  spatial-linear
counterparts and transitive asymmetrical relations of “to the left of”, “to the right of”, etc., the
conflation of time with space at the level of the phenomena turns out to be an inevitable outcome
of his B theoretical view.206. This point becomes strikingly manifest when Mellor later attempts
to characterize this experience of “temporal” phenomena, writing: 
Nothing  is  more  observable  than  temporal  order.  We  see  it  for  example  whenever  we  see  
something move. Suppose I see the second hand of a watch going round clockwise. That means I 
see the event of it passing the numeral '1' occur just earlier, not just later, than the event of it  
passing the numeral '2'. To see any kind  of change occur in a definite direction is to see that one 
event is earlier than another rather than later than it.207 
Lastly, it is also worth pointing out that the specific example which Mellor happens to stumble
upon in the course of trying to make his case here, is one which involves a simple case of passive
206 For other clear examples of this, see Logic: A Very Short Introduction. Graham, Priest. 55-62. (2000); & Tallant,
Jonathan. Metaphysics: An Introduction. 142-165. (2011)
207 Mellor. Real Time, 27
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observation (and coincidentally, of a spatial-visual phenomenon to boot), which further betrays
the fact that his initial metaphysical and epistemological background assumptions about nature of
“time” have remained tacitly wedded to a more traditional Cartesian conception of the self as
Res Cogitans and to something like a spectator theory of knowledge.
A more careful, and rigorous investigation of the actual phenomena of lived experience,
brings out the fact that A properties and B relations are not the sort of entities that show up in the
course of our everyday experience of the world, but are (at best),  merely abstract theoretical
posits that inhabit and enframe a realm which remains once removed from the actual world. If
they do make any sort of appearance, it is noteworthy that this typically occurs in contexts that
are already in some way theoretical,  or somehow already abstracted from ordinary everyday
phenomena,  which  reveals  them  to  be  to  a  fair  extent  artificial,  suspect,  and  increasingly
contrived.208 Moreover,  the  fashionable  practice  of  referring  to  such  ontologies209 as  either
“tensed” or “tenseless”, has only served to further obfuscate this fact, and cover things up, by
conceptually distancing us from the reality that  all  that  these “temporal”  ontologies actually
consist of are just the confused abstract conceptualizations that result from a misguided attempt
to  try  and  “locate”  beings  “in  time”  by means  of  an  idealized  and  fictitious  set  of  spatial
locations and spatial relations, which are then said to be “temporal”.210
The implications of all this lead us to yet another helpful heuristic for those who remain
interested in taking some serious and productive steps forward towards developing something
like a Destruktion of the history of ontology, which can be thought of as an “error theory” of A-B
208 In this, we understand ourselves once again, merely to be echoing the major claims that have already been made
(only much more eloquently) by Henri Bergson, in his Time and Free Will (1889).
209 That is, ontologies consisting of A properties and B relations. 
210 Recall, that tenses get analyzed at the hands of the tradition as “A properties”, with tenseless relations being
understood as “B relations”, but as we have seen, upon closer inspection, A properties and B relations turn out
just to be fictitious locations and spatial relations within the idealized spatial-linear C Series. 
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time.211  The error theory of time entails an anti-realism with regard to serialized conceptions of
the metaphysics of A-B time, and their attendant tensed and tenseless ontologies. 
An argument has already been provided that supplies reasons for maintaining that the
SER thesis is false;212 so if the reasons that have been given are any good, then that means (via
DeMorgan) that both the A and B theories of time must be false. Though if it were preferred, the
original argument could always just be tweaked to provide separate substitution instances of the
reductio and to arrive at the exact same conclusion,213 only using a different route. What this
means,  is  that  all  that  is  left  to  show,  in  order  to  successfully  characterize  the  traditional
conception of time as one which results in an “error theory”, is for each of the two ontological
theses within the central  dogma of the traditional conception of time to likewise be globally
false. A proposition, which coincidentally, happens to be precisely what has been taken as our
initial  working  hypothesis  and  referred  to  here  as  ontico-temporal  nihilism, and  for  which
arguments and phenomenological evidence have likewise already been provided.214 
In presenting the actual argument for the error theory of A-B time, the argument can be
seen to consist of two basic premises.215 The first, is that there are no ontico-temporal features in
211 This version of error theory pertains to “time”. As it is presented here, it is intended to closely parallel a version
of  metaphysical  error  theory  with  which  philosophers  are  much  more  familiar,  and  better  acquainted  with
historically, that happens to be found within the realm of ethics and morality, and that received its first significant
treatment and subsequent development in J.L. Mackie's Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, (1977). 
212 Cf. Chapter 2 and The reductio ad absurdum of the SER thesis and the traditional A-B conception of time. 
213 That is, an argument involving a separate rejection of the A theory and a separate rejection of the B theory. 
214 This  makes  it  once  more  possible  to  glimpse  the  trappings  of  what  has  arguably remained  a  distinctively
“Heideggerian” approach to the question of ontology. As Heidegger himself, famously remarks in  Being and
Time, “Phenomenology is our way of access to what is to be the theme of ontology, and it is our way of giving it
demonstrative precision. Only as phenomenology, is ontology possible.” Being and Time, H35.
215 Given the structural  and metaphysical  similarities  that  can be seen to  hold between the more common and
familiar moral error theories, and the temporal one that is currently being explicated here, despite the latter being
a metaphysical thesis on the nature of “time” as opposed to one of “morality”, it nevertheless ends up being
immensely helpful (by way of clarification) to draw from currently existing resources on error theories in the
course of developing our temporal version. To this end, we will  draw heavily from extant resources on the
subject, such as those that can be found in Shafer-Landau's cleanly presented The Fundamentals of Ethics to aid
us in the clarification and communicability of our temporal account. As a result, much of what is to follow will
remain deeply indebted to, and will very closely parallel, Shafer-Landau's discussion of error theory as it pertains
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this world.216 The traditional claim, that time is either tensed or tenseless, consists in a false
dichotomy,  and  one  in  which  the  disjunction  put  forth  not  only  fails  to  list  exhaustive
alternatives, but where both of the alternatives that it does list, are understood to be false. The
second  premise  in  the  basic  argument  for  the  error  theory  of  A-B  time,  is  the  additional
proposition that no ontico-temporal judgments are true. And this is simply because of the fact
that there is nothing for them to be true of. There are no ontico-temporal facts, and so no ontico-
temporal claims can be accurate, since there are no ontico-temporal facts for them to record.217
Taken  together,  these  two  premises  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  our  sincere  ontico-temporal
judgments try, and always fail, to adequately describe the temporal features of things. Rather, we
always lapse into an error when thinking in ontico-temporal terms. We are trying to state the
truth when thinking in ontico-temporal terms, but since there is no ontico-temporal truth, all our
ontico-temporal  claims  are  mistaken;  hence  the  error.  This  means,  that  both  the  tensed and
tenseless views of time are equally metaphysically bankrupt, as there is some deep mistake that
everyone committed to serialized A-B conceptions of time and ontico-temporal ontologies is
making.  The goal  here has been to reveal  that  mistake,  and expose the truth,  that  serialized
ontico-temporal time is (at best) nothing but a fiction.218 Ontico-temporal claims remain globally
false in that they claim certain ontico-temporal facts exist, which do not in fact exist.
At  this  point,  despite  how simple  (and compelling)  this  basic  argument  for  the error
theory of A-B time happens to be, those still looking for a way out, might well begin to wonder
to  ethics  and  morality—at  times,  serving as  really just  a  recapitulation of  that  original  discussion with the
appropriate substitutions having been made for the words “moral” and “temporal”, etc. Russ Shafer-Landau's
The Fundamentals of Ethics Oxford UP: (2012) 306-311. 
216 This  is  simply  the  central  claim  of  ontico-temporal  nihilism  that  temporal  ontology  is  neither  tensed  nor
tenseless. 
217 Cf. Shafer-Landau. Ibid., 307.
218 Cf. Shafer-Landau. Ibid., 307.
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whether  the  adoption  of  some  scientifically  motivated  version  of  “instrumentalism”  or  a
“pragmatic theory of truth” might help to provide some way of staving off, or side-stepping, the
undesirable import of the theory's radical metaphysics. Any semblance of relief, however, would
only be superficial. Apart from the fact that the primary motivation for the implementation of any
such pragmatic strategies would simply be one of attempting to “resurrect” the traditional A-B
metaphysics of time, the metaphysical result of such a resurrection (even if only to have ontico-
temporal entities serve as something like “useful fictions”—and nothing more) would once more
place  us  right  back  in  the  untenable  position  from  which  we  originally  started,  clinging
tenaciously onto what remain merely thin, and ontologically inadequate, conceptualizations of
time and temporal phenomena. More to the point, Bertrand Russell once famously objected to
the overhasty adoption of pragmatic approaches to truth, that beliefs can be “useful, but yet still
plainly false”. Adding to this, Nicholas Rescher aptly observes that: 
Various continental philosophers have disapprovingly seen in pragmatism's concern for practical  
efficacy—for  'success'  and  'paying  off'—the  expression  of  characteristically American  social  
attitudes:  crass  materialism  and  näive  democratism,  [and]  thus  looked  down  upon  as  a  
quintessentially  American  philosophy—a philosophical  expression  of  the  American  go-getter  
spirit with its-success oriented ideology.219 
Observations such as these make for some admittedly fair and pertinent (if somewhat harsh)
criticisms  of  American  pragmatism,  when  viewed  from  the  standpoint  of  metaphysics—
criticisms, which vast numbers of contemporary American philosophers are likely to have failed
to  even  consider,  but  which  nevertheless  afford  a  more  comprehensive  understanding  and
appreciation of the limits of such aspirations to pragmatism, by identifying and acknowledging
the socially and historically determined context from which they contingently arose. 
219 “Pragmatism”. Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Nicholas Rescher. 712. (1995). For a similar critique, see also,
Heidegger's 'Die Frage Nach der Technik'. 'The Question Concerning Technology'. (1954). Trans. David Krell.
Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings. (1976).
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Digging deep enough within the traditional metaphysical paradigm, we eventually arrive
at the central dogma of the A-B tradition, namely, that time consists of the A Series if and only if
time is  tensed,  but it  consists  of  the B Series  if  and only if  it  is  tenseless (that  is,  that  the
metaphysical nature of time is A theoretical iff the ontology of time is tensed, but is B theoretical
iff the ontology of time is tenseless). This thesis has been historically assumed as an a priori
metaphysical background assumption by the A-B tradition, and serves as the origin and ground
of the horns of the tensed-tenseless dilemma by entailing them as a logical consequence; and it
has historically served to  help to mask the possibility of understanding the A-B tradition as
resulting in something like an error theory of time. Given the arguments that have been presented
here,  the  central  dogma  of  the  traditional  conception  of  time,  despite  being  internally  and
logically consistent (in  regards to its  characterization,  and listing of necessary and sufficient
conditions),220 results  in  a  proposition  whereby  everything  it  actually  claims  about  the
metaphysical  and  ontological  reality  of  time  seems  to  be  false.221 Ironically,  and  somewhat
counter-intuitively however, the central dogma itself still turns out to be true, though not for the
sorts of reasons that its disciples would have hoped, or have historically assumed.222 This has
been made possible because of the simple fact that a biconditional is true in first-order logic only
when its two components have the same truth value, otherwise it is false. In this particular case,
220 That is, that A theoretical time is in some way “dynamic”, and taken to involve genuine change, while the B
theory remains capable of affording us with only a “static” conception of time, etc. Despite the fact that (on a
few  occasions)  there  have  been  some  who  have  attempted  to  challenge,  and  rebel  against  this  standard
interpretation, it remains to this day, largely unchallenged as the “received view” within the extant literature on
the subject.  For more relating to this,  see for example,  “Changes in Events  and Changes in Things”.  Prior.
(1968). The Philosophy of Time. Lepoidevin and MacBeath eds. (1993); as well as “The Problem of Time and
Change”. The Ontology of Time. Oaklander. (2004).  
221 More specifically, it results in a proposition in which the elements of both biconditionals are capable of being
shown to be false, which thus renders the broader conjunctive statement and main logical connective true, a
curious feature, and peculiar ambiguity of the central dogma, which has historically hampered the recognition of
the possibility of an error theory of A-B time up to now. 
222 But rather, simply because it turns out in the end, to be a straightforward case of “F's all across the board.” See 
(Figure 5).
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the two biconditionals that make up the central dogma of the traditional conception of time turn
out to indeed be true, because each of their respective components do end up having the same
truth value,  only this  value is  not “truth” (as has been typically supposed),  but “falsity”;  an
unexpected  outcome  which  curiously  enough,  still  preserves  the  overall  truth  of  the  main
conjunction  at  the  heart  of  the  dogma.  Furthermore,  the  central  dogma  of  the  traditional
conception of A-B time turns out to be derivable from the error theory and the joint claims that
the metaphysics of time is neither A nor B theoretical, and that the ontology of time is neither
tensed nor tenseless.223 This logical peculiarity of the biconditional's truth functionality is what
allows  for  the  central  dogma  to  turn  out  to  be  true,  despite  the  fact  that  all  of  the  major
metaphysical assertions it makes about the nature of time seem to be false. In other words, the
truth of the dogma itself, can be taken as no indication of the truth of its major metaphysical and
ontological claims. Putting this point still more explicitly by laying it all out on a truth table, at
the end of the day, the actual import of the traditional A-B conception of time turns out looking
something like this: 
( A ↔ T )   ^   ( B ↔ L )
  F       F             F      F
   T
A simple yet accurate way of understanding the history of the philosophy of time as it has been
conducted within the A-B tradition, is as it having consisted of a various number of attempts to
show  that  one  of  the  biconditionals  comprising  the  central  dogma  has  metaphysical  and
ontological elements that are all true, while its counterpart biconditional has elements that are all
false; a strategy which might appear at least prima facie to successfully establish the truth of
223 Cf. Chapters 2 & 3.
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Figure 5
one's chosen metaphysical and ontological A-B theses on time, but which notably, merely serves
to preserve common belief in the traditional assumption of the SER thesis.
It is also perhaps worth pointing out here, that given his own understanding of the way
the A, B, and C Series related to one another, McTaggart himself, would have understood it to be
impossible for there ever to be an specific arrangement of truth values within the central dogma
where there happened to be something like: all “T's on the left, and all F's on the right”, or vice
versa, etc. A fact, which has been consistently overlooked by members of the A-B tradition, but
ends up providing us with yet another explanation and reason for seeing why those who remain
caught up in an attempt to successfully formulate a viable metaphysics of time, that begins based
upon an account of time that resembles something like McTaggart's A or B Series, are doomed
from the start.  This is  because the main connective operating within the central  dogma is  a
“conjunction”, a fact that, astonishingly enough, somehow manages to get overlooked by the
multitudes still currently operating within the tradition; who erroneously proceed, and carry on
with  their  research,  as  if  this  conjunction  were  instead  something  more  like  a  exclusive
“disjunction”.  A widespread error, that most likely results from a conflation of the central dogma
of the traditional conception of time, which serves as the tacit origin and ground of the traditional
metaphysical paradigm, with the SER thesis—a prominent metaphysical thesis found within the
paradigm itself, and occurring in the tensed-tenseless dilemma. Recalling the previous findings
of Chapter 2, it can also be seen that the actual reason for why the main logical operator of the
central dogma turns out to be a conjunction (and not a disjunction), is because the dogma itself
ultimately just consists of two alternative ways of interpreting the same thing; specifically, the C
Series; which, as we have shown, just turns out to be a roundabout and indirect way of referring
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to  an  abstract  spatio-linear  “order”,  viz.,  space  (with  the  subsequently  appended  ad  hoc
assumptions being made that one of these is to be thought of as “static”, with the other one
getting characterized as purportedly “dynamic”, etc.).
A significant implication of this traditional strategy for our understanding of time then, is
that  it  effectively precludes any attempt to  transcend the basic  metaphysical  and ontological
concepts and starting points that have already been assumed from the outset. The A-B tradition
has historically assumed that to do the philosophy of time, in a respectful or rigorous manner,
one must first off, antecedently grant these ready-made basic concepts and their concomitant a
priori background assumptions. In fact, one of these fundamental assumptions, which continually
gets passed along (the SER thesis), appears to have roots that can be traced back at least as far as
Aristotle and his writings on time over twenty-five-hundred years ago.   As Heidegger himself
has noted, 
Ever  since  Aristotle  all  discussions  of  the  concept  of  time  have  clung  in  principle  to  the
Aristotelian definition...”, adding,  “Thus for the ordinary understanding of time, time shows itself
as a sequence of nows which are constantly 'present-at-hand', simultaneously passing away and
coming along. Time is understood as a succession, as a 'flowing stream' of “nows”, as the 'course
of time'.224
One could  argue,  and quite  persuasively it  seems,  that  a  major  reason why progress  in  the
philosophy of time has been so slow going over the centuries, and why it has been marked by so
much repetition of what has already been said, is due in large part to the extraordinary amount of
theoretical conservatism that it harbors for its most cherished (and as we have seen, problematic)
basic  concepts.225 In  this  vein,  Quentin  Smith,  a  highly  prolific  philosopher  of  time  and
influential A theorist, has observed that: 
224 Being and Time, H412; H422.
225 Revealing Quine's still fashionable, and oft heeded, siren call for “parsimony” in ontological contexts, to be in
the  end  really  something  of  a  double-edged sword.  Quine,  W.  V.  (1948).  "On What  There  Is".  Review of
Metaphysics. 2: 21–38.
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The  philosophers  of  language  have  developed  theories  with  important  implications  for  the
tensed/tenseless time debate, though they have rarely explored the implications their theories have
for the philosophy of time. Likewise, the philosophers of tensed or tenseless time often make new
or  substantial  contributions  to  the  philosophy of  language  in  the  course  of  developing  their
arguments,  though  they rarely write  essays  that  aim to  establish  theses  in  the  philosophy of
language as an end in itself or that aim to bring their results to the attention of philosophers of
language.226 
Smith, a mentor during my early years in graduate school, had frequently bemoaned the fact that
so much of what had continued to pass muster and be published in professional peer-reviewed
philosophy journals on the topic of time were views that were unmistakably identifiable as other
ones which had already been espoused years ago—and in many cases, already been refuted, and
demonstrated to be nonstarters. Smith saw the root cause of this unfortunate tendency within the
analytic tradition (a tradition which, not without some irony, he himself continued to participate
and play a major part in) to be the customary practice on the part of scholarly analytic journal
article  writers  and editors,  to  arbitrarily  and drastically  limit  their  focus  of  attention  almost
entirely on articles that substantially referenced only recent works that appeared within the past
two to three years, or so. An ahistorical practice, to say the least, which ultimately culminates in
filling a vast number of academic philosophy journals with what are claimed to be “ongoing”
debates,  which,  quite  unbeknownst  to  the  writers  and  editors  “participating”  in  them,  have
actually already been decidedly settled years ago.227
For over the past hundred years, the A-B tradition has remained one which has repeatedly
contented itself with only the semblance of progress and the illusion of advancement, having
preoccupied itself instead with the proliferation and contrivance of increasingly more spectacular
red herrings228, which happen to suggest ever more elaborate and exotic sets of “conclusions”
226 Time, Tense, Reference. Quentin Smith and Aleksandar Jokic. MIT Press. (2003) 1. 
227 For a similar, and related discussion involving many of these same sorts of observations, see also Richard Rorty's
incisive posthumously published article, “The Philosopher as Expert”. 
228 Cf. Chapter 3.
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than the last,  about  the nature of “time”,  but  which universally fail  to  fundamentally put  to
question that  which has already been uncritically accepted regarding time's  basic  relation to
being—and to ourselves. Which then comes to mean, that Augustine's frequently cited sage-like
observations about time, turn out to indeed be quite meaningful and prophetic, though not for
any of the sorts of reasons that have typically been touted by the philosophical tradition (which
for some reason, almost always wind up involving a depiction of time as deeply profound and
inherently  mysterious  etc.),  but  rather,  on  account  of  the  straightforward  Heideggerian-
Bergsonian explanation that  the traditional  conception of “time” is  simply not  what  actually
shows up in ordinary everyday experience. Augustine then, was simply among the very first to
have honestly and accurately observed this fact. And it is only when he misguidedly attempts to
reconcile this phenomenological fact of his actual lived experience, with the traditional spatio-
linear model and conception of “time” (as a Series) that he inherited from Plato and the Greeks,
that problems, confusion,  and “mysteriousness” begins to arise,  leaving him left stuck in the
precarious epistemological position of having to conclude of time that it  is something that is
understood, yet unknown: 
What, after all, is time? Is there any short and simple answer to that question? Can anyone even 
wrap his mind around time so as to express it in words? Is there anything we talk about more  
familiarly, more knowingly, than time? And surely we understand it when we talk about it; we  
even understand it when we hear someone else talking about it. So what is time? If no one asks 
me, I know; if I want to explain it to someone who asks me, I do not know.229
At this point, some might reasonably begin to wonder whether with the proclamation of
an  “error  theory  of  time”,  we  succeed  in  accomplishing  anything  beyond  just  a  grandiose
229 Augustine.  Confessions.  Bk XI;  Hyman,  Arthur,  James  J.  Walsh,  and  Thomas  Williams.  Philosophy in  the
Middle Ages. Hackett Publishing, (2010) p. 75. 14.17. 
quid est enim tempus? quis hoc facile breviterque explicaverit? quis hoc ad verbum de illo proferendum vel cogitatione
comprehenderit? quid autem familiarius et notius in loquendoconmemoramus quam tempus? et intellegimus utique, cum id
loquimur, intellegimus etiam, cum alio loquente id audimus. quid est ergo tempus? si nemo ex me quaerat, scio; si uaerenti 
explicare velim, nescio.
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sounding recapitulation of the major findings originally propounded by McTaggart more than a
hundred years ago already.230 Insofar as both the A and B theories of “time” have been found to
be equally metaphysically bankrupt, our views certainly have this much in common. But there
are important respects in which the views argued for here differ to a significant degree from
those originally put forth by McTaggart—two of which, happen to be well worth pointing out.
First, despite all the erroneous characteristics of both the A and B Series, McTaggart still took the
C Series to, in some sense, be “real”; according to the arguments that have been presented here
however,  the C Series  is  understood to be just  one more erroneous view among the others,
characterizable in fact, as perhaps the primordial error, that gave rise to the other two theories of
time  (the  A  and  B  Series),231 and  which  itself  remains  the  consequence  of  a  distorted
misunderstanding,  and  tacit  spatialization,  of  time.232 Second,  McTaggart  implicitly  took  the
phenomenology of temporality to be essentially tensed or tenseless; but according to the line of
thought that has been laid out here233, such attempts to describe the phenomena of time in purely
tensed or tenseless terms, inevitably result in caricatures and “misperceptions” of what actually
and initially shows up or us phenomenologically; misperceptions that are themselves the result of
an unbridled attempt to try to force the phenomena of the everyday world into well-worn ready-
made conceptual ways of thinking about time, which understand it solely in terms of the ontico-
230 Indeed, given the way that the error theory has been characterized up to this point, there can be seen to be a lot of
agreement not only between it and McTaggart's own views, but also with the views of Bergson and Heidegger
vis-a-vis the traditional conception of time; so much so, that there begins to arise a detectable sense in which all
three of these early twentieth century thinkers (who are typically thought of as having held vastly disparate
views) in fact, shared a common interest in developing something like an “error theory of time” in the course of
providing their own idiosyncratic critiques of the accepted ways in which time has been traditionally understood
and handed down through the generations.
231 Cf. Chapter 2.
232 As McTaggart himself quite clearly put it, in the second volume of his Nature of Existence, “We … call this real
series by the name of the C Series.” The Nature of Existence. Volume II.  McTaggart. (1927) 213. A fatal error,
which arises from mistakenly equating time with merely a thinly conceived linear “order”.
233 Cf. Chapter 3.
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temporal—the traditional way of thinking about time that has arguably been with us ever since
the Ancient Greeks, but which McTaggart was unable to successfully extricate himself from.234
One helpful way to briefly sum up the major arguments that have appeared up to this
point in the dissertation, and how they have made possible our eventual arrival at proclaiming the
possibility of something like an error theory of A-B time to be true, is to understand what we
have  undertaken here as something akin to what might be considered a “deconstruction” of time.
A deconstruction which has proceeded by demonstrating the traditional conception of time to
consist of a metaphysics that is self-contradictory, and an ontology that remains ontologically
inadequate. Since serialized conceptions of time are seen to involve a tacit spatialization of time
(i.e. the prior identification with, or reduction of, time to space),235 and since the metaphysics of
presence  turns  out  to  be  necessary  precondition  for  time  to  be  considered  either  tensed  or
tenseless (i.e. for the tensed-tenseless distinction itself to arise erotetically),236 the central thesis
of the error theory of A-B time—that time is not a Series, and the ontology of time is neither
tensed nor tenseless—follows from the two additional theses, that time is not space (that is, it is
not identifiable with or reducible to space), but is something altogether different in kind,237 and a
rejection of the metaphysics of presence as a legitimate metaontological assumption,238 which
can be arrived at via a Heideggerian hermeneutic phenomenology of being on account of the
discoverable and extant modes of being of the ready-to-hand [Zuhandenheit]239 and Existence
[Existenz]240, that together demonstrate that it is not the case that the present-at-hand is anything
234 The Nature of Existence, McTaggart. 212.
235 Chapter 2.
236 Chapter 3.
237 Cf. Chapter 2; This is once again simply a background assumption that has been historically assumed by the
tradition. 
238 Cf. Chapter 3.
239 And by extension, “worldhood”.
240 And by extension, “the self”.
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like ontologically basic, or exhaustive of being.241 To persist in trying to hold onto this mistaken
belief and continue down the path of conceptualizing time in this traditional way, inevitably
leads to what Heidegger has identified as the “de-worlding” of the world, and the “leveling-
down”  of  the  subjectivity  of  the  subject  (i.e.  human  existence).  To be  human  (qua  Dasein)
however, is to require a world. 
One possible objection to all of this, that is worthy of consideration and worth responding
to, would be what has come to be known as “the argument from disastrous results”,242 which
typically goes something as follows:  “If the widespread acceptance of a view would lead to
disastrous results, then that view is false.  Widespread acceptance of the error theory of time
would lead to disastrous results. Therefore, the error theory of time is false.” 
Our way of responding to this objection is to begin by pointing out that the first premise
of the argument is just patently false. The truth of a theory does not depend on the results of
everyone's  embracing  it.243 In  addition,  while  it  may be  an  interesting  question  whether  the
second premise is true, we need not venture an opinion here on whether it is, 244 since the first
premise  of  the  argument  here  is  most  definitely  false.245 The  point  then  is  that  we  cannot
undermine the error theory by arguing that its popular acceptance would lead to the downfall of
civilization—even if it would.246 And this means that the claim that the error theory of A-B time
is false, based on the argument from disastrous results, is simply a non sequitur. Nicely summing
241 Or,  to  put  it  another  way,  what  this  comes  to  mean is  that  the  metaphysics  of  presence  (as  a  instance  of
ontological reductivism) turns out to be a nonstarter.
242 Once again, this argument, and the discussion which follows, has been drawn heavily from a discussion on the
more traditional moral version of error theory appearing in Shafer-Landau. Ibid., 309. 
243 Shafer-Landau. Ibid., 309.
244 Although  it  appears  to  involve  something  like  a  half-baked  version,  or  perhaps  even  something  like  an
“inversion”, of either argumentum ad populum (bandwagon) or the ad baculum fallacies. 
245 Shafer-Landau. Ibid., 309.
246 Shafer-Landau. Ibid., 309.
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up this point, Shafer-Landau carefully notes: 
Metaphysical theories try to tell us what the world is like. Such theories might contain some bitter
truths, ones that, if widely accepted, would lead to heartache, or loss of faith, or the breakdown of
longstanding customs and social practices (That's what makes them bitter.) At best, this might give
us some reason not to publicize these claims, but that is no reason to suppose that they are false.247
Since the central dogma of the A-B tradition turns out ironically (and counter-intuitively)
to be true, despite the fact that the actual metaphysical and ontological content of what it claims
seems  to  be  entirely  false,  the  error  theory  of  time  also  begins  to  shed  some light  on  the
phenomena of how the deployment of the traditional conception of time comes to be able to
function at times as a form of ideology (understood in the Critical Theorist/Marxist sense of the
term), insofar as the experience of encountering a metaphysical doctrine that is heralded and
paraded about as a “natural” or a “necessary” truth, but which nevertheless can be shown to be
rife with falsehoods and internal contradictions, is taken as a clue—or better, a telltale sign—that
one  is  dealing  with  ideology,  and  an  imagined  relation  to  the  real  conditions  of  existence.
Unfortunately, there will not be sufficient room here to provide a fully developed account of such
phenomena, although initial adumbrations of the way in which “time” can, and does function as
ideology can already be found in the early works of both Karl Marx and Heidegger.  As Marx
famously observed: 
If my own activity does not belong to me, if it is an alien, a coerced activity, to whom, then, does 
it belong? To a being other than me. Who is this being? … The alien being, to whom labour and 
the produce of labour belongs, in whose service labour is done and for whose benefit the produce 
of labour is provided, can only be man himself. … If his own activity is to him an unfree activity, 
then he is treating it as activity performed in the service, under the dominion, the coercion and the 
yoke of another man.248 
And as Heidegger noted: 
In  order  to speak in keeping with the ontological  character  of our theme here,  we must talk  
temporally about time. We wish to repeat temporally the question of what time is. Time is the  
247 Shafer-Landau. Ibid., 310.
248 Karl Marx. “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844”. The Marx-Engels Reader. Tucker. (1978) 77-78.
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'how'. If we inquire into what time is, then one may not cling prematurely to an answer (time is 
such and such), for this always means a 'what'. … Let us disregard the answer and repeat the  
question. What happened to the question? It has transformed itself. What is time? became the  
question: Who is time? More closely: are we ourselves time? Or closer still: am I my time? In this 
way I come closest to it, and if I understand the question correctly, it is then taken completely 
seriously. Such questioning is thus the most appropriate manner of access to and of dealing with 
time as in each case mine.249 
A more thoroughgoing examination of this phenomenon however, would include, among other
things, a detailed analysis of the alienation of human lived time by means of estranged labor; a
discussion of the manner in which the currently dominant technological understanding of being
enframes,  levels-down,  and “orders”  the  world,  and others  in  it,  as  merely standing reserve
[bestand]250; and an account of the measure of power that ruling class elites have historically
yielded from the practice of indoctrinating the lower, subjugated classes with versions of the
traditional  serialized  conception  of  “time”  to  ease  and  expedite  their  ability  to  administer,
regulate,  and  control  the  exploited  members  of  the  population,  and  keep  them  living  in
compliance with the status quo. 
§4.2
THE METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE ARGUMENTS PRESENTED AND
TURNING TOWARDS THE DESTRUKTION OF THE HISTORY OF ONTOLOGY
The metaphysical implications of the arguments that have been presented here are that the
metaphysics of time consists of neither the A nor B Series and that the traditional conception of
time251 is  false.  One  of  the  most  significant  implications  to  come  out  of  the  ontological
249 Der Begriff der Zeit. (1924).  Heidegger, The Concept of Time. McNeill Trans. (1992) 22.
Sehen wir nicht auf die Antwort, sondern wiederholen wir die Frage. Was geschah mit der Frage? Sie hat sich gewandelt. 
Was ist die Zeit? Wurde zur Frage: Wer ist die Zeit? Naher: sind wir selbst die Zeit? Oder noch naher: bin ich meine Zeit? 
Damit komme ich ihr am nachsten, und wenn ich die Frage recht verstehe, dann ist mit ihr alles ernst geworden. Also ist 
solches Fragen die angemessenste Zugangs- und Umgangsart mit der Zeit als mit der je meinigen.”
250 “Die Frage Nach der Technik”. Martin Heidegger. (1954). “The Question Concerning Technology”. Trans. David
Krell. Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings. 1976.
251 Being and Time, H412; H422.
100
argument252  is that it provides a critical first step in what can be seen as a serious attempt at
further developing the proposed second part of Heidegger's groundbreaking work in Being and
Time,  which he left unfinished, and which was to involve “the phenomenological destruction
(Destruktion) of the history of ontology, with the problematic of Temporality [Temporalität] as
our clue [Leitfaden]”.253 As Charles Guignon remarks, “Using the results of the first stage as its
clue or guideline, the historical stage is supposed to de-structure the history of ontology, 'staking
out the positive possibilities of that tradition,' until it arrives 'at those primordial experiences in
which we achieved our first ways of determining the nature of Being—the ways that have guided
us  ever  since'”.254 Guignon  further  notes,  that  “The  historical  reduction  or  'destruction'  is
designed to recover a deeper, more primordial sense of the temporality of Being which underlies
our  common-sense  misunderstanding  of  being  as  mere  presence.”255  As  it  was  originally
conceived by Heidegger, Being and Time was supposed to consist of two parts: 
Accordingly our treatment of the question of Being branches out into two distinct  tasks,  and our
treatise will thus have two parts:  Part One: the Interpretation of Dasein in terms of temporality,
and the explication of time as the transcendental  horizon for  the  question of  Being.  Part  Two:
basic  features  of  a  phenomenological  destruction  of  the  history  of  ontology,  with  the
problematic of Temporality as our clue.
Part One has three divisions
1. the preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein; 
2. Dasein and temporality; 
3. time and Being.
Part Two likewise has three divisions:
1. Kant's doctrine of schematism and time, as a preliminary stage in problematic of 
Temporality; 
2. The ontological foundation of Descartes' 'cogito sum', and how the medieval ontology  
has been taken over into the problematic of the 'res cogitans';
252 Although the sense in which this argument is taken to be “ontological” needs to first be distinguished from the
way in which ontological arguments have been traditionally understood. Traditionally, an “ontological argument”
is taken to be one that begins with “reason”, and with “nothing but analytic a priori and necessary premises”, the
argument appearing here however, begins with nothing of the sort, but begins instead with our “being-in-the-
world”,  and the ordinary concrete ways in which we cope and deal  with the world,  which is at once made
possible, and further reinforced by, the temporal particularity of our human existence. Ontological Arguments
and Belief in God . Graham Oppy. Cambridge UP, (2007).
253 Being and Time, H39. 
254 Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge, Guignon. (1983) 224; as well as Being and Time, H22. 
255 Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge, Ibid., 81.
101
3. Aristotle's essay on time, as providing a way of discriminating the phenomenal basis 
and limits of ancient ontology. 
As English translators of Being and Time, Macquarrie and Robinson point out, “Part Two and the
third division of Part One never appeared”.256 
Yet bearing all this  in mind, insofar as the proposed task for ontology is to seriously
remain one of Destruktion, in order to be able to ever accurately discern just what the positive
possibilities and contributions of the A-B tradition are, we must first critically acquire sufficient
distance from the old tensed-tenseless paradigm and its problematic ways of thinking, in order to
arrive at a position where we can properly reclaim what remains “positive” within that tradition.
As Heidegger himself had put the matter: 
The question of Being does not achieve its true concreteness until we have carried through the
process  of  destroying  the  ontological  tradition”;  [...]  “How  then,  are  we  to  define  the  time
which is manifest within the horizon of the circumspective concernful clock-using in which one
take's one's time? This time is that which is counted and which shows itself when one follows the
travelling  pointer,  counting  and  making  present  in  such  a  way  that  this  making-present
temporalizes itself in an ecstatical unity with the retaining and awaiting which are horizonally
open according to the “earlier” and “later”. This, however, is nothing else than an existential-
ontological interpretation of Aristotle's definition of “time” : τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ὃ χρόνος, ἄριθμος
κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὔστερον. “For this is time: that which is counted in the movement
which we encounter within the horizon of the earlier and later.” This definition may seem strange
at first glance; but if one defines the existential-ontological horizon from which Aristotle has taken
it, one sees that it is as 'obvious' as it at first seems strange, and has been genuinely derived. The
source  of  the  time  which  is  thus  manifest  does  not  become  a  problem  for  Aristotle.  His
Interpretation of time moves rather in the direction of the 'natural' way of understanding Being.
Yet because this very understanding and the Being which is thus understood have in principle been
made a problem for the investigation which lies before us, it is only after we have found a solution
for the question of Being that the Aristotelian analysis of time can be Interpreted thematically in
such a way that  it  may indeed gain some signification in principle,  if  the formulation of  this
question in ancient ontology, with all its critical limitations, is to be appropriated in a positive
manner.257
According to the analysis that has been presented here, the source [Ursprung] and genesis of the
traditional conception of time turns out, in the end, to be something like space [Gegend]. And if
the  early claims  in  Being and Time concerning the  transcendental  role  that  time  plays  with
256 Being and Time. Harper Collins, Macquarrie and Robinson Trans. (2008). 64.
257 Being and Time, H26; H421. 
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respect to being and “any understanding whatsoever of being”258 are taken to hold any water,
then the Western philosophical tradition, which has historically tended to interpret “being” in
terms of “substance” [οὐσία] and “presence” [Anwesenheit]259, turns out to be one that is based
upon a primordial spatialization of time and a fundamental misconstrual of time as a kind of
area,  region, or place [Gegend] (i.e.,  as a kind of “space”);  an historical development in the
history of Western thought which has led to the subsequent rise and continued dominance of an
ontology of the “object” [Gegendstand]. 
Interestingly, among contemporary Heideggerians, serious attempts at trying to further
develop and carry out Heidegger's original project are not all that commonly found. Rather, what
is typically found, is the curious practice of simply talking a bit about what the original project
(and the second part) of Being and Time was supposed to include,260 pointing out that Heidegger
himself was unsuccessful at completing it, and then just leaving it at that, and with the help of
some hand-waiving, quickly moving on to another (and quite often, needlessly turgid) discussion
about something else; a peculiar practice, which leaves one with the impression of wondering
whatever was the point of even bringing it up in the first place. For some unfortunate reason,
there  has  been  (and  remains)  a  widespread  penchant  among  philosophers—and  among
Heideggerian scholars especially—for simply citing what the master has said, and leaving it at
that; for merely passing the word along; for being thorough, yet at the same time otiose.
What is more, it could also be averred here that much of what explains Heidegger's own
failure to successfully carry out to completion the primary aim of his magnum opus, and why he
was ultimately forced to abandon its central project, has much to do with the fact that he failed to
258 Being and Time, H1. 
259 Being and Time, H225. 
260 As we ourselves have just done.
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fully  appreciate  and  take  seriously  enough,  Bergson's  central  insight  with  regard  to  the
spatialization of time.261 While Bergson's views do have their shortcomings,262 from what has
been shown here however, they nevertheless can be seen to have been on the right track.263 Going
against  what  has  become,  and largely maintained itself  as,  the  received view within  current
Heideggerian scholarship, a view which tends to underscore only the differences that are to be
found between Heidegger's and Bergson's writings on time (and this, only on those infrequent
occasions  where  Bergson  has  not  been  overlooked  entirely),  one  could  argue  that  much  of
Heidegger's own progress and indeed his inspiration for working on the question of time is owed
largely (much like Sartre after him) to an initial exposure to Bergsonian ideas, which helped
orient him at the start, and point him in the right direction.264 Bergson was among the first to
glimpse the possibility of thinking time non-spatially. Heidegger, on the other hand, was among
the first to successfully recover the possibility of thinking about time in non-serialized terms.
Both  however,  ultimately  came  to  be  unsuccessful  with  regard  to  their  respective  grander
projects,  though for different  reasons.  Bergson was unable to find a way to sufficiently free
himself  from thinking in the traditional terms of serialized time265,  and as a result,  ended up
pinning all his hopes of being able to provide a positive conception of non-spatialized time on
the strong insistence and rigid requirement that there be a hard and fast, and well discernible,
261 See, Being and Time, H18, H333. 
262 To Heidegger's eyes, Bergson's failure was due in large part to his inability to think time radically enough, as he
took Bergson's treatment of non-quantitative non-juxtaposed time to be just one more variant of the “traditional
conception of time”, writing: “Bergson's view of time too has obviously arisen from an Interpretation of the
Aristotelian essay on time.” And insofar as it remains possible to construe Bergson's positive conception of time
as durée as nothing more than just a colorful description of succession occurring within a Series, then Heidegger
appears to have been right. Being and Time, H26; H432nxxx.
263 Being and Time. Ibid., H47.
264 For textual evidence of this, compare Heidegger's Being and Time, (1927), and some of his other earlier works,
such as The Concept of Time, (1924), with Bergson's Time and Free Will, (1889). 
265 And because of this, Heidegger's characterization of Bergson in Being and Time as just one more member of a
tradition that stretches all the way back to Aristotle, is at least partly correct (H26; H432nxxx). 
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distinction between the serialized notions of juxtaposition and succession, and opting to equate
“time” (à la durée) with the latter variety.266 And despite the preponderance of ingenuity and
unparallelled originality that characterizes Heidegger's account at the start,  his own failure to
fully appreciate significance and metaphysical import of Bergson's primary insights with respect
to the perils of spatialized time267 and find a way to incorporate them seamlessly into his own
thinking, eventually led him to reintroduce a spatialized “temporal” ontology right around the
point where he was well-poised to distance himself furthest from all of the traditional ways of
thinking about time that had come before him; and adding to this irony, he did so in precisely
those areas where he had already begun to make the most progress on the issue of “being and
time”, and the question of the latter's relation to former, namely, within his account of “ecstatic
temporality” and of “world-time”. 
Despite all the ingenuity and profundity that characterizes Division I of Being and Time,
in Division II, Heidegger comes to analyze his account of ecstatic temporality (time understood
through the lens of authentic subjectivity) in terms of “being alongside”, “beings towards”, and
“having beenness”268, and his account of world-time (time as understood against a backdrop of
266 And so given the metaphysical import of his own original insight regarding spatialized time this is what largely
helps to explain why his project became doomed to failure in the end.
267 We necessarily express  ourselves  by means of  words and we usually think in terms of  space.  …  
Nevertheless it is generally agreed to regard time as an unbounded medium, different from space 
but homogenous like the latter: the homogenous is supposed to take two forms, according as its 
contents co-exist or follow one another. It is true that, when we make time a homogenous medium 
in which conscious states unfold themselves, we take it to be given all at once, which amounts to 
saying that we abstract it from duration. This simple consideration ought to warn us that we are 
thus unwittingly falling back upon space, and really giving up time. Bergson, Time and Freewill 
(1889).
Nous nous exprimons nécessairement par des mots, et nous pensons le plus souvent dans l'espace. … Néanmoins on  
s'accorde à envisager le temps comme un milieu indéfini, différent de l'espace, mais homogène comme lui : l'homogène 
revêtirait ainsi une double forme, selon qu'une coexistence ou une succcession le remplit. Il est vrai que lorsqu'on fait du 
temps un milieu homogène où les états de conscience paraissent se dérouler, on se le donne par là même tout d'un coup, ce 
qui revient à dire qu'on le soustrait  à la  durée. Cette simple réflexion devrait  nous avertir que nous retombons alors  
inconsciemment sur l'espace.”  Essai sur les Données Immédiates de la Conscience. Bergson 1889. Avant-Propos, 74.
268 Being and Time, H325-326. 
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teleology/normativity)  along  the  lines  of  the  “now”,  the  “then”,  and  the  “on  the  former
occasion”269,  analyses  which  continue  to  be  readily  and  fairly  easily  mappable  onto  the
traditional conception of time (i.e. “time” conceived as a species of space, and the very sort of
thing that these analyses were supposed to “distance” us from) that happens to be constituted by
the  “now”,  the  “not  yet”,  and  the  “no  longer”  and  treats  time  merely  as  a  sequence  of
“nows”270(and, as we have also seen, gives rise to the problematic temporal ontologies of tensed
A properties and tenseless B relations). Despite the considerable advances that he had made with
respect to the extraordinarily difficult and demanding task of trying to understand time, non-
serially,  Heidegger  eventually  stumbles,  by failing  to  fully  appreciate  and  successfully  heed
Bergson's previous admonitions to those aspiring to undertake a serious investigation of time,
and  instead,  bases  his  account  of  these  contexts  largely  upon  the  concept  of  tense,  which
effectively spatializes his overall account of time in the end, and dampens much of the progress
he  had initially  made  by readmitting  the  traditional  serialized  approach  back  into  his  basic
understanding of time. 
Since, just like the rest of the tradition that he was in the process of providing a massively
ambitious critique of, Heidegger ultimately continued to advocate the simple, basic, and common
assumption that “time is not a kind of space”271, so too, like the rest of the tradition, does his own
account  of  time  ultimately  come  to  result  to  an  extent  in  confusion  and  contradiction.  In
particular, in Division II where his account makes an unwise appeal to the problematic272 concept
of tense during its attempt to provide a more focused and thematized discussion of the nature of
time. In certain places, Heidegger himself appears to have been vaguely aware of this troubled
269 Being and Time, H406-407. 
270 Being and Time, H421.
271 Being and Time, H18.
272 A concept which lies at the heart of the crisis of traditional metaphysics. Cf. Chapter 2.
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outcome,  which  continued  to  loom  just  on  the  horizon273,  and  which  he  was  struggling
desperately at certain times to avoid, writing: 
If the expressions 'before' and 'already' were to have a time-oriented [zeithafte] signification such
as this {'not yet now—but later'; 'no longer now—but earlier'} (and they can have this signification
too), then to say that care has temporality would be to say that it is something which is 'earlier' and
'later', 'not yet' and 'no longer'. Care would then be conceived as an entity which occurs and runs
its course 'in time'. The Being of an entity having the character of Dasein would become something
present-at-hand. If this sort of thing is impossible, then any time-oriented signification {zeithafte
Bedeutung} which the expressions we have mentioned may have, must be different from this.274 
However, despite his becoming vaguely aware of the problem, Heidegger remained unable to
successfully plot a course out of this pressing situation because of his failure (clearly illustrated
here) to properly identify traditional tensed and tenseless significations of “earlier”, “later”, “not
yet”,  and “no longer”,  etc.  (i.e.,  A properties  and B relations),  not  as  a  species  of  zeithafte
Bedeutungen  (time-oriented  significations),  but  of  something  that  would  be  much  more
accurately referred to as Gegend-hafte Bedeutungen von Zeit (i.e., space-oriented significations
of time).
Despite his failure to successfully root out “space” [Gegend] from his own account of
time, Heidegger had nevertheless still gone further than anyone before him (including Bergson)
in  mapping  out  (if  only  inadvertently)  what  some  of  the  detrimental  consequences  for  our
understanding  of  time—and  by  extension,  the  world  and  ourselves—turn  out  to  be,  when
operating  only  within  the  narrow  and  restrictive  confines  of  a  spatialized  understanding  of
“time”: 
When space is discovered non-circumspectively by just looking at it, the environmental regions
[Gegenden] get neutralized to pure dimensions. Places and indeed the whole circumspectively  
oriented totality of places belonging to equipment ready-to-hand—get reduced to a multiplicity of
positions for random Things. The spatiality of what is ready-to-hand within-the-world loses its
involvement-character, and so does the ready-to-hand. The world loses its specific aroundness; the
environment becomes the world of Nature. The 'world', as a totality of equipment ready-to-hand, 
becomes spatialized [veräumlicht] to a context of extended Things which are just present-at-hand 
273 Being and Time, H112.
274 Being and Time, H327. The words occurring in the braces have been added for emphasis.
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and no more. The homogenous space of Nature shows itself only when the entities we encounter
are discovered in such a way that  the worldly character  of the ready-to-hand gets specifically
deprived of its worldhood.275
Through the spatialization of time, the world's organic holism of significance and meaning, its
normativity, and teleology, as well as our own basic human capacity for authenticity, begins to
become drained from the world, leaving us with an increasingly enervated grasp and narrow
calculative  view of  metaphysical  reality.  Indeed,  by the  Winter  of  1941,  Heidegger  himself
finally begins to explicitly admit that, 
The modern habit of thinking time together with “space” (already prefigured in the beginning of
metaphysics  with  Aristotle)  leads  us  astray.  For  according  to  this  way  of  thinking  time  is
considered  solely in  terms of  its  extension,  and  this  as  a  counting up of  fleeting now-points.
Thought in modern terms, time is a parameter, like space, a standard scale according to which
something is measured and estimated. Space and time are essentially related to “calculation”.276
Some commentators, such as the late Bert Dreyfus, have tried at times to accentuate the
separation between Heidegger's work in the two Divisions of  Being and Time,  treating them
separately and focusing almost exclusively on the first, while treating the second with what at
times seem to be almost dismissive airs, claiming that the ideas presented there are left confused
and inchoate, etc. Those that are inclined to follow Dreyfus' lead in doing so, frequently cite the
historical fact that at the time it was being written, the book was being rushed for publication, in
order to try and further lend these views more credence. And while to a certain extent they are
right, and Division II does have its failings (as we have shown here), there is however, in the
course of Heidegger's discussion of time in Division II, also much that is well worth salvaging,
and which should not be so quickly dispensed with, or so readily overlooked. A few examples of
these would be (i) the call for a critique of the traditional conception of time (“time as a series of
nows”; or χρόνος), (ii) the project of providing a genealogy of the lineage of this conception of
275 Being and Time, H112. See also, Chapter 3.
276 Heidegger, Basic Concepts. (Gesmtausgabe, vol. 51). Gary Aylesworth Trans. (1993).
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time through Bergson, Hegel, Kant, Descartes, and all the way back to Aristotle's Physics IV, and
(iii) the provision of a clearing through which we can come to better understand how time can
come to have authentic, teleological, normative, and transcendental aspects; are but just a few.277 
Arguably  however,  it  is  Heidegger's  use  of  world-time  [Weltzeit]  to  translate  the
Presocratic temporal notion of αἰὼν in his lectures of 1929-30, taken together with a recognition
of the primary ontological role that world-time plays with respect to being (in contrast to merely
derivative one played by the traditional conception of “time” as a Series of nows [χρόνος] which,
following Plato and Aristotle, has historically supplied most of the framework for interpreting the
meaning of “temporality”) provides perhaps the clearest, most crystalline glimpse that has yet
been  provided  since  the  Presocratics,  of  a  non-serialized,  non-spatialized  understanding  of
time.278  Understanding time as αἰὼν enables us to better capture the organic thickness (i.e. the
teleological  and  normative  dimensions)  of  time,  and  the  fact  (repeatedly  overlooked  by the
tradition) that it involves something much more like an organization, as opposed to just a thinly
conceived linear “order” modeled on, and mappable to, some idealized vestige of quantifiable
space. 
All  this  having  been  said,  and  notwithstanding  the  shortcomings  of  this  account,
Heidegger had still progressed further than any other modern thinker before him in providing one
of the most illuminating accounts of time and temporal phenomena to ever have been given; with
perhaps the partial exception of Kant. As Heidegger himself notes: 
The first and only person who has gone any stretch of the way towards investigating the dimension
of Temporality [Temporalität] or has let himself be drawn hither by the coercion of the phenomena
themselves  is  Kant.  Only when  we  have  established  the  problematic  of  Temporality,  can  we
succeed in casting light on the obscurity of his doctrine of the schematism. But this will also show
277 Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time Division I. Dreyfus, MIT Press. (1991).  
278 Heidegger, Die Grundbegriffe  der  Metaphysik.  Welt-Endlichkeit-Einsamkeit,  ed.  F._w. Von Hermann (1983),
lectures of 1929-30. 414.
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us why this area is one which had to remain closed off to him in its real dimensions and its central
ontological function. Kant himself was aware that we he was venturing into an area of obscurity:
'This schematism of our understanding as regards appearances and their mere form is an art hidden
in the depths of the human soul, the true devices of which are hardly ever to be divined from
Nature and laid uncovered before our eyes.' (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 1781. 180f.) Here Kant
shrinks back, as it were, in the face of something which must be brought to light as a theme and a
principle if the expression “being” is to have any demonstrable meaning. In the end, those very
phenomena  which  will  be  exhibited  under  the  heading  of  'Temporality'  [Temporalität]  in  our
analysis, are precisely those most covert judgments of the 'common reason' for which Kant says it
is the 'business of philosophers' to provide an analytic.279 
But before coming to largely discard the central project of Being and Time as it was originally
conceived,280 Heidegger nevertheless still advances far enough in his preliminary investigation to
leave us with a promising clue as to how to go about answering the question of time. Having
taken an initial cue from Kant, who had written extensively on the subject, Heidegger eventually
arrives at the auspicious suggestion that we should begin by thinking time transcendentally,281 but
in a way, that interprets it not merely as an a priori precondition for any possible object282 of
experience283 (as Kant had),284 but as an even broader, and even more radical adaptation of this
basic Kantian insight, with its transcendental role expanded and amplified to become even more
comprehensive so as to provide the limit and background for any285 understanding of being in the
first place; that is, to understand “time as the transcendental horizon for the question of being.” 286
279 Being and Time, H23.
280 Which again, as has been suggested here, was the inevitable result of his failure at key points to keep his own
thought from reverting and collapsing back into a spatialization of time. Being and Time, H39-40. 
281 Being and Time, H1; H25; H437. 
282 À la the metaphysics of presence. 
283 Immanuel Kant. The Critique of Pure Reason. [Kritik der reinen Vernunft] (1781) Paul Guyer Trans. ed. 2008.
B50. See especially, Kant's “Transcendental Doctrine of the Power of Judgment and the Schematism of the Pure
Concepts of the Understanding” (B176-B187); and it is  noteworthy (cf. the arguments of §2) that the Kantian
“Transcendental  Aesthetic”  begins  first,  with  space  (of  all  things),  and  that  the  treatment  of  “time” which
follows, remains one where “time” gets characterized and distinguished for the most part simply by way of a
qualification of this same, initial (spatial) starting point. B37; B50.  
284 Heidegger himself remarks, “[Kant's] analysis remained oriented towards the traditional way in which time had
been ordinarily understood; in the long run this kept him from working out the phenomenon of a 'transcendental
determination of time' [transzendentalen Zeitbestimmung] in its own structure and function”.  Being and Time,
H24. 
285 Including, for example, that of worlds and selves, in addition to that of only objectified present-at-hand entities.
286 [Zeit als des transzendentalen Horizontes der Frage nach dem Sein.] Being and Time, H39.
110
Heidegger notes, correctly it seems, that time is not itself a being287, writing: 
Time is not the kind of being that befits some entity that is merely-present. It simply “is” not; its
being is  not  a  determinate kind of  being,  it  is  not  the being of  some entity.  Rather  it  is  the
condition of the possibility of the fact that there is being (not entities). Time does not have the
kind of being of any other thing; rather time [constantly]  unfolds [zeitigt]. And this unfolding
constitutes the temporality of time.288
The clue however, that Heidegger leaves us with for coming up with a satisfactory  answer to the
question  of  time  and  of  ontology,  lies  in  the  transcendental  formal  indication  [Formaler
Anzeige]289  of  time  as  “Temporalität”.  Where  the  idea  of  a  “formal  indication”  [Formaler
Anzeige], as Bert Dreyfus had plainly put it, is just: 
The idea that we've got to start somewhere. And so we begin by specifying that this is the essence
of such and such, but only provisionally, so that further investigation may call it into question. And
it is only at the end of our investigation that we will either discover that we got it wrong, or that
we had the right to say that.290
As Heidegger writes:
The fact  remains that  time,  in  the  sense of  'being [sein]  in  time',  functions as  a  criterion for
distinguishing realms of being. Hitherto no one has asked or troubled to investigate how time has
come to have this distinctive ontological function, or with what right anything like time functions
as such a criterion; nor has anyone asked whether the authentic ontological relevance which is
possible for it, gets expressed when “time” is used in so näively ontological a manner. 'Time' has
acquired this 'self-evident' ontological function 'of its own accord', so to speak; indeed it has done
so within the horizon of the way it is ordinarily understood. And it has maintained itself in this
function. In contrast to all this, our treatment of the question of the meaning of being must enable
us to show that  the central problematic of all ontology is rooted in the phenomenon of time, if
rightly  seen and rightly  explained,  and we must  show  how this is  the case.  If  being is  to be
conceived  in  terms  of  time,  and  if,  indeed,  its  various  modes  and  derivatives  are  to  become
intelligible in their respective modifications and derivations by taking time into consideration, then
being itself (and not merely entities, let us say, as entities 'in time') is thus made visible in its
'temporal' character.291
287 “Temporality 'is' not an  entity at all. It is not, but  temporalizes itself.” [Die Zeitlichkeit »ist«  überhaupt kein
Seiendes. Sie ist nicht, sondern zeitigt sich.] Being and Time, H328.
288 An observation which makes the very prospect of an attempt to provide something like an “ontology of time”,
begin to sound rather suspect, and perhaps something which should itself be called into question. Also, well
worth noting here, would be the patent, dual influences of both Kantian and Bergsonian thought on Heidegger
concerning this point. Heidegger's Lectures of Winter Semester 1925-26 Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit,
ed. W. Biemel (1976) / Logic: The Question of Truth. Trans. Thomas Sheehan. 2010. 338. 
289 For a quick but thorough discussion of Heidegger's use of formal indications, in his early years, see “Heidegger's
Method: Philosophical Concepts as Formal Indications.” Dan Dahlstrom. Vol 47, no. 4 (June) 1994 The Review
of Metaphysics. 775-795.
290 Dreyfus, Hubert. Berkeley Lectures (Fall 2007). 
291 Being and Time, H18. 
Das Faktum besteht: Zeit, im Sinne von »in der Zeit sein«, fungiert als Kriterium der Scheidung von Seinsregionen. Wie
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And adding further:
[T]he  way in  which  being  and  its  modes  and  characteristics  have  their  meaning  determined
primordially in terms of time, is  what we shall  call  its  “Temporal” determinateness.  Thus the
fundamental ontological task of interpreting being as such includes working out the Temporality of
being.  In  the  exposition  of  the  problematic  of  Temporality [Temporalität]  the  question of  the
meaning of being will first be concretely answered.292
Considerations such as these, coupled with careful phenomenological investigations of both the
world  and  of  human  Existence—which  afford  us  with  a  broader  and  more  thoroughgoing
examination  of  these  phenomena  (and  by extension,  of  being  itself)  than  either  the  natural
sciences or traditional philosophy have been capable of providing on their own—supply us with
strong evidence  and reasons  for  understanding  time metaphysically,  not  as  “the  measure  or
dimension  of  change”293 as  has  traditionally  been  the  case294,  but  rather—and  much  more
die Zeit zu dieser ausgezeichneten ontologischen Funktion kommt und gar mit welchem Recht gerade so etwas wie Zeit als
solches Kriterium fungiert und vollends, ob in dieser naiv ontologischen Verwendung der Zeit ihre eigentliche mögliche
ontologische Relevanz zum Ausdruck kommt, ist bislang weder gefragt, noch untersucht worden. Die »Zeit« ist, und zwar
im Horizont des vulgären Zeitverständnisses, gleichsam »von selbst« in diese »selbstverständliche« ontologische Funktion
geraten und hat sich bis heute darin gehalten. Demgegenüber ist auf dem Boden der ausgearbeiteten Frage nach dem Sinn
von Sein zu zeigen,  daƺ und wie im rechtgesehenen und rechtexplizizierten Phänomen der Zeit die znetrale Problematik
aller Ontologie verwurzelt ist. Wenn Sein aus der Zeit begriffen werden soll und die verschiedenen Modi und Derivate von
Sein in ihren Modifikationen un Derivationen in der Tat aus dem Hinblick auf Zeit verständlich werden, dann ist damit das
Sein selbst – nicht etwa nur Seiendes als »in der Zeit« Seiendes, in seinem »zeitlichen« Charakter sichtbar gemacht. 
292 Being and Time, H19. 
[…]  nennen  wir  die  ursprüngliche  Sinnbestimmtheit  des  Seins  und  seiner  Charaktere  und  Modi  aus  der  Zeit  seine
temporale Bestimmtheit. Die fundamentale ontologische Aufgabe der Interpretation von Sein als solehem begreift daher in
sich die Herausarbeitung der  Temporalität des Seins. In der Exposition der Problematik der Temporalität ist allerest die
konkrete Antwort auf die Frage nach dem Sinn des Seins gegeben. 
293 This is interpretation which, given the traditional understanding of substance  [οὐσία] that been passed down
through the ages as “that which persists through change”, can be seen to provide the a priori preconditions only
for the possibility of substance ontologies (broadly construed). As Heidegger himself had penetratingly observed:
...[T]he Greeks have managed to interpret being in this way [as presence “οὐσία”] without any explicit knowledge of the
clues which  function  here,  without  any acquaintance  with  the  fundamental  ontological  function  of  time  or  even  any
understanding of it, and without any insight into the reason why this function is possible. On the contrary, they take time
itself  as  one  entity  among  other  entities,  and  try  to  grasp  it  in  the  structure  of  its  being,  though  that  way  of
understanding being which they have taken as their horizon is one which is itself naïvely and inexplicitly oriented towards
time. Being and Time, H26.  
294 And in a manner, which we may now begin to see, suggests that “time”, understood merely as χρόνος, is perhaps
nothing more than just a transcendental illusion, that has been brought about not by an attempt to go beyond
(transcend) “the limits of possible experience”, but by being fundamentally mistaken from the outset (on account
of  its  own distorted  metaontological  background assumptions),  about  just  what  those  “limits”  initially  are.
Critique  of  Pure  Reason.  Immanuel  Kant.  Paul  Guyer  Trans.  ed.  (2008).  B35-B355.  A  rejection  of  the
metaphysics of presence enables us to begin to see through traditional spatialized distortions of time (like the
SER thesis), and reclaim an understanding of temporality that is appreciative of time's ability to show up in our
everyday lives as an inherently thick (i.e.  a teleological,  normative,  significant,  and at  times, authentic,  and
value-laden)  phenomenon,  as  opposed  to  merely a  thin  (spatial/quantitative)  one,  to  see  time  as  involving
something  more  like  an  organic  organization  of  being,  as  opposed  to  providing  just  a  linearly  construed
cosmological “order” of objects, and to understand time in the positive sense, as more accurately depicted by
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accurately  and  profoundly—as  “the  possible  horizon  for  any  understanding  of  being,
whatsoever”.295 
something like αἰὼν {Weltzeit; Zeit zu}, as opposed to χρόνος, a conception of “time” which seeks to reduce the
sole purpose of time to the subservient one of merely tracking the “changes” (by means of a “When?”) that are
taken to be discoverable among substances [οὐσία]. All of which, then further enables us to begin the arduous
process of trying to progress beyond the narrow traditional, one-sided, reductive, and objectifying approaches to
“time” and “being”, which have historically led us down the path of the de-worlding of  the world and the
leveling-down of the subject (human existence), and to begin an earnest pursuit and serious development of an
ontology of the world and the existing human self.
295 [...Zeit als des möglichen Horizontes eines jeden Seins-verständnisses überhaupt...] H1.
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